Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects endpoint execution artifacts and file activities related to Responder.py and CVE-2025-24071 PoC execution, including the creation of Responder.db and exploit.zip files by Python interpreters.
The following analytic detects the execution of VBScript using the wscript.exe application. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and command-line telemetry. This activity is significant because wscript.exe is typically not used to execute VBScript, which is usually associated with cscript.exe. This deviation can indicate an attempt to evade traditional process monitoring and antivirus defenses. If confirmed malicious, this technique could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to system compromise, data exfiltration, or further lateral movement within the network.
Detects a sequence of multiple built-in discovery commands (such as netstat, net, sc, reg, tasklist, whoami) followed by system impairment activities like firewall modifications or recursive file deletion originating from the same parent process within a 1-day lookback window.
Detects correlations between suspicious web requests containing PHP tags directed at the Rootways Apple Pay endpoint and the subsequent creation of PHP files in the 'var/report' directory by web server processes within 30 minutes, indicating potential web shell deployment.
The exploit primitive. The host client launches a script or binary from a \Temp\ landing folder that a guest pushed. A legitimate host client doesn’t do this on its own. Covers rebranded builds via the .WindowsClient.exe suffix.
A technician deliberately launching a customer-sent file from inside the client UI (rare). Tune by AccountName.
A technician deliberately launching a customer-sent file from inside the client UI (rare). Tune by AccountName.
Detects a pattern where credentials discovered in configuration files,
environment variables, or memory dumps are immediately tested against
multiple authentication endpoints. Autonomous AI agents harvest credentials
from one source and fan out validation attempts across every reachable
service — testing each credential against databases, cloud consoles, APIs,
and internal applications in parallel.
ARTEX worker agents performing credential harvesting scan environment
variables, .env files, web.config, appsettings.json, and process memory.
Discovered credentials are added to the exploration graph and immediately
dispatched to validation workers. The resulting pattern — a process
reading credential stores followed by authentication attempts to many
distinct services within seconds — is distinctive.
Correlate Sysmon Event ID 1 (process reading known credential locations)
with authentication events across multiple services. The compressed
window between credential access and validation attempts is the signal.
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=ep-process where action='PROCESS_ADDED'
and (lower(commandline) like '%.env%'
or lower(commandline) like '%web.config%'
or lower(commandline) like '%appsettings.json%'
or lower(commandline) like '%credentials%'
or lower(commandline) like '%.aws/credentials%')
and (lower(commandline) like '%type %'
or lower(commandline) like '%cat %'
or lower(commandline) like '%get-content%'
or lower(commandline) like '%findstr%')
environment variables, or memory dumps are immediately tested against
multiple authentication endpoints. Autonomous AI agents harvest credentials
from one source and fan out validation attempts across every reachable
service — testing each credential against databases, cloud consoles, APIs,
and internal applications in parallel.
ARTEX worker agents performing credential harvesting scan environment
variables, .env files, web.config, appsettings.json, and process memory.
Discovered credentials are added to the exploration graph and immediately
dispatched to validation workers. The resulting pattern — a process
reading credential stores followed by authentication attempts to many
distinct services within seconds — is distinctive.
Correlate Sysmon Event ID 1 (process reading known credential locations)
with authentication events across multiple services. The compressed
window between credential access and validation attempts is the signal.
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=ep-process where action='PROCESS_ADDED'
and (lower(commandline) like '%.env%'
or lower(commandline) like '%web.config%'
or lower(commandline) like '%appsettings.json%'
or lower(commandline) like '%credentials%'
or lower(commandline) like '%.aws/credentials%')
and (lower(commandline) like '%type %'
or lower(commandline) like '%cat %'
or lower(commandline) like '%get-content%'
or lower(commandline) like '%findstr%')
Detects behavioral indicators of compromise involving PowerShell or Cmd executing a decoder script (EadF.php) with specific parameters or domain activity communicating with ns.mo7sen.dev, followed by wscript launching a VBS script from a temp directory initiated by a batch file command.
Detects the execution of known offensive security, network scanning, exploitation, and reconnaissance tools based on binary filenames, original filenames, and specific command-line arguments across devices.
The following analytic detects cmd.exe command lines that contain long sequences of encoded characters, such as decimal values (12;70;18;...), hexadecimal values (0x41,0x42,...), HTML entities, or Unicode and octal escapes.
This activity is significant because loaders, including ClickFix payloads that retrieve commands through finger, hide their next stage as an index list that cmd.exe decodes at runtime using delayed variable expansion before launching PowerShell.
If confirmed malicious, this could lead to execution of a hidden payload, such as a download cradle with an AMSI bypass.
This activity is significant because loaders, including ClickFix payloads that retrieve commands through finger, hide their next stage as an index list that cmd.exe decodes at runtime using delayed variable expansion before launching PowerShell.
If confirmed malicious, this could lead to execution of a hidden payload, such as a download cradle with an AMSI bypass.
This rule detects the installation or presence of a rogue ScreenConnect (ConnectWise Control) instance by extracting client IDs from file creation events and comparing them against a baseline of known historical client IDs over a 30-day period.
Any ScreenConnect client whose launch arguments (h=<relay>&p=<port>) point at a relay you don’t operate. This covers masterdarky[.]com:8041 and any rogue-relay abuse. Populate AuthorizedRelays with your own relay FQDNs first.
Detects potential NTLM credential leaks where Outlook processes (.msg file handling or execution) are followed closely by outbound network connections on ports 445 (SMB) or 80 (HTTP/WebDAV) to external IP addresses.
Detects a sequence where git-dumper is run against an HTTP(S) target to download a Git repository, followed within 1 day on the same device by a tool uploading data or files to temp.sh.
The following analytic detects the execution of ngrok.exe on a Windows operating system. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line arguments. This activity is significant because while ngrok is a legitimate tool for creating secure tunnels, it is increasingly used by adversaries to bypass network defenses and establish reverse proxies. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to exfiltrate data, maintain persistence, or facilitate further attacks by tunneling traffic through the compromised system.
Detects wscript.exe or cscript.exe spawning curl.exe with insecure TLS and redirect-following flags, writing the download to a pkg_<random>.tmp file in the Temp directory, or matching specific known malicious download URLs.
Detects file creation or modification events within the Windows Common Files Microsoft Shared Ink folder by non-standard and non-system processes, indicating potential execution flow hijacking or unauthorized component replacement.
Detects behavior where SGTool.exe launches SogouComMgr.exe from the SogouInput Components directory, followed by the loading of libcef.dll from the same directory, filtering out common legitimate hashes seen across multiple endpoints.
Detects the NodeRemote persistence chain where node.exe executes main.js from a WebServer- directory under the user's AppData\Local profile, typically launched via a scheduled task, or where the installer registers such a scheduled task using schtasks or PowerShell.
Detects Evil-WinRM usage or suspicious WinRM remote logons from novel IP addresses followed closely by the spawning of interactive shells and discovery tools (such as cmd.exe, powershell.exe, whoami.exe, etc.) via wsmprovhost.exe.
Detects behavioral activity where PowerShell is used to import and link a Group Policy Object (GPO) using Import-GPO and New-GPLink alongside references to SYSVOL, or where an executable/archive is written to SYSVOL by PowerShell followed by GPO cmdlets.
Detects the Trigram (Kimsuky/UNK_DeadDrop, OverLord) Windows dropper pattern where cmd.exe or PowerShell strips the Mark-of-the-Web via Unblock-File or Zone.Identifier removal, followed on the same host by the execution of a hidden VBScript worker using wscript //B.
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