Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects modifications to Microsoft Entra ID (formerly Azure AD) authentication methods policy where a new external authentication method is configured using a non-approved discovery URL. This could indicate an adversary attempting to configure a malicious identity provider to facilitate authentication bypass or unauthorized access.
Detects modifications to Microsoft Entra ID (formerly Azure AD) authentication methods policy where a new external authentication method is configured using a non-approved discovery URL. This could indicate an adversary attempting to configure a malicious identity provider to facilitate authentication bypass or unauthorized access.
Detects high-volume file and data access events within Microsoft 365 services (SharePoint, OneDrive, Exchange) originating from Python-based user agents (e.g., 'python-requests', 'python-httpx'). This pattern is indicative of automated scraping, data exfiltration, or bulk activity performed by unauthorized scripts.
Detects high-volume file access or download activity by a single user in SharePoint or OneDrive over a 15-minute window. This behavior is indicative of bulk cloud data exfiltration often associated with extortion campaigns.
Detects high-volume, automated enumeration of cloud resources (SharePoint, OneDrive, or Exchange) via Graph API or search queries immediately following a user sign-in event. This behavior is indicative of session hijacking (token replay) followed by unauthorized scripted discovery, as opposed to legitimate user browsing activity.
This rule detects potentially malicious messages within Microsoft Teams that use common social engineering keywords related to security configuration changes (e.g., passkey, MFA, SSO). The detection specifically filters for users who have successfully logged in within the last 30 days to identify potential compromised accounts acting as internal senders.
This rule detects unauthorized mailbox access by identifying specific ClientAppId and API ID pairs known to be associated with an Office 365 email exfiltration toolkit. This activity is indicative of an attacker attempting to programmatically access or exfiltrate sensitive email data from the organization's environment.
This rule detects potentially unauthorized access or downloading of files from SharePoint and OneDrive, as well as specific MailItemsAccessed events associated with known exfiltration toolkit patterns within Microsoft 365. It flags individual events matching these criteria as a baseline for identifying suspicious data access behaviors.
This rule monitors successful user sign-ins using the 'deviceCode' authentication protocol that originate from an IP address previously unseen for that specific user within the last 24 hours. The Device Code flow is commonly targeted in phishing campaigns to bypass traditional credential-based MFA, making anomalous logins using this protocol a high-signal indicator of account compromise.
Detects anomalous, high-volume access to email items by specific applications known to be associated with suspicious activity or unusual access patterns within the Exchange environment, potentially indicating email harvesting or data exfiltration.
Detects sign-ins to Office Home or Office365 applications from unmanaged or unknown devices, followed by an unusual amount or variety of activity within SharePoint Online or OneDrive for Business within a two-hour window. This behavior is indicative of potential unauthorized access or account compromise where an actor is using a non-corporate device to interact with sensitive cloud documents.
Detects high-frequency search queries in SharePoint that utilize internal document identifiers (indexdocid), which may indicate an adversary attempting to enumerate or scrape content across a site collection.
This rule detects a multi-stage attack chain targeting a single user within a 2-hour window. It identifies the combination of email bombing (a distraction technique), an incoming external or anonymous Teams call (social engineering channel), and the installation of common remote access tools (e.g., AnyDesk, TeamViewer) on the same host.
This rule detects a multi-stage attack chain targeting a single user within a 2-hour window. It identifies the combination of email bombing (a distraction technique), an incoming external or anonymous Teams call (social engineering channel), and the installation of common remote access tools (e.g., AnyDesk, TeamViewer) on the same host.
Detects anomalous authentication patterns in Microsoft 365 logs where a valid session is utilized across multiple distinct devices within a short timeframe (under 5 minutes) without a corresponding multi-factor authentication (MFA) challenge. This behavior is indicative of a session token replay attack, where an adversary uses a stolen session cookie to bypass MFA and access cloud services.
Hunts network, HTTP, and email-URL telemetry for known ARToken infrastructure (operator backend IPs and phishing/panel domains). Bounded to a 30-day lookback and tiers matches by confidence: domain hits are high-confidence (attacker-registered infrastructure), while IP hits are medium-confidence since the IPs sit on shared DigitalOcean hosting that can be reassigned to unrelated tenants once ARToken's infrastructure is taken down. Empty/unparsed indicator fields are excluded to avoid spurious matches in the HTTP event parsing branch. No known file hashes are associated with this intel.
This rule detects a multi-stage phishing attack, often referred to as 'quishing'. It identifies incoming emails containing image (JPG, PNG) or PDF attachments that embed previously unseen URLs, correlated with a subsequent sign-in event from a mobile device by the same recipient, which is a common indicator of Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) credential harvesting.
Detects the creation or modification of inbox rules (e.g., forwarding, redirecting, deleting, or moving to hidden folders) that target finance, invoice, or payment-related communications, occurring shortly after an initial user sign-in from a new or unseen country/ASN within the last 30 days. This pattern is indicative of a post-compromise activity where an adversary attempts to exfiltrate financial data or hide malicious email activity.
This rule detects when a user grants OAuth application permissions for high-risk scopes (e.g., Mail, Files) to an application that was registered within the last 7 days. It correlates this event with subsequent suspicious actions performed by the same user, specifically mailbox rule modifications or file download activity, which are common indicators of post-compromise activity following OAuth consent phishing.
Detects phishing emails containing suspicious URLs pointing to PaaS platforms (Azure Static Web Apps, Cloudflare, Firebase) that exhibit credential harvesting characteristics (branded keywords or base64 patterns). The rule correlates these emails with subsequent clicks and a successful M365 sign-in by the same user within 30 minutes of the click, indicating a probable successful credential compromise.
This rule detects mass phishing campaigns by identifying HTML/HTM email attachments that contain embedded URLs. It monitors for a pattern where the same sender distributes these attachments to multiple recipients, a common behavior for HTML smuggling delivery vectors where malicious payloads are constructed client-side to bypass static email gateway inspection.
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