Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
40,407 detections
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Detects high-volume filesystem activity (exceeding 300 operations in 5 minutes) initiated by 'claude-code' or 'claude' processes. This behavior may indicate an autonomous, patched, or jailbroken AI coding assistant performing mass file operations or reconnaissance without user confirmation.
Detects instances where a development-oriented web server (such as Vite or Node.js) is configured to bind to all network interfaces ('0.0.0.0') and is simultaneously receiving inbound connections from non-private, external IP addresses on a common development port (5173). This rule filters out common CI/CD environments to focus on potentially insecure exposure of development tools to the public internet.
Detects instances where a development-oriented web server (such as Vite or Node.js) is configured to bind to all network interfaces ('0.0.0.0') and is simultaneously receiving inbound connections from non-private, external IP addresses on a common development port (5173). This rule filters out common CI/CD environments to focus on potentially insecure exposure of development tools to the public internet.
Detects instances where a development-oriented web server (such as Vite or Node.js) is configured to bind to all network interfaces ('0.0.0.0') and is simultaneously receiving inbound connections from non-private, external IP addresses on a common development port (5173). This rule filters out common CI/CD environments to focus on potentially insecure exposure of development tools to the public internet.
Detects high-volume bursts of HTTP GET requests against specific paths associated with a Vite development server (/@vite/client, /@fs/, /src/) on port 5173. This pattern is indicative of automated reconnaissance or vulnerability scanning targeting an exposed development environment.
Detects the execution of known Windows accessibility binaries (e.g., sethc.exe, utilman.exe) where the internal metadata or original filename indicates that the process is actually cmd.exe. This is a common technique used by adversaries to gain unauthenticated command-line access with SYSTEM privileges via accessibility features, typically during the login screen process.
Detects token duplication/impersonation targeting winlogon.exe to obtain SYSTEM privileges (SeDebugPrivilege abuse, DuplicateToken, SetTokenInformation to Untrusted integrity)
Bigbear V2 Ioc Hunt
Sigma
CloudSEK researchers uncovered BigBear 2.0, a global Microsoft 365 phishing-as-a-service operation targeting hundreds of organizations across 40+ countries. The investigation exposed the attacker’s admin panel, affiliate network, phishing infrastructure, and thousands of stolen credentials and session cookies, revealing how modern AiTM attacks can hijack authenticated sessions even after MFA.
This rule monitors DeviceFileEvents for the presence of specific browser extension files on disk known to be associated with malicious campaigns. It utilizes a predefined mapping of extension IDs to names to identify and flag files matching the known malicious browser extensions.
This rule detects the presence or execution of a file named 'GlobalProtect.exe' within the Palo Alto GlobalProtect directory. It focuses on identifying potentially masqueraded or unauthorized binaries by monitoring file events and associated process execution. This pattern is commonly used by attackers to disguise malicious files as legitimate security software to evade detection.
This rule detects potential browser-based manipulation or phishing campaigns where a user visits a known loader script host (paste.sh) and subsequently visits cryptocurrency trading sites (SimpleSwap, SwapZone) within a short time window. This behavior is indicative of an injected script modifying the browser's view of trading sites to display deceptive 'Loyalty Bonus' or discount banners to lure users into transactions.
Detects network connections to known command and control (C2) infrastructure, including hardcoded malicious domains, specific C2 IP addresses, and suspicious GitHub access patterns by processes other than standard web browsers, which may indicate malicious ingress tool transfer or C2 communication.
Detects the creation of files named 'strEncodedData.txt' on the local file system. This naming convention is associated with the DarkTortilla RAT, which uses this specific file to stage encoded data prior to exfiltration or further processing.
This rule detects potentially malicious behavior by correlating intensive usage of graphics-related API calls (like BitBlt, GetDC, etc.) which are indicative of screen capture, with the execution of specific command identifiers typically associated with C2 (Command and Control) traffic. The combination suggests an adversary is capturing screen data and potentially staging or exfiltrating it via a C2 channel.
This rule monitors for network connections to known command-and-control (C2) IP addresses and the execution or presence of files matching known hashes associated with the 'PhantomC2' threat group or malware family. It correlates data from DeviceNetworkEvents, DeviceFileEvents, and DeviceProcessEvents to identify potential compromise.
This rule monitors for network connections to known command-and-control (C2) IP addresses and the execution or presence of files matching known hashes associated with the 'PhantomC2' threat group or malware family. It correlates data from DeviceNetworkEvents, DeviceFileEvents, and DeviceProcessEvents to identify potential compromise.
Detects ClickFix-style social engineering attacks where users are prompted to copy and execute malicious commands in a shell environment. The rule triggers on process execution of terminal or shell binaries (zsh, sh, cmd.exe, powershell.exe) containing indicators of obfuscated execution or remote code downloading, such as piped shell commands (curl | sh/zsh) or PowerShell encoded command execution.
This rule monitors Portable Executable (PE) files to identify those signed with certificates associated with Discord Inc. or Lenovo. Adversaries frequently abuse stolen or fraudulently obtained code-signing certificates from legitimate, reputable companies to bypass security controls like Windows SmartScreen, gain persistence, or increase the likelihood of successful malware execution.
Detects PowerShell or PowerShell ISE spawned directly from Windows Explorer (explorer.exe, covering both Start-menu launches and the Run dialog abused by ClickFix) whose command line carries a genuine obfuscation/evasion signal - true -EncodedCommand/-e usage, a hidden/minimized window flag, or a remote download cradle (IEX, Invoke-WebRequest, DownloadString, certutil, mshta, etc.) - while excluding invocations that point at an on-disk script file under a standard install path, since ClickFix payloads are inline one-liners rather than references to a local .ps1. Bare -NoProfile/-NoLogo flags no longer trigger alone, since they are common in legitimate automation.
Matches known SilverFox malware payload samples by SHA256 hash
This rule detects potential persistence attempts by monitoring for the execution and service installation commands of specific binaries: cplsupport.exe and wtass.exe. The rule triggers if these files are executed directly, invoked with specific command-line arguments (e.g., '--install'), or used in conjunction with the 'sc.exe' utility to create new services, which is a common technique for establishing persistence or privilege escalation.
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