Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects .NET malicious payloads associated with the StealC info-stealer by identifying anti-debugging and anti-analysis routines. The rule specifically looks for the usage of System.Diagnostics.Debugger methods (IsAttached, IsLogging), native debugger presence checks (IsDebuggerPresent, CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent), and Environment.FailFast usage, often in combination with obfuscation markers like ConfuserEx.
Detects the creation of a specifically named shortcut (.lnk) file in the Windows Startup directory, a common persistence mechanism used by StealC/ClickFix malware variants.
Detects the suspicious sequential execution of the 'wevtutil cl' command to clear multiple critical Windows Event Log channels, including security, system, and application logs. This behavior is indicative of anti-forensic activities performed by adversaries, such as the Settra ransomware, to hinder incident response and forensic analysis.
Detects the use of PowerShell to load .NET assemblies directly from memory or via Base64/encoded streams. This technique is commonly used by malicious payloads to execute shellcode, reflection-based attacks, or obfuscated scripts while minimizing their on-disk footprint.
Detects successful user authentication events originating from an external source IP address. This rule is intended to identify remote logins that can be correlated with RMM (Remote Monitoring and Management) activity or other remote access patterns.
Detects the use of AI assistant command-line interfaces (such as Claude, GitHub Copilot, or Gemini) to execute git checkout commands with specific commit hashes or references like FETCH_HEAD. This behavior may indicate an attempt to use automated AI tooling to stage or interact with repository code, which could be part of an automated exfiltration or unauthorized code modification attempt.
Detects the execution of a local git force-push operation, which is a technique used by an adversary to overwrite existing repository tags or branches during a software supply chain compromise or repository takeover scenario.
Detects file hash hits matching known malicious IOCs or network connections to suspicious domains/URLs.
Detects file hash hits matching known malicious IOCs or network connections to suspicious domains/URLs.
Detects file hash hits matching known malicious IOCs or network connections to suspicious domains/URLs.
Detects the presence of the known vulnerable GIGABYTE driver (gdrv.sys) used in Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) attacks to bypass security controls and facilitate kernel-mode execution, as associated with Settra ransomware campaigns.
Detects the creation of shortcut files (.lnk) within the current user's Startup folder using Windows command line utilities or scripts that leverage the WScript.Shell COM object. This behavior is indicative of an adversary establishing persistence to ensure malicious payloads execute upon user logon.
Detects unauthorized processes attempting to access sensitive browser data files, specifically 'Login Data' (passwords) and 'Cookies' for Google Chrome and Microsoft Edge. The rule excludes the browser applications themselves and their update processes to minimize noise.
This rule monitors endpoint telemetry for occurrences of known malicious file hashes, C2 IP addresses, and C2 domains. It aggregates file creation/modification events, process execution, and network connections to detect activity associated with known malicious entities.
This rule monitors endpoint telemetry for occurrences of known malicious file hashes, C2 IP addresses, and C2 domains. It aggregates file creation/modification events, process execution, and network connections to detect activity associated with known malicious entities.
Detects the execution of PowerShell commands containing indicators of AMSI or ETW unhooking (e.g., references to amsi.dll, AmsiScanBuffer, EtwEventWrite, or VirtualProtect). This activity is commonly associated with attackers attempting to bypass endpoint security telemetry and antimalware scanning mechanisms prior to executing malicious payloads.
Detects execution of PowerShell commands containing suspicious arguments (e.g., encoded commands, download cradles) initiated by scheduled task binaries (svchost.exe, taskeng.exe, schtasks.exe) or involving specific suspicious strings associated with identified threat activity.
Detects execution of PowerShell commands containing suspicious arguments (e.g., encoded commands, download cradles) initiated by scheduled task binaries (svchost.exe, taskeng.exe, schtasks.exe) or involving specific suspicious strings associated with identified threat activity.
Detects execution of PowerShell commands containing suspicious arguments (e.g., encoded commands, download cradles) initiated by scheduled task binaries (svchost.exe, taskeng.exe, schtasks.exe) or involving specific suspicious strings associated with identified threat activity.
This rule detects potential malicious activity by matching endpoint file events against a known list of malicious file hashes (SHA256, SHA1, MD5) and monitoring for connections to known malicious domains or URLs.
Detects the execution of command-line tools (powershell, cmd, bash, curl, etc.) originating from common package managers and build tools (npm, node, pip, python, yarn). The rule flags these processes if they contain command-line arguments indicative of suspicious activity such as base64-encoded commands, remote script execution (IEX, curl/wget to shell), or indicators of persistence mechanisms (scheduled tasks, registry Run keys).
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