Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
40,046 detections
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This rule detects potential web skimmer activity where a user's browser performs a network connection to known payload delivery hosts (e.g., paste.sh or Google Sheets API) followed by a clipboard modification event on the same device within a one-hour window. This behavior is consistent with malicious scripts attempting to replace copied cryptocurrency wallet addresses with an attacker-controlled address.
Detects browser-based network requests to the Google Sheets Visualization API (gviz/tq) that appear to be used for fetching malicious JavaScript payloads from public Google Sheets. The rule specifically identifies instances where a process initiates these requests without any corresponding active browser session associated with standard Google Docs or Sheets editing activity.
This rule detects potential browser-based manipulation or phishing campaigns where a user visits a known loader script host (paste.sh) and subsequently visits cryptocurrency trading sites (SimpleSwap, SwapZone) within a short time window. This behavior is indicative of an injected script modifying the browser's view of trading sites to display deceptive 'Loyalty Bonus' or discount banners to lure users into transactions.
This rule detects potential browser-based wallet address substitution attacks by monitoring for a specific sequence of network connections within a single browser process. It looks for connections to cryptocurrency swap platforms (SimpleSwap/SwapZone) closely followed by the retrieval of an external loader script (paste.sh) and a Google Sheets Visualization API payload, which is a known technique for injecting malicious scripts that intercept and modify XHR/fetch responses in the user's browser.
Detects browser-based network requests to the Google Sheets Visualization API (gviz/tq) that appear to be used for fetching malicious JavaScript payloads from public Google Sheets. The rule specifically identifies instances where a process initiates these requests without any corresponding active browser session associated with standard Google Docs or Sheets editing activity.
Detects potential credential harvesting or process memory manipulation against browser processes (Chrome or Edge). The rule monitors for unauthorized debugging activity initiated against browser processes (e.g., using flags like DEBUG_PROCESS or specific API calls) and the access of the App-Bound encryption provider symbol, which is often a target for attackers seeking to decrypt browser-stored secrets.
Detects the loading or usage of the malicious driver 'DCRCVDrv.sys' associated with the ClearFake crypto stealer campaign, which uses a Bring-Your-Own-Vulnerable-Driver (BYOVD) technique to interact with the device path '\Device\DCRCVDRV_U' to terminate or impair EDR and security tools.
This rule monitors for file, process, and image load events associated with a set of known malicious indicators (IOCs). It specifically flags potential DLL side-loading anomalies, such as 'Secur32.dll' being loaded by 'platform_experience_helper.exe' from non-system directories, or 'platform_experience_helper.exe' executing from locations outside the standard Google application directory.
This rule monitors for file, process, and image load events associated with a set of known malicious indicators (IOCs). It specifically flags potential DLL side-loading anomalies, such as 'Secur32.dll' being loaded by 'platform_experience_helper.exe' from non-system directories, or 'platform_experience_helper.exe' executing from locations outside the standard Google application directory.
This rule detects the addition of specific suspicious executables to Windows Registry run keys. Adversaries use these keys to achieve persistence, ensuring that malicious programs execute automatically upon user logon.
Detects the execution of PowerShell or PWSH with command-line arguments often used to obfuscate scripts or hide activity, such as encoded commands (-enc), base64 decoding, or running the process with a hidden window.
This rule detects the use of package managers like 'pip' or 'npm' to install specific suspicious software packages or tools often associated with supply chain compromise or malicious library installation (e.g., 'huggingface-cli', 'unused-imports', 'react-codeshift').
Detects the execution of package managers (pip or npm) to install software dependencies initiated by development or agent-related processes (like IDEs or background services) in a non-interactive session. This behavior can be indicative of automated dependency confusion attacks, malicious supply chain activity, or unauthorized package installation occurring without direct user oversight.
Detects the installation of software packages in build or CI pipelines where the package was published to its registry between 30 and 90 days prior to being first used in the environment. This pattern is indicative of potential dependency confusion or typosquatting attacks, where adversaries use newly created packages to deliver malicious code.
Detects package manager processes (npm, pip, python) executing install-related commands followed by the creation or modification of sensitive files (SSH keys, cloud credentials, shell configurations) within a short timeframe. This behavior is indicative of potential supply chain attacks where a malicious package attempts to steal credentials or secrets upon installation.
Detects instances where a shell process (powershell, cmd, mshta, or wscript) is spawned by a browser-related process (explorer, wt, or SearchHost) shortly after a user focuses on a web browser, followed by a network connection from that shell within a short time window. This pattern is indicative of potential web-based exploitation or file download and execution chains.
This rule detects activity associated with known indicators of compromise (IOCs) related to European political targeting campaigns. It monitors network, email, and authentication logs for connections to specific malicious domains (including .onion addresses) and IP addresses. The rule spans multiple data sources, including device network events, Entra ID sign-in logs, cloud application events, and email communications.
Detects suspicious executions of 'nslookup.exe' and 'svchost.exe' when triggered by the Windows LockAppHost process. This pattern is indicative of potential process injection or masquerading attempts by malicious actors using legitimate system processes as proxies for unauthorized activity.
Detects network communication to known malicious infrastructure associated with the GRAYRABBIT malware campaign. The rule correlates TCP connections on port 443 to the domain 'mail.uaiubifas.top' with process events attempting to discover system and user information (GetAdaptersAddresses, gethostname, GetUserNameA), which is characteristic of the malware's initial beaconing behavior.
Detects the spawning of cmd.exe from 7z.exe, which is characteristic of the GRAYRABBIT malware sideloading chain where 7z.exe is used to load malicious DLLs (e.g., boy.dll, core.dll) that subsequently initiate an interactive reverse shell.
Detects child processes spawned by 7z.exe when it is executed from the 'C:\Users\Public\Documents\' directory. This is consistent with the behavior of the GRAYRABBIT backdoor, where a trojanized 7z.dll or boy.dll is sideloaded into the 7z.exe process to facilitate silent arbitrary process execution.
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