Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
40,063 detections
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Detects instances where cmd.exe or wscript.exe are executed from explorer.exe or via a .lnk file, which is a common pattern for initial access and execution of malicious payloads, often seen in spearphishing scenarios involving obfuscated or disguised files.
This rule detects potential ransomware activity by monitoring for specific file naming patterns associated with known ransom notes (.krsid, README_KRSID.Txt) and the execution of suspicious processes (HTSPnew.Exe, UBPUpdater.exe).
Detects execution of processes associated with QuasarRAT or references to its configuration files, originating from or involving files and processes named 'UBPUpdater.exe' or 'UBPPatch.Psh'. Also identifies network connections via FTP or involving configuration files ('config.Ini') initiated by these specific processes, which may indicate malicious activity, command and control, or data exfiltration.
This rule detects potentially malicious file manipulation activities, such as renaming, moving, copying, or deleting files, specifically when involving targeted filenames (e.g., 'GymTraniningShedule.exe') or locations (e.g., 'SystemFolder32'). The detection monitors for suspicious command-line arguments executed by 'cmd.exe' or 'conhost.exe' and cross-references them with file deletion events involving '.lnk' files or specific application artifacts.
Detects the use of mklink.exe or cmd.exe with mklink arguments to create symbolic links associated with specific file paths (ProgramData\doxc) or specific suspicious filenames (hzwzucr_widsisa.exe). This behavior is often associated with malware persistence or evasion, where adversaries link malicious binaries to disguise their location or execution source.
This rule detects the installation or modification of ScreenConnect services on Windows endpoints. It monitors for the creation of services using 'sc.exe', process commands related to ScreenConnect setup executables, or registry modifications and service installations associated with specific ScreenConnect identifiers, often indicative of unauthorized remote management software installation.
Detects the Stella_Gary .NET backdoor loader used by Kimsuky/APT-C-55, identified by managed-layer reflective assembly loading strings (loader.Program.Main, AssemblyResolve callback, Stella_Gary.Program.Main)
Detects the Stella_Gary .NET backdoor loader used by Kimsuky/APT-C-55, identified by managed-layer reflective assembly loading strings (loader.Program.Main, AssemblyResolve callback, Stella_Gary.Program.Main)
This rule detects the execution of PowerShell commands that simultaneously perform reconnaissance for security analysis tools and virtual machine environment indicators. The presence of encoded, hidden, or non-interactive PowerShell flags in conjunction with these discovery actions is indicative of an adversary attempting to verify their execution environment to evade detection and analysis by security researchers or automated sandbox systems.
This rule detects the execution of PowerShell commands that simultaneously perform reconnaissance for security analysis tools and virtual machine environment indicators. The presence of encoded, hidden, or non-interactive PowerShell flags in conjunction with these discovery actions is indicative of an adversary attempting to verify their execution environment to evade detection and analysis by security researchers or automated sandbox systems.
This rule detects the execution of PowerShell commands that simultaneously perform reconnaissance for security analysis tools and virtual machine environment indicators. The presence of encoded, hidden, or non-interactive PowerShell flags in conjunction with these discovery actions is indicative of an adversary attempting to verify their execution environment to evade detection and analysis by security researchers or automated sandbox systems.
This rule detects the execution of PowerShell commands that simultaneously perform reconnaissance for security analysis tools and virtual machine environment indicators. The presence of encoded, hidden, or non-interactive PowerShell flags in conjunction with these discovery actions is indicative of an adversary attempting to verify their execution environment to evade detection and analysis by security researchers or automated sandbox systems.
This rule detects a correlation between host-level reconnaissance activity using WMI (via PowerShell or WMIC) to query system information, followed by network exfiltration to a known C2 IP address over a specific URI within a 10-minute window.
This rule detects a correlation between host-level reconnaissance activity using WMI (via PowerShell or WMIC) to query system information, followed by network exfiltration to a known C2 IP address over a specific URI within a 10-minute window.
This rule monitors for network connections, firewall traffic, and Entra ID authentication events involving known malicious IP addresses (the 'Wall of Shame'). The rule specifically flags interactions occurring over common VPN ports, suggesting potential unauthorized access or persistence attempts via VPN services.
Detects network connection events to known domains and subdomains associated with the SilkParasite threat actor. The rule specifically monitors for connections to specific parent domains (natcommunzu.com, kginfocom.com, mfa-uz.com) and subdomains utilizing service-oriented naming patterns (e.g., mail, service, help, storage, support, microsoft, post) commonly used by this actor for command and control infrastructure.
Detects processes running from user-writable locations (Temp/AppData/Public/Downloads) creating a self-referential Windows Firewall allow rule via netsh, consistent with NJRAT establishing outbound C2 connectivity while evading network-based blocking.
This rule detects a high volume of unique command executions within a short time window where the command lines contain patterns resembling developer or script comments (e.g., # or // followed by keywords like 'attempt', 'retry', 'diagnos'). The threshold-based logic (over 600 unique commands in less than 1 hour) combined with high-frequency retry attempts suggests automated or scripted activity, potentially indicative of automated exploitation frameworks, reconnaissance, or brute-force tools that include verbose logging or internal notes within the command execution.
Detects a suspicious correlation where a host reports a confirmed exploit attempt followed by a high volume of file modifications (encryption behavior) within a single hour. This short dwell time is a strong indicator of automated or AI-orchestrated ransomware deployments.
This rule detects the creation or modification of a file named 'ClipBoard.txt' within the directory 'AppData\Roaming\ConfigsEx\', as well as the creation of the 'ConfigsEx' directory using command-line tools. This behavior is indicative of an adversary staging sensitive information, such as harvested clipboard data, for potential exfiltration.
Detects unauthorized file operations (creation, modification, or renaming) against the Windows hosts file located at C:\Windows\System32\drivers\etc\hosts. This is a common technique used by attackers to redirect network traffic, hijack domains, or disrupt communications to security services. The rule excludes common system processes known to perform legitimate maintenance on this file.
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