Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
2,594 detections
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Detects network activity associated with the AMOS (Atomic macOS Stealer) malware, specifically identifying C2 registration/heartbeat beacons and tasking retrieval requests to known C2 URI paths over port 8133.
Detects network activity associated with the Sauron Loader, including TLS connections to specific C2 domains and repeated HTTPS POST requests to api.* subdomains indicating beaconing or polling behavior.
Detects outbound TLS traffic where the Server Name Indication (SNI) matches known command-and-control (C2) domains associated with the Sauron Loader malware. This indicates a compromised host attempting to communicate with malicious infrastructure.
Detects network traffic consistent with AMOS Stealer command-and-control (C2) activity, specifically HTTP POST requests to the path '/api/t' on non-standard TCP port 8133. The rule includes a threshold to mitigate noise from single connections.
Detects HTTP POST requests to '/api/credentials' which is indicative of the AMOS (Atomic macOS) Stealer malware exfiltrating stolen credentials. The rule uses a threshold to identify multiple exfiltration attempts from the same source within a short time window.
Detects HTTP POST requests to '/api/credentials' which is indicative of the AMOS (Atomic macOS) Stealer malware exfiltrating stolen credentials. The rule uses a threshold to identify multiple exfiltration attempts from the same source within a short time window.
Detects DNS queries and TLS SNI traffic directed towards known domain names associated with the Sauron Loader command-and-control infrastructure. This rule identifies outbound communication attempts using hardcoded beaconing domains.
This rule detects known command-and-control (C2) domains associated with the Sauron Loader malware family, specifically by inspecting TLS Server Name Indication (SNI) fields. It also monitors for patterns of repeated connections to domains prefixed with 'api.' over established TLS sessions, which may indicate beaconing behavior characteristic of C2 activity.
Detects network activity associated with the AMOS (Atomic Stealer) malware, specifically identifying C2 registration, heartbeats, or credential exfiltration attempts over the non-standard port 8133 using HTTP patterns matching its known API endpoints.
Detects outbound HTTP POST requests characteristic of the Sauron Loader malware, utilizing a specific, randomized URI path structure and a known malicious User-Agent string to establish C2 communication.
Detects outbound HTTP POST requests characteristic of the Sauron Loader malware, utilizing a specific, randomized URI path structure and a known malicious User-Agent string to establish C2 communication.
Detects outbound network traffic from internal hosts to known domains associated with the Sauron Loader malware family. These alerts monitor for TLS connections where the Server Name Indication (SNI) matches domains identified as part of the malware's C2 infrastructure.
Detects network communication associated with the Casbaneiro (Metamorfo) banking trojan, specifically identifying DNS queries, TLS SNI headers, HTTP Host headers, and direct IP connections to known malicious C2 infrastructure.
Detects network activity associated with the SloppyRAT malware, specifically identifying C2 authentication attempts via HTTP POST requests containing specific headers and user-agent strings, as well as TLS connections to known malicious domains and IP addresses.
Detects periodic outbound HTTP POST requests consistent with C2 beaconing behavior associated with the Latrodectus malware. The rule identifies multiple POST requests occurring within a 10-minute window, a pattern often used by Latrodectus for command-and-control heartbeats.
Detects outbound TCP traffic originating from internal hosts to known command and control infrastructure associated with the SilkParasite campaign and the SpiceRAT malware family.
Detects repeated authentication login attempts (opcode 0xA0) against Dahua Easy4IP devices over TCP port 37777, indicative of a brute-force or credential stuffing attack.
Detects Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) traffic occurring over non-standard high ports (64350, 64330, 65535, 65111, 61256), which is indicative of SilkParasite C2 activity or potentially malicious lateral movement attempting to bypass standard port monitoring.
Detects network traffic involving TLS certificates that impersonate the Uzbekistan state railway authority, specifically using certificates issued by 'TLC DV TLS CA' or specific known malicious certificate fingerprints. This activity is attributed to the threat actor SilkParasite.
Detects network traffic associated with exploitation attempts against Dahua P2P relay services. The rules monitor for specific URI patterns ('/online/p2psrv/' and '/probe/device/') used to probe the device, as well as traffic containing a hardcoded AES-OFB initialization vector, which indicates attempts to exploit CVE-2025-31702.
Detects network activity associated with the SilkParasite actor's NodeEdgeRAT malware, including DNS queries, TLS SNI, HTTP Host headers, and direct IP connections to the identified command-and-control infrastructure 'hoster-kg.com'.
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