Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the invocation of TabTip.exe via DCOM with a specific error ID, which is indicative of the JuicyPotatoNG tool being used in brute force mode for local privilege escalation. This technique leverages a DCOM vulnerability to elevate privileges.
This rule detects a DHCP server error where a specified Callout DLL, configured in the registry, could not be loaded. This event can indicate an attempt to inject a malicious DLL into the DHCP server process for persistence, privilege escalation, or defense evasion.
This rule detects when a DHCP server loads a specified Callout DLL, which can be abused for persistence, privilege escalation, or defense evasion. Adversaries might inject malicious DLLs into legitimate processes like the DHCP server to maintain access or elevate privileges on a system.
This analytic detects suspicious data transfer activities involving the use of the `split` syscall with the `-b` option, which specifies the size of each output file. This technique can be used by attackers to evade detection by breaking large files into smaller parts, bypassing size-based security controls, and facilitating covert exfiltration of sensitive data. By monitoring for unusual or unauthorized use of the `split` syscall with a specified block size, this analytic helps identify potential data exfiltration attempts.
This analytic identifies the bulk creation of ransomware notes (e.g., .txt, .html, .hta files) on an infected machine. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 11 to detect multiple instances of these file types being created within a short time frame (10 seconds). A detection is triggered if 15 or more unique readme paths are observed. This activity is a strong indicator of an active ransomware attack, where the attacker is notifying the victim of the encryption. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to widespread data encryption, rendering critical files inaccessible and potentially causing significant operational disruption.
The following analytic detects suspicious attempts to find credentials stored in password stores, indicating a potential attacker's effort to access sensitive login information. Password stores are critical repositories that contain valuable credentials, and unauthorized access to them can lead to significant security breaches. By monitoring for unusual or unauthorized activities related to password store access, this analytic helps identify potential credential theft attempts, allowing security teams to respond promptly and prevent unauthorized access to critical systems and data.
The following analytic detects the suspicious termination of known services commonly targeted by ransomware before file encryption. It leverages Windows System Event Logs (EventCode 7036) to identify when critical services such as Volume Shadow Copy, backup, and antivirus services are stopped. This activity is significant because ransomware often disables these services to avoid errors and ensure successful file encryption. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to widespread data encryption, rendering files inaccessible and potentially causing significant operational disruption and data loss.
The analytic detects the creation of a Windows service named "Sliver" with the description "Sliver Implant," indicative of SliverC2 lateral movement using the PsExec module. It leverages Windows EventCode 7045 from the System Event log to identify this activity. This behavior is significant as it may indicate an adversary's attempt to establish persistence or execute commands remotely. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to maintain control over the compromised system, execute arbitrary code, and further infiltrate the network.
This analytic detects the suspicious termination of known services commonly targeted by ransomware before file encryption. It leverages Windows System Event Logs (EventCode 7036) to identify when critical services such as Volume Shadow Copy, backup, and antivirus services are stopped. This activity is significant because ransomware often disables these services to avoid errors and ensure successful file encryption. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to widespread data encryption, rendering files inaccessible and potentially causing significant operational disruption and data loss.
Detects known malicious service installs that appear in cases in which a Cobalt Strike beacon elevates privileges or lateral movement
The following analytic detects the creation of Alternate Data Streams (ADS) with Base64 content on Windows systems. It leverages Sysmon EventID 15, which captures file creation events, including the content of named streams. ADS can conceal malicious payloads, making them significant for SOC monitoring. This detection identifies hidden streams that may contain executables, scripts, or configuration data, often used by malware to evade detection. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to hide and execute payloads, persist in the environment, or access sensitive information without being easily detected.
The following analytic detects the creation of a Windows Service with a binary path located in uncommon directories, using Windows Event ID 7045. It leverages logs from the `wineventlog_system` to identify services installed outside typical system directories. This activity is significant as adversaries, including those deploying Clop ransomware, often create malicious services for lateral movement, remote code execution, persistence, and execution. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to maintain persistence, execute arbitrary code, and potentially escalate privileges, posing a severe threat to the environment.
The following analytic detects the creation of files in the Windows %startup% folder, a common persistence technique. It leverages the Endpoint.Filesystem data model to identify file creation events in this specific directory. This activity is significant because adversaries often use the startup folder to ensure their malicious code executes automatically upon system boot or user logon. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to maintain persistence on the host, potentially leading to further system compromise and unauthorized access to sensitive information.
The following analytic detects the creation of archived files in a temporary folder, which may contain collected data. This behavior is often associated with malicious activity, where attackers compress sensitive information before exfiltration. The detection focuses on monitoring specific directories, such as temp folders, for the presence of newly created archive files (e.g., .zip, .rar, .tar). By identifying this pattern, security teams can quickly respond to potential data collection and exfiltration attempts, minimizing the risk of data breaches and improving overall threat detection.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks that involves a temporary folder and runs only once
Detects the creation of a schtasks that potentially executes a payload stored in the Windows Registry using PowerShell.
Detects a WMI backdoor in Exchange Transport Agents via WMI event filters
The following analytic identifies the creation of executables or scripts in suspicious file paths on Windows systems. It leverages the Endpoint.Filesystem data model to detect files with specific extensions (e.g., .exe, .dll, .ps1) created in uncommon directories (e.g., \windows\fonts\, \users\public\). This activity is significant as adversaries often use these paths to evade detection and maintain persistence. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute unauthorized code, escalate privileges, or persist within the environment, posing a significant security threat.
This rule detects when critical Windows services or processes associated with Active Directory (NTDS, Netlogon, LSASS, LDAP) or the Print Spooler (Spooler, spoolsv.exe) crash multiple times (3 or more) on a machine within a 7-day period. This could indicate instability, a denial-of-service attempt, or a system compromise affecting core services.
Detects the configuration of a new ISATAP router on a Windows host. While ISATAP is a legitimate Microsoft technology for IPv6 transition, unexpected or unauthorized ISATAP router configurations could indicate a potential IPv6 DNS Takeover attack using tools like mitm6.
In such attacks, adversaries advertise themselves as DHCPv6 servers and set malicious ISATAP routers to intercept traffic.
This detection should be correlated with network baselines and known legitimate ISATAP deployments in your environment.
In such attacks, adversaries advertise themselves as DHCPv6 servers and set malicious ISATAP routers to intercept traffic.
This detection should be correlated with network baselines and known legitimate ISATAP deployments in your environment.
Detects a PDQDeploy service installation which indicates that PDQDeploy was installed on the machines.
PDQDeploy can be abused by attackers to remotely install packages or execute commands on target machines
PDQDeploy can be abused by attackers to remotely install packages or execute commands on target machines
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