Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects Microsoft 365 Exchange MailItemsAccessed operations performed by a specific ClientAppId and AppId known to be associated with an exfiltration toolkit. This activity indicates unauthorized access to mail items, consistent with data harvesting efforts.
Detects anomalous SharePoint search activity that uses 'indexdocid' queries targeting specific site or web content classes. This pattern is often indicative of automated reconnaissance or enumeration of documents within a SharePoint environment, potentially attempting to bypass standard UI navigation to identify or access sensitive content.
Detects high-volume or systematic SharePoint search queries performed by a single user, specifically looking for indicators of data discovery activities such as searching for SharePoint sites, web structures, or iterating through document IDs which may suggest an adversary attempting to map or identify sensitive data within the environment.
This rule identifies potential automated activity by monitoring for specific HTTP User-Agents (e.g., Python requests, Microsoft Graph client) associated with file and mail access events. It groups by UserId and UserAgent to detect anomalous patterns that may indicate unauthorized data access or interaction by automated tools or scripts.
This rule correlates the receipt of a potential extortion-themed email (containing keywords related to ransom, bitcoin, or data leaks and mentioning cloud platforms like SharePoint, OneDrive, or Box) with a subsequent bulk access event of mail items by the same recipient using a specific client application identifier. This pattern is indicative of an attacker attempting to extort a user or organization following the unauthorized exfiltration or access of sensitive email data stored in cloud services.
Detects high-frequency access to mail items via specific client applications, or high-frequency file downloads/access within SharePoint and OneDrive. These patterns may indicate suspicious data collection or exfiltration attempts by a compromised account.
Detects high-volume, diverse administrative and discovery activities in cloud environments, including SharePoint site enumeration, Azure AD user/identity discovery, and suspicious access to mail items via specific client applications, potentially indicating post-compromise reconnaissance or data harvesting.
This rule monitors for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the threat actor SideCopy and their associated malware, such as ReverseRAT. It hunts for specific malicious SHA256 file/process hashes, connections to known malicious C2 infrastructure (IPs and domains), requests to known malicious URLs, and user interaction with these URLs via email clicks.
This rule monitors for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the threat actor SideCopy and their associated malware, such as ReverseRAT. It hunts for specific malicious SHA256 file/process hashes, connections to known malicious C2 infrastructure (IPs and domains), requests to known malicious URLs, and user interaction with these URLs via email clicks.
This rule monitors for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the threat actor SideCopy and their associated malware, such as ReverseRAT. It hunts for specific malicious SHA256 file/process hashes, connections to known malicious C2 infrastructure (IPs and domains), requests to known malicious URLs, and user interaction with these URLs via email clicks.
This rule monitors for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the threat actor SideCopy and their associated malware, such as ReverseRAT. It hunts for specific malicious SHA256 file/process hashes, connections to known malicious C2 infrastructure (IPs and domains), requests to known malicious URLs, and user interaction with these URLs via email clicks.
This rule monitors for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the threat actor SideCopy and their associated malware, such as ReverseRAT. It hunts for specific malicious SHA256 file/process hashes, connections to known malicious C2 infrastructure (IPs and domains), requests to known malicious URLs, and user interaction with these URLs via email clicks.
This rule detects incoming email messages containing .zip attachments with filenames that mimic financial documents (e.g., NFe, DANFE, invoice-related keywords) combined with numerical strings. This naming pattern is commonly associated with phishing campaigns attempting to deliver malicious archives.
This rule detects network and email activity associated with a list of known suspicious or 'ghost' domains. It monitors email sender and recipient addresses, email URL links, and DNS query logs for matches against the predefined domain list, identifying potential spearphishing or command-and-control communication.
Detects repeated MFA authentication failures for specific Microsoft applications (like OfficeHome, My Apps, My Sign-Ins) from the same user and source IP, typically indicative of an MFA fatigue (prompt bombing) attack. The rule identifies multiple authentication failures or interruptions (ErrorCode 50074 or 50140) from unmanaged or unregistered devices, which suggests an adversary attempting to force a user to approve an MFA request.
This rule detects potential OAuth token theft resulting from device code phishing (e.g., N0va phishkit). It monitors for a successful OAuth device-code authentication followed within 5 minutes by a secondary successful sign-in for the same user from a different IP address, different browser client, or different user agent, which is a common indicator of an adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) session hijacking attempt.
This rule detects phishing emails where the sender's display name impersonates well-known brands (e.g., Microsoft, DocuSign, Zoom) while using a non-official domain. It further correlates these suspicious senders with embedded URLs that either match the targeted brands' domains or contain patterns commonly associated with device code phishing or API verification workflows.
Detects potential device code phishing activity by identifying users who successfully perform a device code authentication flow shortly before registering a new device in Azure AD. This pattern is indicative of an adversary tricking a user into authenticating a malicious device to the victim's account.
Detects phishing emails containing lures that direct users to the Microsoft device login portal to enter an attacker-supplied code. The rule correlates the delivery of these emails with subsequent successful device-code based authentication events, identifying potential token theft via the OAuth device code flow.
Detects inbound emails containing an '.r01' attachment (often associated with multi-part RAR archives) where both SPF and DMARC authentication checks have failed, and the email subject implies business-related themes like purchase orders or supply chain communication. This pattern is indicative of a spearphishing attempt.
Detects anomalous, high-volume file access or download activity in Microsoft SharePoint Online or OneDrive for Business originating from a 'python-httpx' user agent. This pattern often indicates automated data collection or exfiltration attempts using programmatic tools.
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