Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Rust-based ransomware family targeting enterprise environments
Rust-based ransomware family targeting enterprise environments
This rule monitors for administrative VMware operations (cloning, snapshotting, or process manipulation) performed on sensitive infrastructure servers (such as Domain Controllers, PKI, Vault, or ADFS) that occur outside of a designated maintenance window by non-authorized accounts. It leverages tools like vim-cmd, esxcli, or govc to detect potential unauthorized VM manipulation that could lead to data theft, snapshot-based credential extraction, or unauthorized system changes.
Detects the use of esxcli or vim-cmd commands on VMware ESXi hosts to power off virtual machines, remove software components (VIBs), or enable maintenance mode. These actions are commonly performed by the Akira ransomware group to disrupt operations and facilitate encryption.
Detects enabling of ESXi host shell via vSphere API for remote execution
Detects ESXi hypervisor CLI access via direct SSH connection
Identifies the presence of the known ITScape (CVE-2026-46316) proof-of-concept executable by its SHA256 hash. This vulnerability enables a critical guest-to-host escape affecting ARM64 infrastructure.
This rule detects attempts to access the ESXi Hypervisor Command Line Interface (CLI) via HTTPS. It specifically looks for HTTP requests to the '/sdk' and 'vim25' URIs on port 443, which are indicative of vSphere API or CLI interactions with an ESXi host.
This rule detects the upload of a vSphere Installation Bundle (VIB) to an ESXi host. It specifically looks for HTTP PUT requests to the '/bundle' URI with a payload size greater than 100,000 bytes, which is indicative of a VIB file transfer. This activity could be part of a persistence mechanism where an attacker installs malicious software or backdoors on an ESXi host.
This rule detects an attempt to access the ESXi direct SSH shell by looking for the 'vim-cmd' string in TCP traffic directed to port 22 (SSH) on the home network. This indicates an administrative command being executed directly on an ESXi host via SSH.
This rule detects attempts to enable the ESXi Host Shell via the vCenter Web API. It specifically looks for HTTP requests to the '/api/vcenter/host' URI containing the word 'shell' in the client body, indicating a potential administrative action to enable shell access on an ESXi host.
This rule detects network traffic destined for TCP port 902 on the home network, which is commonly used for ESXi vSphere management. The rule specifically looks for established TCP connections to this port and triggers an alert if five such connections are observed from the same source within a 30-second window. This could indicate management activity or potential reconnaissance/attack against ESXi hosts.
This rule detects attempts to establish a TCP connection to port 902 on the home network, which is commonly used for VMware ESXi management. The rule specifically looks for SYN packets (flags:S) and triggers if there are at least 3 such connection attempts from the same source within a 60-second window. This could indicate an attempt to access or scan the ESXi management interface.
This rule detects attempts to enumerate the VMware vSphere virtual machine inventory via the API. It specifically looks for HTTP POST requests to the '/sdk/vimService' URI with 'RetrieveProperties' in the client body, indicating a query for system properties, which can include VM inventory details. The detection is focused on network traffic to port 443 (HTTPS) within the home network.
This rule detects HTTP POST requests to the '/sdk/vimService' URI on TCP port 443 (HTTPS) targeting an ESXi host. This pattern is indicative of direct API command execution attempts against the VMware vSphere API, which could be used by an attacker to interact with or control the ESXi hypervisor.
Detects high-fidelity static artifacts from VECT 2.0 across Windows, Linux, and ESXi variants. This includes known SHA-256 hashes of the ransomware executables, the '.vect' encrypted file extension, the '!!!READ_ME!!!.txt' ransom note, the 'dvm3_wall.bmp' wallpaper, the 'vector_notice.sh' shell hook, and the embedded Tor C2 hostname. These indicators are unique to VECT ransomware and have no legitimate use.
Detects anomalous file modification or deletion events targeting the SSH known_hosts file. This activity can be indicative of VECT ransomware, which zeroes out this file across compromised Linux and ESXi systems to suppress host-key warnings, enabling silent lateral movement via SCP and SSH.
Detects the creation of the 'vector_notice.sh' script in the '/etc/profile.d/' directory. The VECT ransomware (Linux and ESXi variants) drops this shell script to display a ransom note to users upon shell login.
Detects the use of esxcfg-advcfg to alter the BufferCache settings (MaxCapacity or FlushInterval) on an ESXi host. This activity is often associated with ransomware variants like Gentlemen ransomware, which modify these settings to prepare the storage layer for fast, reliable bulk file encryption.
Detects the use of esxcfg-advcfg to alter the BufferCache settings on an ESXi host. This activity can be a precursor to bulk file encryption, as seen with the 'Gentlemen Linux variant' which modifies VMFS write buffer and flush interval to prepare ESXi hosts for fast, reliable encryption.
Detects the execution of devcon.exe with command-line arguments to disable the VMware Virtual Machine Communication Interface (VMCI) PCI device or host device driver. Threat actors use this technique to gain direct hardware access as a preparatory step for VM escape exploits.
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