Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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The following analytic detects modifications to the Windows registry aimed at disabling the Registry Editor (regedit). It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically monitoring changes to the registry path "*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System\\DisableRegistryTools" with a value of "0x00000001". This activity is significant because malware, such as RATs or trojans, often disable registry tools to prevent the removal of their entries, aiding in persistence and defense evasion. If confirmed malicious, this could hinder incident response efforts and allow the attacker to maintain control over the compromised system.
The following analytic detects the use of Ntdsutil to export the Active Directory database (NTDS.dit). It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line arguments. This activity is significant because exporting NTDS.dit can be a precursor to offline password cracking, posing a severe security risk. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain access to sensitive credentials, potentially leading to unauthorized access and privilege escalation within the network.
The following analytic detects the use of the Enable-PSRemoting cmdlet, which allows PowerShell remoting on a local or remote computer. This detection leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode 4104) to identify when this cmdlet is executed. Monitoring this activity is crucial as it can indicate an attacker enabling remote command execution capabilities on a compromised system. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to take control of the system remotely, execute commands, and potentially pivot to other systems within the network, leading to further compromise and lateral movement.
The following analytic identifies the execution of rundll32.exe with the DLL function names "Start" and "StartW," commonly associated with Cobalt Strike payloads. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions and process metadata. This activity is significant as it often indicates the presence of malicious payloads, such as Cobalt Strike, which can lead to unauthorized code execution. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to inject shellcode, escalate privileges, and maintain persistence within the environment.
The following analytic detects the use of Windows Curl.exe to upload a file to a remote destination.
It identifies command-line arguments such as `-T`, `--upload-file`, `-d`, `--data`, and `-F` in process execution logs.
This activity is significant because adversaries may use Curl to exfiltrate data or upload malicious payloads. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to data breaches or further compromise of the system.
Analysts should review parallel processes and network logs to determine if the upload was successful and isolate the endpoint if necessary.
It identifies command-line arguments such as `-T`, `--upload-file`, `-d`, `--data`, and `-F` in process execution logs.
This activity is significant because adversaries may use Curl to exfiltrate data or upload malicious payloads. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to data breaches or further compromise of the system.
Analysts should review parallel processes and network logs to determine if the upload was successful and isolate the endpoint if necessary.
The following analytic detects suspicious registry modifications aimed at disabling Windows Group Policy features. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, focusing on specific registry paths and values associated with disabling key Windows functionalities. This activity is significant because it is commonly used by ransomware to hinder mitigation and forensic response efforts. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could severely impair the ability of security teams to analyze and respond to the attack, allowing the attacker to maintain control and persist within the compromised environment.
The following analytic detects the use of `dism.exe` to remove Windows Defender. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions that include specific parameters for disabling and removing Windows Defender. This activity is significant because adversaries may disable Defender to evade detection and carry out further malicious actions undetected. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to the attacker gaining persistent access, executing additional payloads, or exfiltrating sensitive data without being intercepted by Windows Defender.
The following analytic detects a suspicious modification to the Windows registry that disables automatic updates. It leverages data from the Endpoint datamodel, specifically monitoring changes to the registry path "*\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows\\WindowsUpdate\\DoNotConnectToWindowsUpdateInternetLocations" with a value of "0x00000001". This activity is significant as it can be used by adversaries, including malware like RedLine Stealer, to evade detection and prevent the system from receiving critical updates. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to exploit vulnerabilities, persist in the environment, and potentially deploy additional payloads.
The following analytic detects modifications to the Windows Error Reporting registry key "DontShowUI" to suppress error reporting dialogs. It leverages data from the Endpoint datamodel's Registry node to identify changes where the registry value is set to 0x00000001. This activity is significant as it is commonly associated with DarkGate malware, which uses this modification to avoid detection during its installation. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to maintain a low profile, avoiding user alerts and potentially enabling further malicious activities without user intervention.
The following analytic detects a modification to the Windows registry setting "LongPathsEnabled," which allows file paths longer than 260 characters. This detection leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry datamodel, focusing on changes to the specific registry path and value. This activity is significant because adversaries, including malware like BlackByte, exploit this setting to bypass file path limitations, potentially aiding in evasion techniques. If confirmed malicious, this modification could facilitate the execution of long-path payloads, aiding in persistence and further system compromise.
The following analytic identifies a suspicious modification of the Windows registry setting for max connections per server. It detects changes to specific registry paths using data from the Endpoint.Registry datamodel. This activity is significant because altering this setting can be exploited by attackers to increase the number of concurrent connections to a remote server, potentially facilitating DDoS attacks or enabling more effective lateral movement within a compromised network. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to network disruption or further compromise of additional systems.
The following analytic detects modifications to the Windows registry key "ProxyEnable" to enable proxy settings. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry datamodel, specifically monitoring changes to the "Internet Settings\ProxyEnable" registry path. This activity is significant as it is commonly exploited by malware and adversaries to establish proxy communication, potentially connecting to malicious Command and Control (C2) servers. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to redirect network traffic through a proxy, facilitating unauthorized communication and data exfiltration, thereby compromising the security of the affected host.
The following analytic detects the execution of common network sniffing tools on Windows systems, including Wireshark, WinPcap, tcpdump, and similar utilities.
This activity is significant because attackers use packet capture tools to intercept and analyze network traffic, enabling credential theft, sensitive data harvesting, and reconnaissance of internal network communications.
While these tools have legitimate administrative uses, their presence in unexpected environments may indicate an adversary conducting man-in-the-middle attacks or exfiltrating sensitive information traversing the network.
If confirmed malicious, this could lead to the exposure of credentials, session tokens, and confidential data, facilitating lateral movement and further compromise of the environment.
This activity is significant because attackers use packet capture tools to intercept and analyze network traffic, enabling credential theft, sensitive data harvesting, and reconnaissance of internal network communications.
While these tools have legitimate administrative uses, their presence in unexpected environments may indicate an adversary conducting man-in-the-middle attacks or exfiltrating sensitive information traversing the network.
If confirmed malicious, this could lead to the exposure of credentials, session tokens, and confidential data, facilitating lateral movement and further compromise of the environment.
The following analytic detects modifications to the BootExecute registry key, which manages applications and services executed during system boot. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, focusing on changes to the registry path "HKLM\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Session Manager\\BootExecute". This activity is significant because unauthorized changes to this key can indicate attempts to achieve persistence, load malicious code, or tamper with the boot process. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to maintain persistence, execute arbitrary code at boot, or disrupt system operations.
The following analytic detects modifications to the Windows RunMRU registry key, which stores a history of commands executed through the Run dialog box (Windows+R). It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry to monitor registry events targeting this key. This activity is significant as malware often uses the Run dialog to execute malicious commands while attempting to appear legitimate. If confirmed malicious, this could indicate an attacker using indirect command execution techniques for defense evasion or persistence. The detection excludes MRUList value changes to focus on actual command entries.
The following analytic detects changes in the ScManager service security descriptor settings. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, specifically searching for any process execution involving the "sc.exe" binary with the "sdset" flag targeting the "scmanager" service. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to escalate their privileges.
The following analytic identifies the use of `wmic.exe` to enumerate local groups on an endpoint. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs, including command-line details. Monitoring this activity is significant as it can indicate reconnaissance efforts by an attacker to understand group memberships, which could be a precursor to privilege escalation or lateral movement. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to map out privileged groups, aiding in further exploitation and persistence within the environment.
Detects endpoint and network activity matching known Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) associated with BPFDoor, AVERAT, and Rekoobe backdoors based on Rapid7 research. The query checks for specific file hashes, IP addresses, and domain names across process, file, image load, network, and DNS events.
The following analytic detects DNS queries to domains associated with known remote access software such as AnyDesk, GoToMyPC, LogMeIn, and TeamViewer. This detection is crucial as adversaries often use these tools to maintain access and control over compromised environments. Identifying such behavior is vital for a Security Operations Center (SOC) because unauthorized remote access can lead to data breaches, ransomware attacks, and other severe impacts if these threats are not mitigated promptly.
The following analytic identifies the provisioning of a new MFA device shortly after a password reset. It detects this activity by correlating Windows Event Log events for password changes
(EventID 4723, 4724) with PingID logs indicating device pairing. This behavior is significant as it may indicate a social engineering attack where a threat actor impersonates a valid user
to reset credentials and add a new MFA device. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to gain persistent access to the compromised account, bypassing traditional security measures.
(EventID 4723, 4724) with PingID logs indicating device pairing. This behavior is significant as it may indicate a social engineering attack where a threat actor impersonates a valid user
to reset credentials and add a new MFA device. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to gain persistent access to the compromised account, bypassing traditional security measures.
Detects PowerShell execution performing port checks across multiple internal hosts using Test-NetConnection in a looping construct with output redirected to a log file, indicative of post-compromise reconnaissance (such as LONEPAGE scanning).
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