Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the execution of 'bun' during a Node.js package installation process (npm or node). This behavior can be indicative of a supply chain attack where malicious actors attempt to leverage alternative runtimes during the 'preinstall' phase or package installation to execute arbitrary code or bypass security controls typically associated with standard Node.js installations.
Detects instances where 'ERAAgent.exe', part of the ESET Remote Administrator agent, loads the 'dpapi.dll' library from a location outside of standard Windows System directories (System32 or SysWOW64). Furthermore, the rule flags this behavior if the loaded 'dpapi.dll' file is either unsigned or contains an untrusted digital signature, which may indicate a malicious DLL side-loading or masquerading attempt to access protected system credentials.
Detects behavior where the ERAAgent process writes a file to disk and executes that same file shortly after (within 5 minutes). This pattern is consistent with staged payload delivery, decompression, or assembly often observed in malicious activity, specifically referencing SLEEPWALKER malware patterns.
Detects instances where the ESET Remote Administrator Agent (ERAAgent.exe) modifies registry keys related to Windows network security settings, such as LSA policies, NullSession pipes/shares, or server/workstation auto-sharing. These settings can be manipulated to weaken Windows security posture, potentially facilitating lateral movement or credential access.
Detects instances where the ESET Remote Administrator Agent (ERAAgent.exe) terminates shortly after loading the Data Protection API service (dpapisvc.dll). This pattern may indicate an attempt to interact with or disrupt DPAPI services, potentially to facilitate credential dumping or sensitive data access.
This rule monitors process command lines for identifiers related to virtual machine communication interfaces such as 'VMCI', 'AF_VSOCK', 'svm_cid', or 'vm:2'. It specifically targets both the ESET Remote Administrator (ERA) Agent and any other processes utilizing these communication mechanisms, which can be indicators of inter-process communication across virtual machine boundaries or potential hypervisor-related activity.
This rule monitors for the connection of specific KVM-over-IP hardware devices (e.g., PiKVM, Guermok) which can be used by an adversary to gain remote access to a system's physical keyboard, video, and mouse interface, effectively bypassing software-based security controls.
Detects instances where the SQL Server process (sqlservr.exe) initiates a child process that is a known command-line tool, script interpreter, or utility often used in living-off-the-land attacks, or when a child process is spawned from suspicious directory paths such as AppData, Temp, or Windows\Temp.
This rule monitors for email events where the email is flagged for suspicious properties (SPF/DKIM/DMARC failure, threat categorization) and includes potentially malicious attachments or URLs. It then correlates these suspicious emails with subsequent process execution events on the recipient's endpoint within a 30-minute window, identifying a potential successful execution of a phishing payload.
This rule monitors for web server exploit attempts (indicated by patterns like JNDI lookups or SQL injection sequences in URI/cookie data) that correlate with a surge in server-side errors (400+ status codes) and subsequent anomalous process creation or outbound network connections from the web server process.
Detects potential exploitation of a CrowdStrike Falcon remediation process vulnerability ('FalconFlank'). The rule identifies either direct execution of the PoC binary or the suspicious combination of a CrowdStrike remediation process loading an unsigned or untrusted DLL from a user-writable path followed by the same process spawning a command shell in the SYSTEM context within 15 minutes.
Detects the loading of registry hives using the 'reg load' command. This technique is often associated with adversary attempts to manipulate the Windows registry, access sensitive data, or establish persistence, particularly when followed by actions executed in the SYSTEM context from the same process lineage.
Detects rapid, repeated invocation of Microsoft Defender remediation processes (mpcmdrun.exe, MsMpEng.exe) occurring in conjunction with suspicious file write or rename operations in System32. This pattern is characteristic of a Time-of-Check to Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) race condition, where an attacker attempts to exploit the timing gap between Defender's detection and remediation actions to replace a file with a malicious version.
This rule detects unauthorized attempts to modify CrowdStrike Falcon sensor exclusion registry keys or commands involving DLL loading techniques that may indicate evasion preparation, specifically referencing potential FalconFlank-related activities. It filters out legitimate management activity from known service accounts, SCCM, and the CrowdStrike Falcon agent itself.
Detects the invocation of the AppInstaller executable to install .msix packages, often used in software installation or malicious delivery scenarios involving application deployment.
Detects the addition of suspicious file names or known potentially unwanted program artifacts to Windows Run registry keys, often used for persistence. The rule correlates registry modifications with potential installer process activity.
Detects when the Postgres service process or account attempts to modify system-level persistence mechanisms, such as scheduled tasks (cron/schtasks) or system services (systemd/startup folders), which are typical behaviors for an adversary using database service context to maintain persistence.
Detects network activity associated with the CurlRAT malware during its beaconing phase. The rule monitors for process command line arguments containing 'writeservice_info' or 'atd_get_system_info', which indicate the collection of system information, and correlates this with network connections that potentially transmit a ~10KB data payload characteristic of its check-in mechanism.
This rule detects potential bulk data exfiltration by monitoring for high volumes of file access events (FileAccessed, FileRead, FileModified) originating from the 'doc_helper.aspx' file-management web shell. It summarizes activity by device and user account, flagging instances where over 100 unique files are touched within a short timeframe, which is indicative of automated collection and exfiltration activities.
Detects the creation of a scheduled task using 'schtasks.exe' where the initiating process is a script interpreter such as 'mshta.exe' or 'powershell.exe'. This behavior is often associated with the execution of malicious payloads or the establishment of persistence.
Detects attempts to modify, disable, or exclude paths and processes from Microsoft Defender Antivirus using legitimate administrative utilities such as PowerShell, cmd, sc, and netsh. This behavior is indicative of an adversary attempting to evade security monitoring.
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