Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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KQL Query
This rule detects the execution of PsExec or similar tools (psexec.exe, psexec64.exe, paexec.exe) which are commonly used for lateral movement within a network. It also identifies the use of PsExec service (psexesvc.exe) or command-line arguments indicative of PsExec activity, such as accessing administrative shares (ADMIN$, C$, IPC$) or the '-accepteula' flag.
Detects mshta.exe spawning PowerShell with hidden execution, web download, archive extraction, and staged process launch behavior, indicative of the UAC-0184 threat actor.
Detects installation of Tiflux RMM components delivered through phishing campaigns. Threat actors abuse Tiflux to establish persistent remote access and subsequently deploy additional remote management tools.
Detects suspicious modifications to Notepad++ configuration files (config.xml or shortcuts.xml) by processes other than Notepad++ itself. This behavior may indicate an attempt to exploit vulnerabilities (e.g., CVE-2026-48778 or CVE-2026-48800) by injecting unvalidated interpreter commands, leading to arbitrary code execution or other malicious activities.
Detects the execution of specific file names and directory combinations used by the GRAT malware (Cyber Isnaad Front) to masquerade as legitimate tools before deploying ransomware or wiper modules. Specifically looks for 'Checker.exe.exe', 'WindowsUpdater.exe' in 'C:\ProgramData\', and 'SpellChecker.exe' in '\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Spelling\'.
This rule detects the execution of 'vsce-sign.exe' with command-line arguments indicating the verification of cached VS Code extensions. This activity is part of the normal VS Code extension installation and update process, where extensions are verified for integrity and authenticity. While this is a legitimate process, monitoring it can be useful for identifying anomalies or potential supply chain compromises if unexpected extensions are being verified or if the verification process itself is being abused.
Identifies package managers (like npm or yarn) executing suspiciously placed setup binaries from hidden or unconventional folders (e.g., tools/setup, .github/scripts/precheck) indicative of IronWorm preinstall hooks.
KQL Query
This rule detects attempts to delete shadow copies or system backups using built-in Windows utilities like vssadmin.exe, wbadmin.exe, and diskshadow.exe. These actions are often associated with ransomware behavior to prevent system recovery.
This rule detects the creation of scheduled tasks using `schtasks.exe` or `at.exe` with specific command-line arguments (`/create`, `/tn`, and either `/ru` or `/tr`). It then correlates these process events with registry events related to Task Scheduler keys or values containing "Task" to identify potential persistence mechanisms.
Identifies the creation of a stage-2 binary named 'payload.bin' within a 'node_modules' directory. This artifact is dropped by the Gen-1 stager used in the vpmdhaj malicious npm campaign, which targets cloud and CI/CD credentials.
This rule detects the download of JavaScript (.js) or HTML Application (.hta) files followed by the execution of scripting interpreters like mshta, cscript, wscript, node, or powershell with encoded commands on the same device within a one-hour window. It assigns a score based on the count of downloaded files and executed scripts, triggering an alert if the combined score exceeds 2. This behavior is indicative of potential malicious script execution, often seen in initial access or execution phases of an attack.
This rule detects when a file, initially received as an email attachment, is subsequently observed on multiple endpoints within a 7-day period. It correlates SHA256 hashes from email attachment logs with device file events to identify widespread propagation of potentially malicious attachments.
Detects Plane9 or Cluster-Overlay style execution from AppData or other user-writable staging paths, which is indicative of malware associated with the UAC-0184 threat actor.
Identifies node.js or npm processes attempting to access known credential stores or execute credential dumping utilities, which may indicate the presence of the Miasma credential-stealing worm.
Detects variable splitting technique in cmd.exe to obfuscate PowerShell invocation.
Detects the execution of mshta.exe attempting to download and execute a remote payload masquerading as an msixbundle file.
This rule detects potential port scanning activity from a single host. It identifies scenarios where a device attempts to connect to a large number of unique remote ports (20 or more) or a large number of unique remote IP addresses (25 or more) within a 10-minute window. This behavior is indicative of an adversary attempting to discover open ports or active hosts on a network.
Detects network connections to known CountLoader C2 domains based on McAfee Labs analysis. This rule identifies outbound network traffic from devices to a predefined list of Command and Control (C2) domains associated with the CountLoader malware. The detection logic specifically looks for the presence of these domains in the 'RemoteUrl' field of network events.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks that explicitly call mshta.exe, matching the persistence mechanism of the CountLoader payload launcher.
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