Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the execution of nested, hidden, and bypassed PowerShell sessions spawned by cmd.exe, typically launched from a Startup LNK file. This behavior is associated with the SHADOW-EARTH-066 campaign, which uses specific command-line arguments for evasion and loads payloads from C:\ProgramData\ using Invoke-Expression or iex.
Detects process command lines executing an `_index.js` payload using the Bun runtime, which is characteristic of the Hades stealer's execution chain where a Python loader downloads Bun to execute an obfuscated JavaScript payload.
This rule flags a large number of files receiving a '.lalia' extension at once, indicating potential Lalia ransomware activity. Bulk extension changes are a common initial indicator of ransomware infection. The rule looks for at least 20 file events (renamed, created, or modified) where the file name ends with '.lalia' within a 30-day window.
This rule watches for creation of ransom notes associated with the Lalia family. Notes often appear in multiple folders once encryption finishes. Identify patient zero and check offline backups. Ask the person who used the computer whether they installed new software or clicked a link, and involve your security team if the answer is unclear.
Identifies 'forfiles.exe' being executed with a combination of multiple command-line switches ('/c', '/p', '/m' or their hyphenated equivalents). This pattern can indicate automated scripting or malicious Living-off-the-Land activity, where 'forfiles.exe' is used to execute commands on multiple files or in specific directories.
Detects privilege escalation attempts utilizing PowerShell's Start-Process cmdlet with the 'RunAs' verb. This technique can be used by malware like Lucid Stealer's UAC module to elevate privileges.
Monitors for network connections originating from the VSCode extension host process to GitHub API endpoints immediately following a new extension installation. This may indicate token exfiltration or repository enumeration from a malicious extension.
This rule detects explicit references to popular PowerShell credential dumping tools, specifically 'Invoke-Mimikatz' and 'Invoke-Kerberoast', within executed PowerShell commands. It leverages native Defender XDR PowerShell command logging to identify these suspicious activities, which are indicative of credential access attempts.
Detects the creation of zip archives matching the specific naming convention (Unix-[HOSTNAME]-[ID].zip) used by the UnixStealer malware family. Detecting these host artifacts enables early discovery before successful exfiltration.
Detects the initial execution phase of the Phantom Gyp technique, which is used by the Miasma worm. This technique abuses the binding.gyp file with a command substitution pattern to execute a silent payload, bypassing standard npm lifecycle scripts.
Detects the creation of temporary '.tmp' files starting with 'Hid' in the user's temporary directory, which is indicative of the PoisonX dropper deploying its driver. This behavior is associated with the initial stages of PoisonX malware execution.
This rule detects an unusually high volume of file deletion events on a device within a short time frame (100 or more files deleted within a 5-minute window). This activity can be indicative of malicious behaviors such as ransomware encrypting and deleting original files, data wiping attacks, or an adversary attempting to remove forensic evidence by deleting logs or other critical files.
This rule detects an unusually high number of Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) process executions (wmic.exe or wmiprvse.exe) on a single device within a one-hour window. A threshold of 10 or more executions per hour is used to flag potential suspicious activity. Adversaries often leverage WMI for various purposes, including reconnaissance, lateral movement, persistence, and execution of malicious commands.
This rule detects an unusually high number of file rename events (20 or more within a 1-hour window) initiated by a single process account. This behavior can be indicative of malicious activities such as data staging prior to exfiltration, ransomware encryption, or attempts to evade detection by renaming malicious files or legitimate system utilities.
This rule detects when a single account initiates 5 or more successful Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) connections within a one-hour window. This behavior can be indicative of an adversary attempting to gain widespread access within a network, potentially through credential stuffing, brute-force attacks, or lateral movement using compromised credentials.
This rule detects potential vulnerability scanning activity by identifying multiple network connection attempts to common vulnerable ports (135, 139, 445) where the remote URL contains keywords like 'vuln' or 'scan'. It aggregates these activities by device and time, flagging devices with 5 or more such connections within an hour.
Detects exploitation of weak service file permissions for privilege escalation
Detects use of CreateProcessWithTokenW for spawning elevated processes
Detects autorun.inf files written to removable media for self-propagation
Detects remote service connections originating from external internet addresses
Detects use of stolen legitimate code signing certificates on suspicious binaries
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