Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
40,063 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
15,361
13,596
2,797
1,803
1,725
Contributors
7,678
5,999
5,315
4,504
4,191
Categories
18,113
9,760
3,854
3,760
3,714
Platforms
40,063
7,331
6,542
3,907
3,666
Products / Services
10,442
9,677
6,722
1,888
1,879
MITRE Techniques
13,738
13,119
8,068
5,949
4,415
CVEs
49
45
30
30
29
IDS Classtypes
214
56
43
23
19
IDS Protocols
183
172
20
16
8
Detects PE executables whose embedded filename strings claim to be Adobe, TrueConf, or 1C software but whose PE metadata (company/product name) or digital signature does not match the claimed vendor, as used by NightEagle/GhostContainer operators to blend malicious tooling into normal process activity
Detects potential tampering with Windows Event Logs or audit services by correlating manual service stops or log clearing events (EventIDs 1100, 1102, 104, 7036, 7040) with a sudden, significant decrease in total event volume on the same host. The rule accounts for planned maintenance and legitimate event log service restarts to reduce noise.
Detection rules identifying malformed RDP MCS Connect Initial PDUs and unusual service crashes following RDP connection attempts, both indicative of exploitation attempts against the CVE-2019-0708 (BlueKeep) vulnerability.
This rule detects the use of the VS Code command line interface to install extensions, specifically by monitoring for the 'workbench.extensions.installExtension' command. This activity can be indicative of automated installation of extensions, which could be used for malicious purposes or persistence if an attacker installs a malicious extension.
This rule detects potentially malicious activity originating from code editors (VS Code, Electron-based applications) spawning suspicious child processes (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, calc.exe) or the creation of a specific suspicious file 'EXTINSTALL_PWNED.txt' in the 'Users\Public' directory.
This rule detects potentially malicious activity originating from code editors (VS Code, Electron-based applications) spawning suspicious child processes (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, calc.exe) or the creation of a specific suspicious file 'EXTINSTALL_PWNED.txt' in the 'Users\Public' directory.
Detects instances where a Visual Studio Code (VS Code) extension host process launches potentially suspicious child processes, specifically command-line tools like cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or calc.exe, within 30 seconds of the extension host starting.
Detects modifications or creation of the VS Code 'settings.json' file within a '.vscode' folder where the configuration includes 'workbench.startupEditor' and 'readme'. This pattern is frequently used in malicious extensions or malicious repository configurations to trick users into opening a malicious README file upon starting the editor, potentially leading to further compromise.
Detects the installation of Visual Studio Code extensions via the command line interface using the Code.exe process. Adversaries may abuse VS Code extensions to achieve code execution or persistence by installing malicious .vsix files.
Detects the execution of common discovery commands like 'whoami' combined with system information gathering commands (tasklist, ver, uname) when initiated by an application named 'pc-app.exe'. This pattern is frequently observed during the reconnaissance phase of an attack.
Detects the execution of BloodHound/SharpHound reconnaissance tools and the presence of their generated output files (ZIP or JSON format) on a host. This rule monitors both the process creation events associated with the tool's execution and file creation events indicative of data staging or collection output.
Detects the execution of BloodHound/SharpHound reconnaissance tools and the presence of their generated output files (ZIP or JSON format) on a host. This rule monitors both the process creation events associated with the tool's execution and file creation events indicative of data staging or collection output.
This rule monitors network traffic and internal logs for connections to known malicious IP addresses or domain names associated with 'ClickFix' social engineering campaigns (often impersonating services like HBO Max). The logic explicitly filters out known threat intelligence scanners and security researcher probes. It performs correlation by requiring domain/message matches for generic IP-based alerts to reduce noise, and aggregates events per host over 15-minute windows to produce consolidated alerts.
Detects network communication with domains and IP addresses known to be associated with 'ClickFix' social engineering campaigns (specifically those masquerading as legitimate HBO Max or macOS related updates). The rule applies a strict correlation between observed malicious IP traffic and specific DNS requests to reduce noise from IP address reuse or threat intelligence feed probes, while also excluding known security-related processes.
Detects network communication with domains and IP addresses known to be associated with 'ClickFix' social engineering campaigns (specifically those masquerading as legitimate HBO Max or macOS related updates). The rule applies a strict correlation between observed malicious IP traffic and specific DNS requests to reduce noise from IP address reuse or threat intelligence feed probes, while also excluding known security-related processes.
This rule detects anomalous access patterns on a specific IIS host (agent.3bb.co.th) by comparing recent traffic against a 30-day historical baseline. It identifies requests from accounts or source IPs not seen in the baseline, activity occurring during off-hours, or traffic from external sources. The rule further filters for high-volume or high-path diversity requests, which are indicative of automated reconnaissance or potential brute-force activity against the web application.
Detects the use of the native Windows utility 'wbadmin.exe' to delete the system backup catalog or system state backups. This activity is a common indicator of ransomware or other destructive attacks aiming to inhibit system recovery by preventing administrators from restoring data from existing backups.
IOC hunt for the HEAVYGRAM/CRUDEEXCLUDE campaign: matches known SHA256 file hashes (first-stage malware, implant, RAR/ZIP artefacts) via DeviceFileEvents and DeviceProcessEvents, plus known-malicious domains/staging infrastructure by parsed hostname across network connections, process command lines, and file origin URLs.
Detects HEAVYGRAM/CRUDEEXCLUDE persistence via Run-key registry writes or reg.exe command-line adds, scoped to payloads staged in AppData/ProgramData/Temp/Public/Downloads and excluding legitimate Program Files/System32 targets to reduce false positives from normal software autorun entries.
Detects the execution of msiexec.exe referencing a 'Temp.txt' file located within the user's AppData Local Temp directory, which matches a known suspicious file hash. This pattern often indicates an attempt to proxy the execution of malicious payloads via the Windows Installer utility.
This rule detects the creation of a local user account using the 'net.exe' or 'net1.exe' utility where the command line contains a specific hardcoded password ('Numlock!123'). This pattern is indicative of automated or manual post-exploitation activities, such as creating a back-door account for persistent access.
Page 364 of 1908