Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects potential command-and-control beaconing activity associated with the Go RAT used in the GapiUpdate campaign. It monitors for outbound network connections over TCP port 5556 to a known malicious C2 IP address, or alternatively, detects persistent outbound activity to other external (non-RFC1918) IP addresses characterized by multiple successive connections within a 10-minute window, which mimics the behavior of persistent beaconing.
Detects a 'git checkout' command targeting a specific commit SHA that is not followed within five minutes by a 'git rev-parse HEAD' integrity check. This behavior, known as 'Plugin4Shell', involves an attacker replacing a pinned commit with a malicious branch of the same name, potentially leading to unauthorized code execution if verification steps are absent.
Detects network activity associated with Rust-based stealer malware, specifically focusing on connections to a known C2 IP address (31.76.7.137) or HTTP requests directed at static-asset paths (e.g., analytics.gif, pixel.png, content.js) when the destination is an IPv4-literal address. This behavior is indicative of C2 beacons or data exfiltration disguised as legitimate web traffic.
This rule detects successful outbound network connections to the domain 'gapidriver.com' targeting the URI path '/api/get.php'. This pattern is associated with command and control (C2) activity. Due to the lack of specific HTTP header validation in this telemetry source, the signal may require additional validation, such as analyzing the initiating process lineage.
This rule detects successful outbound network connections to the domain 'gapidriver.com' targeting the URI path '/api/get.php'. This pattern is associated with command and control (C2) activity. Due to the lack of specific HTTP header validation in this telemetry source, the signal may require additional validation, such as analyzing the initiating process lineage.
Detects successful network connections to a known hVNC RAT (GapiUpdate) C2 infrastructure IP address on port 5556, based on DeviceNetworkEvents logs.
Detects successful network connections to a known hVNC RAT (GapiUpdate) C2 infrastructure IP address on port 5556, based on DeviceNetworkEvents logs.
Detects high-frequency file creation, modification, or renaming activity involving files with the specific '.df_win' extension, likely indicative of mass encryption activity or automated ransomware behavior. The rule excludes known backup and security software processes to reduce noise.
Detects anomalous child process execution by Chromium-based browsers (e.g., chrome.exe, msedge.exe, brave.exe). This behavior is indicative of potential exploitation of browser vulnerabilities such as CVE-2026-85046, where a memory corruption vulnerability is leveraged to escape the browser sandbox and execute arbitrary commands via interpreters like cmd.exe or powershell.exe.
Detects the execution of COM files located in the AppData\Local directory with a numeric filename and specific command-line arguments indicative of file transfer or proxying tools like curl/wget wrappers.
Detects indicators of the 'ShieldCrash' proof-of-concept (CVE-2026-69414 exploit bypass) on Windows systems. The rule monitors for specific malicious file activity, module loading, and the presence of decoy archive files associated with the PoC, which are used to achieve arbitrary file read as SYSTEM.
Detects unauthorized or suspicious modifications to the SyncRootManager registry keys. This rule is designed to identify potential exploitation attempts, such as the ShieldCrash zero-day, which abuse the Windows CFAPI sync-root mechanisms to achieve privilege escalation or bypass security features. Legitimate synchronization software is explicitly excluded from this detection.
Detects Run key persistence pointing to the known VBScript staging directory (C:\Users\Public\Libraries\Default\Lib\Lib1) used by the worm-like ScreenConnect campaign (Aug 2026), matching known script filenames (WindowsServiceHost.vbs, 1.vbs-4.vbs) invoked via wscript.exe/cscript.exe.
Detects automated searching (via grep, findstr, or select-string) for sensitive strings (e.g., API keys, private keys, wallet data) across multiple occurrences on a single host, or the creation of suspicious sensitive files (e.g., .env, credentials, wallet.dat) on devices where such automated sweeping activity has been observed. This pattern indicates an adversary staging data for exfiltration.
Detects suspicious process execution patterns originating from Langflow or Nacos AI orchestration services, including the spawning of sensitive binaries like cmd, powershell, or scripts (python/bash/sh) with suspicious command-line arguments. Additionally, it identifies potential exploitation attempts targeting known-vulnerable API endpoints (code validation and Nacos user authentication).
Detects suspicious process execution patterns originating from Langflow or Nacos AI orchestration services, including the spawning of sensitive binaries like cmd, powershell, or scripts (python/bash/sh) with suspicious command-line arguments. Additionally, it identifies potential exploitation attempts targeting known-vulnerable API endpoints (code validation and Nacos user authentication).
This rule detects the use of the VS Code command line interface to install extensions, specifically by monitoring for the 'workbench.extensions.installExtension' command. This activity can be indicative of automated installation of extensions, which could be used for malicious purposes or persistence if an attacker installs a malicious extension.
Detects instances where a Visual Studio Code (VS Code) extension host process launches potentially suspicious child processes, specifically command-line tools like cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or calc.exe, within 30 seconds of the extension host starting.
This rule detects the use of the VS Code command line interface to install extensions, specifically by monitoring for the 'workbench.extensions.installExtension' command. This activity can be indicative of automated installation of extensions, which could be used for malicious purposes or persistence if an attacker installs a malicious extension.
Detects unauthorized attempts to dump the process memory of the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS), a common technique used by attackers to harvest credentials from memory. This includes the use of legitimate diagnostic tools like procdump and comsvcs.dll, as well as the identification of resulting dump files in directory paths associated with LSASS.
Detects execution and file activity associated with the XRed backdoor, which masquerades as 'Synaptics.exe' by running from the non-standard 'C:\ProgramData\Synaptics\' directory instead of authorized system paths.
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