Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects googleupdate.exe loading an unsigned DLL from a non-standard path, followed by network communication to a known Command and Control (C2) domain or IP address.
Exposure-assessment hunt for endpoints running OpenCode and contacting OpenCode Console or AI provider APIs, to prioritise API key rotation after the October 2026 OpenCode breach.
Detects msiexec.exe spawning scripting or programming engines (such as PowerShell or Python) that perform LDAP directory searches and establish outbound external network connections within a specific time window.
Detects processes accessing or enumerating multiple cryptocurrency wallet files or directories across common storage paths (e.g., Exodus, Electrum, Coinomi, Ethereum, Atomic, Guarda) within a short timeframe, which is often indicative of wallet theft or credential harvesting malware.
Detects script execution (such as wscript, cscript, mshta) spawned from a shell parent process (like explorer.exe or cmd.exe) referencing browser cache files (matching f_* in browser profile directories) or copying scripts to the local Temp directory as t.vbs.
Detects browser cache smuggling (ClickFix/FileFix delivery mechanisms) where a non-browser script interpreter or LOLBin accesses a browser HTTP-cache directory and writes an executable or script payload outside the cache, followed shortly by the execution of a payload from a user staging directory.
Files with well-known filenames (sensitive files with credential data) copying
Detects the use of Inveigh a cross-platform .NET IPv4/IPv6 machine-in-the-middle tool
Detects the execution of msiexec.exe from an uncommon directory
This rule detects execution of a PowerShell code through the sqltoolsps.exe utility, which is included in the standard set of utilities supplied with the Microsoft SQL Server Management studio.
Script blocks are not logged in this case, so this utility helps to bypass protection mechanisms based on the analysis of these logs.
Script blocks are not logged in this case, so this utility helps to bypass protection mechanisms based on the analysis of these logs.
Windows Test Authoring and Execution Framework (TAEF) framework allows you to run automation by executing tests files written on different languages (C, C#, Microsoft COM Scripting interfaces
Adversaries may execute malicious code (such as WSC file with VBScript, dll and so on) directly by running te.exe
Adversaries may execute malicious code (such as WSC file with VBScript, dll and so on) directly by running te.exe
Detects the correlation between the loading of known stealer plugin DLLs outside of standard application paths and subsequent process activity accessing credential stores, sensitive files, or executing wireless key recovery commands.
Detects the creation of a Windows scheduled task with the name or command containing 'WinRTCS' correlated with WMI permanent event subscription activities or execution of the 'own_lib.ps1' watchdog script within a 1-hour window on the same device, using Microsoft Defender XDR tables.
Detects web server processes (such as apache2, nginx, httpd, php-fpm, or w3wp.exe) spawning shell interpreters (such as bash, sh, cmd.exe, or powershell.exe), which is a common indicator of web shell activity or application exploitation.
Detects suspicious command execution activities using Azure RunCommand, Custom Script Extension, or Azure Connected Machine Agent combined with potentially malicious command arguments or tools such as PowerShell encoded commands, 'IEX', download strings, certutil, whoami, base64, curl, or wget.
Detects the execution of ntdsutil.exe with arguments to create an Install from Media (IFM) database backup, preceded shortly by a Remote Interactive logon (RDP) from a remote IP source, which can indicate adversary activity attempting to dump Active Directory credentials.
Detects a PowerShell download-and-execute command referencing specific typosquatted lure domains (e.g., choclatey.org, massgravel.net) combined with follow-up script activity writing into a fake SystemHealth\Update directory.
Detects Python interpreter activity accessing multiple credential store categories (such as password managers, Discord, SSH keys, or Steam) in a short window on a single device, or specific stealer scripts associated with known file paths.
Detects potential SQL injection (SQLi) attempts targeting web applications by identifying multiple requests matching specific SQLi regex patterns combined with encoding or internal reference markers within web access logs.
Detects instances where a web browser accesses a domain listed in the 'AdFection_Domains' watchlist, followed closely by the browser spawning a script interpreter (such as PowerShell, wscript, cscript, mshta) or dropping an executable/script file in user profile or temporary directories.
Detects web server processes writing PHP files into sensitive WordPress directories (such as mu-plugins or rank-math-pro/includes) shortly after deleting them within a 1-hour window. This behavior often indicates the rebuilding or updating of a webshell or backdoor for persistence.
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