Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the creation of a crontab entry configured to execute a Python one-liner that performs a network connection to a specific remote IP address on port 4444. This behavior is indicative of a persistence mechanism and a C2 (Command and Control) beaconing attempt.
Detects the creation or modification of persistence mechanisms (Windows Registry Run/RunOnce keys, Cron jobs, Systemd services, and macOS LaunchAgents/LaunchDaemons) that specifically reference Java executables or .jar files. This pattern is consistent with cross-platform malware such as QuimaRAT attempting to maintain persistence.
Detects the creation or modification of cron jobs initiated by processes associated with the OpenClaw or ClawHub platforms. This behavior is indicative of a persistence mechanism being established by these applications, which may be leveraged by attackers if the processes themselves are compromised or malicious.
Detects post-compromise persistence techniques, including crontab modifications, SSH authorized_keys updates, and systemd service creation, when performed by child processes of AI agentic tools like Claude, Node.js, or Python. This activity suggests malicious persistence establishment following an indirect prompt injection or supply-chain compromise of the AI agent environment.
Detects instances where the Claude Code AI agent or its subprocesses are used to establish persistence. This is achieved by monitoring for crontab modifications or direct writes to SSH authorized_keys files, which are common indicators of post-exploitation activity following an Axiom-style indirect prompt injection.
Detects indicators of persistence on Linux systems, specifically targeting unauthorized cron job creation/deletion in /etc/cron.d/, execution of suspicious shell scripts (ssync.sh), modification of startup scripts (e.g., /etc/rc.d/cron), and execution of binaries from world-writable directories by cron or system daemons. This rule is designed to identify the footprint of known Linux-based persistence mechanisms associated with service account exploitation.
Detects unauthorized or suspicious modifications to critical Linux configuration directories (e.g., cron, rc, init, ipsec) or specific application-related paths by processes not typically associated with system management or package maintenance. The rule further elevates risk when specific indicators like LD_PRELOAD, LD_LIBRARY_PATH, or known malicious string artifacts are present in the command line or file path.
Detects post-exploitation activities related to the CVE-2026-45257 BUMSRAKETE vulnerability on FreeBSD. The rule monitors for kernel module loading using kldload from suspicious directories, kldstat execution, unauthorized root-level crontab modifications, and suspicious root-level shell execution spawned from non-standard parent processes, all of which indicate potential persistence or rootkit installation following a local privilege escalation.
Detects suspicious execution patterns originating from or associated with crontab, crond, or anacron processes. The rule identifies potential persistence or malicious task scheduling by monitoring specific command-line indicators such as execution from /tmp or /dev/shm, unusual execution intervals, or specific shell command patterns associated with cron job abuse.
Detects evidence of Linux-based cryptomining malware, such as xmrig and associated droppers, along with their persistence mechanisms and efforts to disable system security controls (e.g., SELinux, AppArmor, ufw). The rule monitors process execution, file creation, cron job configuration, and modifications to system immutability locks via chattr.
This rule detects instances where common web server processes (e.g., httpd, nginx) or system utility services (e.g., sshd, crond, dropbear) spawn shell processes like bash, sh, or ash. This activity is a classic indicator of potential remote command execution (RCE) via web application exploits or the abuse of legitimate system services to run arbitrary commands.
This rule detects persistence mechanisms and fileless execution patterns commonly associated with the MYRA malware family on Linux systems. It specifically monitors for malicious cron job creation, LD_PRELOAD library manipulation, unauthorized shell profile modifications, and memfd-based execution spawned from Node.js or npm processes.
This rule detects various Linux persistence mechanisms, including the use of LD_PRELOAD to hijack dynamic linker execution, the creation or modification of malicious cron jobs, and tampering with shell startup scripts. These techniques allow an adversary to maintain access to a compromised host by ensuring malicious code is executed automatically or injected into legitimate processes.
This rule detects potentially malicious activity related to the cron utility, including the modification of cron-related configuration files and the execution of specific suspicious payloads (e.g., ssync.sh, blacklist). It monitors for file creation, modification, or renaming events within sensitive directories, as well as the spawning of processes by cron daemons using identified suspicious paths or command names.
Detects persistence mechanisms associated with the MYRA RAT. This includes Linux/macOS crontab modification using specific schedules or shell profile writes initiated by node/npm processes, as well as Windows scheduled task creation or task manipulation via schtasks.exe initiated by node/npm processes.
Detects MYRA Linux RAT persistence mechanisms. The rule monitors for the creation of cron jobs scheduled to run every 13 minutes and the creation of a profile initialization script at /etc/profile.d/.sh.local, which is a common technique for ensuring code execution upon user shell session initialization.
This rule detects potentially malicious activity related to cron job scheduling. It monitors for three distinct stages: (1) direct modification of crontab files or directories using common shell utilities, (2) suspicious file write operations to critical cron configuration paths, and (3) execution of shell scripts or binaries from unusual directories (e.g., /tmp, /dev/shm) where the parent process is a cron utility.
Detects indicators of the MYRA Linux RAT, including process masquerading as systemd-userdbd, persistent modifications to system locations like /etc/profile.d/ and /usr/local/lib/, and malicious cron scheduling, typically originating from a Node.js process.
Detects when a non-root user modifies, creates, or renames files within common cron directories or the main crontab file on Linux systems. This activity can indicate an attempt to establish persistence or schedule malicious tasks.
Detects potential persistence attempts via cron job manipulation by unprivileged service accounts (such as www-data) or patterns indicative of the 'lambsys' threat, including usage of known writable temporary directories, non-interactive crontab installations, and aggressive execution schedules.
Detects unauthorized cron job creation or modification associated with cryptominer persistence. The rule monitors for common persistence indicators such as referencing 'lambsys', 'isp.sh', or 'procq' within cron-related commands and shell execution patterns that suggest malicious automated tasks in Linux environments.
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