Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects potential ransomware activity by monitoring for a high volume of file creation or renaming events where the new file names end with common ransomware extensions such as '.encrypted', '.locked', or '.crypted'. It aggregates these events over 5-minute intervals and triggers if 50 or more such files are observed on a single device.
This rule detects suspicious file renaming activities indicative of ransomware. It specifically looks for files that previously had common document extensions (.doc, .xls, .ppt) being renamed to extensions commonly associated with encryption by ransomware (.encrypted, .locked, .crypted, .ecc). The rule triggers if 20 or more such renames occur within a 5-minute window on a single device.
This rule detects suspicious file activity indicative of ransomware by monitoring for a high volume of file creations or renames where the filenames contain common ransomware-related extensions such as '.encrypted', '.locked', or '.ransom'. It aggregates these events over a one-hour period per device and triggers if 20 or more such events occur.
Detects suspicious modifications to Registry Run and RunOnce keys that include common scripting or command execution keywords (powershell, cmd, .bat). This activity is often associated with persistence mechanisms where adversaries attempt to execute malicious code upon user login.
Detects when a user executes more than 3 commands via the Windows Run dialog, as indicated by entries in the 'Explorer\RunMRU' registry key. This activity could be indicative of an attacker performing reconnaissance or executing multiple commands, or it could be a legitimate power user or administrator activity.
Detects Atlas RAT anti-analysis behavior by monitoring for registry queries or interactions with the Windows Defender Application Guard (WDAG) RunOnce registry key. This rule specifically looks for registry events where the key name contains "RunOnce" and the value name contains "WDAG", indicating an attempt by malware to detect or interact with a sandbox environment.
This rule detects indicators of a multi-stage infection involving PlugX malware, often associated with the Mustang Panda threat group. It correlates process execution events where the command line contains "mustang", "panda", or "plugx" with either registry modifications containing the same keywords or network connections to a remote URL containing "/update". This correlation helps to identify more sophisticated attacks that involve multiple stages of execution, persistence, and communication.
This rule detects devices making a high volume of outbound network connections (more than 1000 connections within a one-minute window) to a single remote IP address. This behavior could indicate a network denial-of-service (DoS) attack originating from the device, or potentially other forms of high-volume network activity such as data exfiltration or scanning.
Detects file execution where curl.exe or bitsadmin.exe are copied to a public document folder and renamed to DLL extensions (like winhttp.dll or wininet.dll) to evade detection. This activity is associated with the TAX#TRIDENT campaign.
Detects regedit.exe being used to import a registry (.reg) file located in the C:\ProgramData\ directory. This technique is utilized in the Nimbus RAT attack chain, where users are socially engineered via Teams to manually import a pre-staged .reg file (e.g., InboxCorePro.reg) to establish persistence on the host.
Detects the execution of the Java runtime (javaw.exe) from the C:\ProgramData\ directory with the -jar flag. This behavior is indicative of malware like Nimbus RAT, which bundles its own OpenJDK runtime to evade detection and bypass missing Java dependencies on the target host.
Identifies wscript.exe executing a JavaScript file from a user directory and subsequently spawning a PowerShell process with execution policy bypass (-nop) and encoded command (-enc) flags, indicative of potential MonoGlyphRAT staging activity.
This rule detects potential DNS tunneling or data exfiltration by identifying high volumes of DNS queries with unusually long subdomains from a single process on a device. It aggregates DNS connection inspection events, extracts the subdomain length, and then summarizes the count of queries, unique domains, and average subdomain length within a 10-minute window. An alert is triggered if the query count exceeds 100 or if more than 50 unique domains are observed, combined with subdomain lengths greater than 30 characters.
Detects execution of svchost.exe from the non-standard \Windows\SysWOW64\msres\ folder. This behavior is associated with the ClientSetup/SyncFuture payload used in the TAX#TRIDENT campaign to maintain C2 sessions.
Detects VSLauncher.exe execution or image loading involving input.dll under SysWOW64, indicative of DLL side-loading by the UAC-0184 threat actor.
Detects modification of the InprocServer32 key for the Windows Color System Calibration CLSID, used by Argamal RAT for persistence. Legitimate Windows Color System components are typically registered in HKLM, not HKCU.
This query identifies devices and users where the compromised Nx Console VS Code extension version 18.95.0 was observed in the local VS Code extensions directory or referenced in process command-line activity. The detection focuses only on the affected version: nrwl.angular-console-18.95.0. This query combines two evidence sources: DeviceFileEvents (confirms file or folder activity related to the extension path) and DeviceProcessEvents (confirms execution or command-line reference involving the extension).
This rule detects potential lateral movement activities using `wmic.exe`, `psexec.exe`, or `wmiprvse.exe`. It specifically looks for these executables being run with command-line arguments indicative of remote execution or specific PsExec usage (e.g., containing backslashes for paths, `/accepteula`, or `-s`). The rule then aggregates these events and flags instances where the same process command line is observed multiple times on a device, and there are distinct remote targets involved, suggesting coordinated lateral movement.
This rule detects the loading of modules (DLLs or executables) from user-specific AppData folders that are not commonly observed across the environment. It specifically excludes common legitimate paths within AppData like 'Local\Programs' and 'Local\Temp' to reduce false positives. The rule identifies modules loaded by processes that also originate from an AppData folder, indicating potentially suspicious activity such as malware or custom tools operating from user-writable locations.
This rule detects Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) block events where a file operation was prevented. It specifically filters out audit-only events and excludes operations on .dll and .tmp files to reduce noise. The rule aims to identify malicious activity that ASR has actively blocked, indicating a potential attempt to execute or modify files in a suspicious manner.
KQL Query from file: VSCode Extension Inventory In Your MDE Tenant
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