Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects suspicious application consent activity in Azure AD. It identifies instances where a user successfully grants consent to three or more applications within a one-hour window. This behavior can indicate an adversary attempting to gain access to resources by tricking users into consenting to malicious applications.
This rule detects HTTP traffic directed to 'management.azure.com' with a URI containing 'runCommand'. This pattern indicates an attempt to execute a command on an Azure Virtual Machine using the Azure Run Command feature. This activity is often associated with administrative actions or potential malicious execution on cloud resources.
Detects an unusual volume of 'Logging' or 'Monitor' operations within Azure Activity logs from a single caller within an hour. This could indicate an adversary attempting to enumerate logging configurations, monitor activities, or potentially tamper with logging settings as a precursor to other malicious activities or an attempt to cover tracks.
This rule detects when a global administrator role is assigned in Azure via the Graph API. It specifically looks for HTTP POST requests to 'graph.microsoft.com' with 'assignLicense' in the URI.
This rule detects suspicious activity related to the assignment of application roles. Specifically, it identifies when a single user principal name (UPN) performs 10 or more successful 'Add app role assignment' operations within a one-hour window. This could indicate an attacker rapidly granting themselves or other entities access to multiple applications or resources.
Detects suspicious activity related to OAuth2PermissionGrant operations, specifically looking for a high volume of successful consent grants by a single user within a short timeframe. This could indicate an attacker attempting to gain broad access to resources by granting permissions to a malicious OAuth application.
This rule detects potential tampering with Conditional Access Policies in Azure Active Directory by monitoring for multiple update, delete, or add operations on policies containing 'Conditional Access' in their display name within a one-hour window. This could indicate an adversary attempting to weaken security controls to maintain access or bypass MFA.
This rule detects suspicious activity related to the assignment of application roles. Specifically, it identifies when a single user principal name (UPN) performs 10 or more successful 'Add app role assignment' operations within a one-hour window. This could indicate an attacker rapidly granting themselves or other entities access to multiple applications or resources.
Detects suspicious activity involving multiple password resets for different users initiated by a single user within a one-hour timeframe in Azure AD. This could indicate an attacker attempting to gain control over multiple accounts.
This rule detects the creation of new service principals or the assignment of new role assignments to existing service principals in Azure Active Directory. It specifically looks for assignments that grant high-privilege roles such as "Contributor", "Owner", or "Global Admin". The rule aggregates these changes by target and time, highlighting instances where multiple changes or distinct initiators are involved.
This rule detects suspicious activity involving API key rotation followed by high usage. It correlates audit logs for API key operations (rotate, update, create) with cloud application events showing API requests or token usage. Specifically, it looks for instances where an API key is rotated, updated, or created, and then subsequently used more than 50 times within a day by the same actor. This could indicate an adversary gaining access to an API key and then rapidly utilizing it for malicious purposes.
This rule detects when public or anonymous access is enabled for an Azure Storage Account. This configuration change can lead to potential data exposure, as it allows unauthenticated users to access blobs within the storage account. The rule specifically looks for 'STORAGEACCOUNTS/WRITE' or 'STORAGEACCOUNTS/BLOBSERVICES/WRITE' operations that successfully modify the storage account configuration to allow public access.
This rule detects attempts to modify an Azure Management Group, specifically when a PUT request is made to 'management.azure.com' with 'managementGroups' in the URI. This activity could indicate an attempt to evade defenses by altering management group configurations.
This rule detects suspicious activity involving Azure AD device registration followed by a sign-in from the same user and IP address, particularly when the user agent strings are indicative of non-standard clients (e.g., 'node', 'axios', 'undici', 'node-fetch'). This pattern can indicate an adversary attempting to establish persistence or bypass multi-factor authentication by registering a new device and then immediately using it for access.
This rule detects attempts to grant consent to OAuth applications, which could indicate an illicit consent grant attack. It specifically looks for successful operations related to consenting to applications, adding app role assignments to service principals, adding delegated permission grants, or adding OAuth2PermissionGrants within audit logs. The rule extracts details such as the target application, the user who consented, their initiating IP address, and the permissions granted.
This rule detects when a credential (password) is added to an Azure Service Principal. This activity is identified by monitoring HTTP traffic for requests to 'graph.microsoft.com' containing 'addPassword' in the URI. This could indicate an attacker establishing persistence by adding new credentials to an existing service principal.
This rule detects suspicious activity involving API key rotation followed by high usage. It correlates audit logs for API key operations (rotate, update, create) with cloud application events showing API requests or token usage. Specifically, it looks for instances where an API key is rotated, updated, or created, and then subsequently used more than 50 times within a day by the same actor. This could indicate an adversary gaining access to an API key and then rapidly utilizing it for malicious purposes.
This rule detects high-volume access to Azure Key Vault secrets, keys, or certificates within a one-hour window. It specifically looks for successful read operations on secrets, keys, and certificates, as well as modifications to access policies. A high volume (more than 10 accesses) from a single caller within an hour is flagged as potential credential harvesting.
Detects suspicious activity involving multiple password resets for different users initiated by a single user within a one-hour timeframe in Azure AD. This could indicate an attacker attempting to gain control over multiple accounts.
This rule detects when an 'Agent ID Administrator' role adds an owner to a service principal in Azure Active Directory. This activity could indicate an attempt to escalate privileges or maintain persistence within the Azure environment by granting control over service principals to potentially unauthorized entities.
This rule detects when a user account assigns a 'Global Administrator' or 'Owner' role from multiple distinct IP addresses within a one-hour window. This behavior can indicate a compromised account being used to escalate privileges or establish persistence from different locations.
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