Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule monitors web server access logs for suspicious activity targeting sensitive Flowise API endpoints (credentials, variables, secretvariable, apikey). It flags two types of threats: 1) Case-bypass evasion attempts, where canonical endpoints are bypassed via non-standard casing while requesting sensitive data (e.g., matching a status 200 on non-canonical casing for sensitive paths), and 2) High-frequency requests indicative of bulk enumeration or directory/wordlist scanning.
This rule detects the exploitation of CVE-2026-48558 in SimpleHelp, where an OIDC authentication bypass allows unauthenticated attackers to forge identity tokens. The lack of cryptographic signature verification permits the registration of unauthorized, privileged Technician accounts, effectively bypassing MFA. The detection logic monitors for specific log patterns indicating OIDC response processing followed by technician account registration and configuration changes.
Detects exploitation attempts against CVE-2026-33017, an unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerability in Langflow. The rule identifies suspicious HTTP POST requests directed at specific vulnerable API endpoints, looking for common Python code injection payloads (e.g., 'os.system', '__import__', 'subprocess') or the presence of a known dropper payload ('isp.sh') within the URI query. It also flags requests originating from common automation user agents like 'python-requests'.
Detects Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI) attempts targeting the Floci API Gateway, specifically looking for Velocity Template Language (VTL) payloads intended to trigger Remote Code Execution via 'java.lang.ProcessBuilder', along with indicators of an IAM credential scope bypass.
Detects instances where AI coding assistants (e.g., Claude Code, Cursor, Windsurf) spawn shell interpreters or scripting runtimes that subsequently initiate outbound network connections to non-private IP addresses. This behavior is indicative of potential malicious activity, such as credential theft or workspace trust bypass exploits (e.g., CVE-2026-12957), where an attacker leverages an AI coding assistant to execute arbitrary code. The rule excludes common build and test runner processes to minimize false positives.
Detects log entries related to sensitive HR and financial data modifications, specifically identifying keywords such as 'Workday', 'direct deposit', 'payment election', or 'bank account' changes. This activity is indicative of potential payroll fraud, where an adversary attempts to redirect employee compensation to an unauthorized account.
Detects the execution and network activity of known reverse tunneling and proxy tools such as Chisel, Ngrok, and FRP. These tools are commonly abused by adversaries to establish persistence, bypass firewalls, and facilitate command and control (C2) communication. The rule monitors for specific process names, command-line arguments, and DNS requests related to these services.
Detects attempts to exploit Velocity Template Language (VTL) injection vulnerabilities in the Floci API Gateway, specifically targeting MOCK integration configurations on port 4566. The rule monitors for the injection of malicious Java objects via response templates, deployment of these templates, and the execution of the RCE payload via a specific API endpoint path, including potential IAM enforcement bypass attempts.
Detects an unusually high volume (100 or more within an hour) of API calls (POST, DELETE, PUT methods to URIs containing 'api') originating from a single IP address. This activity could indicate various malicious behaviors such as brute-force attacks, credential stuffing, web application attacks, or a denial-of-service attempt against the API endpoint.
Detects anomalous process spawning behavior initiated by AI IDE extensions (e.g., Amazon Q, Claude Code, Cursor) when loading Model Context Protocol (MCP) configuration files. The rule flags instances where these IDE components trigger suspicious child processes or command-line executions, which could be indicative of remote code execution (RCE) via malicious mcp.json workspace configurations.
Detects the creation of Model Context Protocol (MCP) server configuration files (such as .mcp.json or those in .vscode/ and .amazonq/ directories) shortly after a Git operation (pull, fetch, merge, or clone). This pattern is indicative of a supply chain attack where a contributor introduces malicious MCP configurations into a workspace, which are subsequently loaded by development tools like VS Code, Cursor, or language servers to execute arbitrary code or exfiltrate data.
Detects the execution of MeshCentral agent commands, specifically the 'RunCommand' feature, which is often used by adversaries for post-compromise remote command execution and payload staging. This rule monitors both endpoint process activity and system logs for command-line arguments involving meshctrl.js and RunCommand.
Detects anomalous outbound network connections initiated by media server processes (Jellyfin, FFmpeg, or Nextcloud) immediately following an inbound video file upload (AVI) to the media server's API, indicative of post-exploitation activity related to the PixelSmash (CVE-2026-8461) heap out-of-bounds write vulnerability.
Detects Log4Shell JNDI exploitation attempts by scanning incoming network request data for JNDI patterns and simultaneously monitors for suspicious shell child processes (cmd, powershell, bash, sh) spawned by java.exe, indicating post-exploitation activity.
Detects instances where a user within the MyBB Admin Control Panel (ACP) attempts to create a new user account and assign it to the administrator usergroup (gid=4). This activity is indicative of a privilege escalation attempt by an authenticated user with limited administrative access or an attacker who has compromised such an account.
This rule detects two distinct malicious activities related to Gitea installations: 1) Container escape attempts involving 'act-runner' processes configured with dangerous flags like --pid=host, --cap-add=ALL, or usage of nsenter, and 2) Potential administrative impersonation attempts against a Gitea instance via injection of the X-WEBAUTH-USER: admin HTTP header.
Detects exploitation attempts against Gitea instances where an attacker impersonates an admin user by injecting the 'X-WEBAUTH-USER' header. This vulnerability typically occurs when 'REVERSE_PROXY_TRUSTED_PROXIES' is misconfigured to trust all proxies ('*'), allowing unauthenticated users to gain administrative access via header manipulation. The rule covers web request headers, container logs for suspicious admin creation, and process execution arguments associated with the exploitation.
Detects the exploitation of CVE-2026-20896 in Gitea, where an unauthenticated attacker sends a crafted POST request to user registration or installation endpoints. The rule triggers when this network activity is followed by the creation of a new user account with administrative roles within a 10-minute window, indicating potential privilege escalation.
Cloud extortion group exploiting exposed credentials and storage
This rule detects Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) attempts by monitoring for URL parameters containing malicious path injections. Specifically, it looks for sequences typical of differential parsing vulnerabilities where an attacker attempts to access sensitive local files (e.g., /proc/self/environ, /var/task/) or internal cloud metadata services (metadata.google.internal) by manipulating a 'url' parameter, often combined with attempts to bypass path validation using double-slash formatting.
This rule detects potentially malicious web requests attempting to access sensitive local system files, environment variables, or application source code within a cloud-hosted application environment. The detection logic focuses on URI patterns indicative of Local File Inclusion (LFI) attempts targeting proc filesystem nodes, credential configuration files, or application source bundles.
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