Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects incoming email messages containing .zip attachments with filenames that mimic financial documents (e.g., NFe, DANFE, invoice-related keywords) combined with numerical strings. This naming pattern is commonly associated with phishing campaigns attempting to deliver malicious archives.
This rule detects a correlation between a successful user login from an IP address not previously seen for that specific user in the last 14 days, followed immediately (within 1 hour) by sensitive administrative operations performed by the same user, such as adding members to roles or modifying application permissions.
Detects a suspicious sequence of events where a user modifies the Entra Authentication Methods Policy to register an external authentication method (EAM) provider, followed immediately by the same user associating a new FIDO key with their account. This behavior can be indicative of an adversary setting up a persistence mechanism via a malicious or unauthorized MFA provider.
Detects the creation of an application registered with a specific Microsoft external authentication provider URI, immediately followed by the configuration of its service principal with reply URLs pointing to external tunneling services like ngrok. This sequence is indicative of an attacker attempting to register a rogue MFA provider to intercept authentication requests.
Detects scenarios where a user registers a new WebAuthn/Passkey credential and subsequently performs a sign-in from a different network or device shortly after, preceded by a sign-in from a risky or non-passkey-based method. This pattern is often associated with credential abuse or MFA registration hijacking.
Detects Microsoft Entra Privileged Identity Management (PIM) activations for high-privileged roles (e.g., Global Administrator) that occur outside of defined business hours or are performed without an associated justification or ticket number. This helps identify potentially unauthorized or abnormal use of elevated privileges.
Detects a single user identity performing bulk destructive device actions (wipe, retire, remote lock, or delete) against multiple distinct devices within a short timeframe. This activity is indicative of potential unauthorized access and destructive intent, mirroring techniques observed in large-scale cloud-based identity compromise incidents.
This rule detects inbound emails where the sender domain matches the recipient domain (internal-looking), but the message authentication (SPF/DKIM/DMARC as indicated by CompAuth status) failed or was not performed. This is indicative of abuse of Exchange Online 'Direct Send' or similar unauthenticated relay methods to spoof internal identities.
Detects anomalous, high-frequency, multi-channel probing of AI agent input surfaces. The rule identifies external actors sending instruction-injection style keywords across different communication channels (e.g., email, Teams, calendar) within a short window, which may indicate an attempt to identify and manipulate an organization's autonomous agents. Covers T1595.002
Detects modifications to Microsoft Entra ID (formerly Azure AD) authentication methods policy where a new external authentication method is configured using a non-approved discovery URL. This could indicate an adversary attempting to configure a malicious identity provider to facilitate authentication bypass or unauthorized access.
Detects a sequence of activity where a user receives a high volume of inbound emails (potential vishing or social engineering lures) within a short window, followed by the user executing Windows Remote Assistance or Quick Assist tools within the next 6 hours, which is highly indicative of remote access social engineering pre-cursors.
Correlates an MFA method change with the next sign-in occurring from an ASN/country never seen for that user in 30 days, operationalizing TrustSphere's 2026 finding that reset-then-new-location access is the clearest signal separating a hijack from a genuine recovery.
Flags installation of RMM tools (AnyDesk, ScreenConnect, TeamViewer, Atera, Splashtop) on an endpoint shortly after that user's account undergoes a password/MFA reset — matches the post-vishing tooling pattern CrowdStrike attributes to Mutant Spider (loaders including PrionFlaire and SocksLoader) and Scattered Spider.
Aggregates MFA/passkey enrollments tenant-wide, alerting when an unusual number of distinct users register new authenticators within a short rolling window — a mass-takeover indicator rather than isolated recovery activity, especially when linked by a common actor or source ASN.
Flags changes to a user's registered SMS/voice MFA phone number followed by a successful high-risk sign-in — the SIM-swap/SMS-interception bypass step documented across the 2024-2026 vishing threat-report taxonomy (CrowdStrike, Mandiant, Pindrop).
Detects instances where a non-administrative user grants an OAuth application consent to access high-privilege Microsoft Graph scopes, such as 'Mail.Read', 'Directory.ReadWrite.All', or 'offline_access'. This pattern is frequently used in consent phishing attacks to maintain persistent access to sensitive cloud resources.
Detects inbound Microsoft Teams calls or chats originating from an external or federated tenant where the caller's display name mimics internal IT support or helpdesk personnel, a technique used in social engineering and vishing campaigns.
Detects a sequence of events where a user's MFA configuration is modified (typically via a help-desk impersonation vishing attack) followed closely by a successful sign-in from a new IP address. This pattern is indicative of attackers hijacking sessions or stealing credentials by coercing victims into resetting MFA settings.
Detects a suspicious sequence of events suggesting potential technical support scam or social engineering activity: a rapid influx of emails (email bombing) followed by an external Microsoft Teams call, and subsequently the execution of a common remote access tool on the same host within a short timeframe.
Detects high-velocity, multi-application sign-in activity within a short timeframe (<= 15 minutes) originating from suspicious Python-based user agents (requests library). This pattern is often indicative of automated script-based reconnaissance or unauthorized access attempts against Microsoft 365 services.
Detects a sequence of events where a user is targeted by an email bombing attack, subsequently receives an external or anonymous Microsoft Teams call, and finally launches a known remote access tool (e.g., AnyDesk, TeamViewer) on the same host within a one-hour window. This pattern is consistent with social engineering campaigns designed to trick users into providing remote access to their systems.
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