Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
40,056 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
15,357
13,598
2,797
1,803
1,721
Contributors
7,678
5,999
5,315
4,504
4,191
Categories
18,109
9,757
3,851
3,758
3,713
Platforms
40,056
7,331
6,542
3,907
3,664
Products / Services
10,439
9,678
6,723
1,887
1,878
MITRE Techniques
13,737
13,116
8,066
5,949
4,414
CVEs
49
45
30
30
29
IDS Classtypes
214
56
43
23
19
IDS Protocols
183
172
20
16
8
GhostContainer
YARA
Detects GhostContainer .NET-based backdoor assembly components deployed on compromised Exchange servers, requiring multiple corroborating unique indicators (module/class names, C2 header, masquerading filenames) to reduce false positives on generic .NET assemblies
GhostContainer
YARA
Detects GhostContainer .NET-based backdoor assembly components deployed on compromised Exchange servers, requiring multiple corroborating unique indicators (module/class names, C2 header, masquerading filenames) to reduce false positives on generic .NET assemblies
This rule detects potential web shell creation on a Microsoft Exchange server by monitoring for suspicious child processes spawned by the IIS web server process (w3wp.exe) that correlate with the creation or modification of web-accessible script files (.aspx, .ashx, .asp, .dll) within the Exchange virtual directories (ecp, owa, aspnet_client). This pattern is consistent with common post-exploitation activities used by attackers to gain persistent access via web shells.
This rule detects potential web shell creation on a Microsoft Exchange server by monitoring for suspicious child processes spawned by the IIS web server process (w3wp.exe) that correlate with the creation or modification of web-accessible script files (.aspx, .ashx, .asp, .dll) within the Exchange virtual directories (ecp, owa, aspnet_client). This pattern is consistent with common post-exploitation activities used by attackers to gain persistent access via web shells.
This rule detects HTTP requests directed at Microsoft Exchange Outlook Web Access (OWA) that contain suspicious 'fakePath' and 'fakePageName' parameters in the URI. These parameters are indicators of the 'GhostContainer' malware attempting to establish a socket forwarding proxy through the web server to facilitate command and control communications.
This rule detects HTTP requests directed at Microsoft Exchange Outlook Web Access (OWA) that contain suspicious 'fakePath' and 'fakePageName' parameters in the URI. These parameters are indicators of the 'GhostContainer' malware attempting to establish a socket forwarding proxy through the web server to facilitate command and control communications.
Detects the GhostContainer .NET-based backdoor assembly deployed on compromised Microsoft Exchange servers, requiring multiple corroborating unique indicators (C2 header, proxy class name, virtual path parameters) alongside .NET/PE structure to reduce false positives
This rule detects attempts by an IIS worker process (w3wp.exe) to tamper with or disable the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) by monitoring for specific non-standard provider registrations or scan buffer patching events. This activity often indicates an attacker attempting to bypass security scanning within a web-based application process.
This rule detects attempts by an IIS worker process (w3wp.exe) to tamper with or disable the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) by monitoring for specific non-standard provider registrations or scan buffer patching events. This activity often indicates an attacker attempting to bypass security scanning within a web-based application process.
This rule detects attempts by an IIS worker process (w3wp.exe) to tamper with or disable the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) by monitoring for specific non-standard provider registrations or scan buffer patching events. This activity often indicates an attacker attempting to bypass security scanning within a web-based application process.
This rule detects attempts by an IIS worker process (w3wp.exe) to tamper with or disable the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) by monitoring for specific non-standard provider registrations or scan buffer patching events. This activity often indicates an attacker attempting to bypass security scanning within a web-based application process.
Detects Active Directory DCSync attempts by monitoring for Windows Security Event ID 4662 where the object properties contain GUIDs associated with directory replication services (DS-Replication-Get-Changes, DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All, and DS-Replication-Get-Changes-In-Filtered-Set). The rule excludes domain controller machine accounts and known legitimate service accounts used for synchronization or backup operations.
Detects Active Directory DCSync attempts by monitoring for Windows Security Event ID 4662 where the object properties contain GUIDs associated with directory replication services (DS-Replication-Get-Changes, DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All, and DS-Replication-Get-Changes-In-Filtered-Set). The rule excludes domain controller machine accounts and known legitimate service accounts used for synchronization or backup operations.
Detects Kerberos TGT or TGS requests that either exhibit a suspicious combination of ticket flags (Forwardable + Proxiable + Renewable) when associated with high-value targets, unusual accounts, or off-hours activity, or utilize the weak RC4-HMAC encryption type, both of which are indicative of ticket manipulation and credential theft.
Detects Kerberos TGT or TGS requests that either exhibit a suspicious combination of ticket flags (Forwardable + Proxiable + Renewable) when associated with high-value targets, unusual accounts, or off-hours activity, or utilize the weak RC4-HMAC encryption type, both of which are indicative of ticket manipulation and credential theft.
Detects Kerberos TGT or TGS requests that either exhibit a suspicious combination of ticket flags (Forwardable + Proxiable + Renewable) when associated with high-value targets, unusual accounts, or off-hours activity, or utilize the weak RC4-HMAC encryption type, both of which are indicative of ticket manipulation and credential theft.
Detects the use of netsh.exe to establish a port proxy, specifically conditioned on the execution context of the Impacket atexec tool (indicated by specific naming patterns and parent processes). This activity often follows the lateral movement or execution of a remote service by a tool like Impacket.
Detects the use of netsh.exe to establish a port proxy, specifically conditioned on the execution context of the Impacket atexec tool (indicated by specific naming patterns and parent processes). This activity often follows the lateral movement or execution of a remote service by a tool like Impacket.
Detects the use of netsh.exe to establish a port proxy, specifically conditioned on the execution context of the Impacket atexec tool (indicated by specific naming patterns and parent processes). This activity often follows the lateral movement or execution of a remote service by a tool like Impacket.
Detects the execution of the rdp2tcp tunneling tool in conjunction with RDP virtual channel activity using the 'rdp2tcp' channel name. This combination is a strong indicator of RDP-based protocol tunneling.
Detects the execution of the rdp2tcp tunneling tool in conjunction with RDP virtual channel activity using the 'rdp2tcp' channel name. This combination is a strong indicator of RDP-based protocol tunneling.
Page 386 of 1908