Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects high-risk administrative actions in Microsoft 365, such as new MFA method registration, OAuth app consent grants, or email forwarding rule creation, occurring in sessions that lack fresh authentication (often indicative of a session-cookie replay attack).
Detects Microsoft 365 sign-in events where MFA was successfully satisfied, but the sign-in is simultaneously flagged by risk detection engines as exhibiting anomalous token or session characteristics, indicative of Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) session hijacking.
Detects anomalous Entra ID sign-in patterns characterized by a single session ID replayed from multiple diverse source IP addresses and Autonomous System Numbers (ASNs) within a short timeframe. This behavior is indicative of Session Hijacking (AiTM/Adversary-in-the-Middle) where an attacker maintains persistence by proxying requests through a residential network to bypass conditional access policies and evade location-based threat detection.
Detects anomalous sign-in attempts to the OfficeHome application that result in OAuth error 90014 (frequently associated with application access issues or invalid consent) combined with an implausible mismatch between the reported Windows 10 operating system and mobile-specific browser user agents (e.g., Mobile Safari, Chrome Mobile). This behavior may indicate an adversary attempting to mimic legitimate device traffic to bypass conditional access policies or facilitate OAuth-based token manipulation.
Detects session hijacking (AiTM) attempts where a failed or interrupted sign-in (ResultType 50199) is followed by a successful login using the same SessionId but with an Axios user-agent, indicating automated replay of a stolen session token rather than legitimate browser usage.
Detects anomalous Microsoft Graph API activity characterized by user enumeration or querying for sensitive organizational groups (e.g., payroll, finance, HR) often associated with post-AiTM account-takeover reconnaissance. This detection specifically identifies multiple requests for sensitive URIs or high-count enumeration requests originating from suspicious User-Agent strings like 'axios/1.18.1', commonly observed in threat actor activity such as Storm-2755.
Detects potentially malicious OAuth device code sign-ins by identifying sign-in events that exhibit anomalous characteristics, such as atypical geographic locations, rare client-application combinations, unmanaged/noncompliant device status, or elevated risk signals associated with the account. This detection helps identify account compromise or malicious OAuth consent activity often associated with 'EvilTokens' or device-code phishing attacks.
Detects potentially malicious OAuth device code sign-ins by identifying sign-in events that exhibit anomalous characteristics, such as atypical geographic locations, rare client-application combinations, unmanaged/noncompliant device status, or elevated risk signals associated with the account. This detection helps identify account compromise or malicious OAuth consent activity often associated with 'EvilTokens' or device-code phishing attacks.
Detects potential abuse of stolen OAuth session tokens, where refresh tokens are used to authenticate after a user has performed a password reset. This rule identifies accounts that continue to sign in from previously unseen devices or IP addresses within 24 hours post-password reset, a technique consistent with session persistence mechanisms used by adversary tools and platforms like EvilTokens.
Detects an administrator account rapidly granting mailbox permissions (Add-MailboxPermission, Add-RecipientPermission, Set-MailboxFolderPermission) to a large number of objects within a short timeframe (15 minutes). The rule correlates this activity with a prior 'risky' sign-in or a sign-in using device-code flow, indicative of potential EvilToken or similar adversary-in-the-middle proxy-based session hijacking.
Detects sign-in events where Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) was satisfied using an External Authentication Method (EAM) that asserts specific possession or inherence claims (e.g., 'hwk' - hardware key). This behavior may indicate an adversary attempting to bypass or forge MFA responses via a rogue EAM provider.
This rule detects persistence by identifying accounts that continue to authenticate using an External Authentication Method (EAM) both before and after a password reset event. This behavior suggests that an adversary has established a persistent authentication mechanism (such as an EAM) that survives a standard password reset, indicating potential account compromise and bypass of primary authentication controls.
This rule hunts for indicators associated with the TrustSink technique, which involves using rogue External Authentication Methods (EAM) or malicious OIDC providers to bypass authentication or maintain persistence within a cloud environment. It monitors Azure AD sign-in and audit logs, alongside DNS and network events, for references to known malicious domains and URLs used for EAM-based attacks.
This rule hunts for indicators associated with the TrustSink technique, which involves using rogue External Authentication Methods (EAM) or malicious OIDC providers to bypass authentication or maintain persistence within a cloud environment. It monitors Azure AD sign-in and audit logs, alongside DNS and network events, for references to known malicious domains and URLs used for EAM-based attacks.
This rule monitors for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the ShinyHunters threat actor, including specific malicious domains, IP addresses, and artifacts found in command lines or event data. It aggregates telemetry from network events, Entra ID sign-in logs, cloud application activity, email logs, process execution, and general device events to detect interaction with known malicious infrastructure or execution of threat-actor specific artifacts.
This rule detects a password-spraying attack pattern directed at privileged or manager-titled accounts. It monitors for multiple failed sign-in attempts from a single source IP address against a large volume of distinct user accounts identified as managers or senior staff. The detection logic filters for low-frequency attempts per account, which is indicative of a distributed spray attack designed to evade account lockout thresholds while focusing on high-value targets.
This rule detects a password-spraying attack pattern directed at privileged or manager-titled accounts. It monitors for multiple failed sign-in attempts from a single source IP address against a large volume of distinct user accounts identified as managers or senior staff. The detection logic filters for low-frequency attempts per account, which is indicative of a distributed spray attack designed to evade account lockout thresholds while focusing on high-value targets.
This rule detects a password-spraying attack pattern directed at privileged or manager-titled accounts. It monitors for multiple failed sign-in attempts from a single source IP address against a large volume of distinct user accounts identified as managers or senior staff. The detection logic filters for low-frequency attempts per account, which is indicative of a distributed spray attack designed to evade account lockout thresholds while focusing on high-value targets.
Detects successful authentication events for accounts that have been dormant for at least 90 days, correlated with suspicious activity markers such as recent failed sign-in attempts, access from an unfamiliar geographic location or ASN, or a complete absence of historical sign-in activity.
Detects successful authentication events for accounts that have been dormant for at least 90 days, correlated with suspicious activity markers such as recent failed sign-in attempts, access from an unfamiliar geographic location or ASN, or a complete absence of historical sign-in activity.
Detects a suspected account compromise sequence where an account first authenticates to a Microsoft Teams application from infrastructure associated with TeamFiltration (e.g., specific AWS ranges), followed by a rapid (within 2 minutes) authentication to a VPN or SAML service provider from a different IP address, indicative of an account pivot.
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