Detections

Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.

40,045 detections

Correlates a delivered PDF attachment with the same user's browser visiting Mir0Auth C2-style paths within 4 hours. Restricted to browser processes and successful connections, excludes dev/code-hosting domains, and matches users by mailbox alias (DeviceInfo LoggedOnUsers holds UserName, not full email).
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Arnold Chan@slaz
Defender - KQL
26 days ago
005
Detects endpoint connections to known DarkSword/Coruna exploit-host and C2 infrastructure. The shared AWS IP is only matched on C2 ports 8881/8882 to reduce collateral hits.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Hunters
26 days ago
005
Detects anomalous process execution and loopback network activity associated with the Model Context Protocol (MCP) 'exec_in_session' method. This pattern indicates an adversary potentially abusing the AI coding assistant's MCP server capabilities to execute arbitrary commands as a C2 channel.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
5018
IOC sweep for ARTEX campaign indicators: C2 host, nine proxy IPs, xcai.pro and its subdomains, and the CLAUDE.md URL across Defender, CEF/firewall, DNS and Entra sign-in telemetry. Domains match on exact host or subdomain only, connection types are limited to real connection events, and sign-ins are limited to successes and credential failures.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
28 days ago
0010
Detects the presence of known MD5 file hashes associated with the TraderTraitor trojanized Terraform provider campaign (also known as FLATROOF/ROOFDECK). The query sweeps DeviceFileEvents, DeviceProcessEvents, and DeviceImageLoadEvents across the last 30 days.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Hunters
23 days ago
002
Detects the presence of known MD5 file hashes associated with the TraderTraitor trojanized Terraform provider campaign (also known as FLATROOF/ROOFDECK). The query sweeps DeviceFileEvents, DeviceProcessEvents, and DeviceImageLoadEvents across the last 30 days.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Midnight Slayer
23 days ago
002
Detects the presence of known MD5 file hashes associated with the TraderTraitor trojanized Terraform provider campaign (also known as FLATROOF/ROOFDECK). The query sweeps DeviceFileEvents, DeviceProcessEvents, and DeviceImageLoadEvents across the last 30 days.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
Defender - KQL
23 days ago
002
Detects network connections to known Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) associated with the TraderTraitor campaign, including trojanized Terraform providers (FLATROOF/ROOFDECK malware families) using specific domains and URL paths.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
Defender - KQL
23 days ago
002
Point-in-time sweep of the 16 published BraZetsu sample SHA-256 hashes across file, process and image-load telemetry. Hashes rotated across five versions, so absence of a hit does not rule out BraZetsu.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
23 days ago
002
Point-in-time sweep of the 16 published BraZetsu sample SHA-256 hashes across file, process and image-load telemetry. Hashes rotated across five versions, so absence of a hit does not rule out BraZetsu.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Hunters
23 days ago
002
Sweeps endpoint and firewall telemetry for connections to the two high-confidence BraZetsu infrastructure IPs. Review hits against the IP's first-seen date before blocking because the Njalla host has changed service.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Hunters
23 days ago
002
Sweeps endpoint and firewall telemetry for connections to the two high-confidence BraZetsu infrastructure IPs. Review hits against the IP's first-seen date before blocking because the Njalla host has changed service.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
23 days ago
002
Sweeps proxy, firewall and endpoint network telemetry for requests to the three published BraZetsu Pastebin dead-drop raw URLs used to retrieve the XOR-encrypted C2 config.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
Defender - KQL
23 days ago
002
Sweeps DNS, endpoint network and proxy/firewall telemetry for BraZetsu C2, panel and shop domains using exact or subdomain matching. The apex installscenter.com remains active on Cloudflare with wildcard certificates.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
Defender - KQL
23 days ago
002
Detects network, file, process, and email interactions associated with known IOCs related to Power BI phishing and rogue ScreenConnect campaigns over a 30-day lookback period.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
23 days ago
002
Sweeps Defender XDR telemetry for known NEBULA / KNTRAT indicators (SHA256 hashes, C2 IP, decoy domain and URLs, burner publisher emails). Hash matching is scoped per table (execution hash only in process events), noisy tooling is excluded from command-line matches, network hits are limited to connection events, and results are aggregated per device and IOC.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Midnight Slayer
23 days ago
002
Detects alternate PowerShell hosts potentially bypassing detections looking for powershell.exe
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
18 days ago
000
Detects usage of "Reflection.Assembly" load functions to dynamically load assemblies in memory
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
18 days ago
000
Detects command line activity that tries to clear or disable any ETW trace log which could be a sign of logging evasion.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
25 days ago
004
Detects suspicious powershell download cradle using nslookup. This cradle uses nslookup to extract payloads from DNS records
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
24 days ago
003
The following analytic detects non-Firefox processes accessing the Firefox profile directory, which contains sensitive user data such as login credentials, browsing history, and cookies. It leverages Windows Security Event logs, specifically event code 4663, to monitor access attempts. This activity is significant because it may indicate attempts by malware, such as RATs or trojans, to harvest user information. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to data exfiltration, unauthorized access to user accounts, and further compromise of the affected system.
Splunk Security@SplunkSecurity
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Splunk Security Content
18 days ago
000
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