Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Goal: Find machines in the last N days where the SystemGuardSecurityLevel value NOW is less than it was BEFORE.
Step 1: Get a list of all security levels in the system where the level is not null.
Step 1: Get a list of all security levels in the system where the level is not null.
Query for processes that accessed more than 10 IP addresses over port 445 (SMB) - possibly scanning for network shares.
To read more about Network Share Discovery, see: https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1135.
Tags: #SMB, #NetworkScanning, #UniqueProcessId.
To read more about Network Share Discovery, see: https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1135.
Tags: #SMB, #NetworkScanning, #UniqueProcessId.
This query looks for local admin account used to logon into the computer.
This can help to detect malicious insiders that were able to add a local account to the local admin group offline.
This can help to detect malicious insiders that were able to add a local account to the local admin group offline.
'Identifies a match across various data feeds for hashes and IP IOC related to Europium
Reference: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/09/08/microsoft-investigates-iranian-attacks-against-the-albanian-government'
Reference: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/09/08/microsoft-investigates-iranian-attacks-against-the-albanian-government'
This query looks for users performing file deletion activities. Spikes in file deletion observed from risky sign-in sessions are flagged here.
This applies to SharePoint and OneDrive users.
Audit event and Cloud application identifier references.
Reference - https://learn.microsoft.com/microsoft-365/compliance/audit-log-activities?view=o365-worldwide
Reference - https://learn.microsoft.com/azure/sentinel/entities-reference#cloud-application-identifiers
This applies to SharePoint and OneDrive users.
Audit event and Cloud application identifier references.
Reference - https://learn.microsoft.com/microsoft-365/compliance/audit-log-activities?view=o365-worldwide
Reference - https://learn.microsoft.com/azure/sentinel/entities-reference#cloud-application-identifiers
'Finds instances where a file uploaded to blob or file storage and it is seen on an endpoint by Microsoft Defender XDR.'
'Identifies when 30 or more ports are used for a given client IP in 10 minutes occurring on the IIS server.
This could be indicative of attempted port scanning or exploit attempt at internet facing web applications.
This could also simply indicate a misconfigured service or device.
References:
IIS status code mapping - https://support.microsoft.com/help/943891/the-http-status-code-in-iis-7-0-iis-7-5-and-iis-8-0
Win32 Status code mapping - https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc231199.aspx'
This could be indicative of attempted port scanning or exploit attempt at internet facing web applications.
This could also simply indicate a misconfigured service or device.
References:
IIS status code mapping - https://support.microsoft.com/help/943891/the-http-status-code-in-iis-7-0-iis-7-5-and-iis-8-0
Win32 Status code mapping - https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc231199.aspx'
This query will provide a report of many of the best practice configurations for Defender ATP deployment. Special Thanks to Gilad Mittelman for the initial inspiration and concept.
Any tests which are reporting "BAD" as a result imply that the associated capability is not configured per best practice recommendation.
Any tests which are reporting "BAD" as a result imply that the associated capability is not configured per best practice recommendation.
This query looks for a large number of network-based authentications using local credentials coming from a single source IP address. High counts of logons involving a large number of distinct machines may identify an attacker beachhead within an enterprise.
Author: alex verboon @alexverboon.
Blogpost: https://www.verboon.info/2020/09/hunting-for-local-group-membership-changes.
Blogpost: https://www.verboon.info/2020/09/hunting-for-local-group-membership-changes.
'Extracts MDATP Alert for a web shell being placed on the server and then enriches this event with information from W3CIISLog to idnetigy the Attacker that placed the shell'
'This detection will identify network requests in HTTP proxy data that contains Base64 encoded IP addresses. After identifying candidates the query joins with DeviceNetworkEvents to idnetify any machine within the network using that IP address. Alerts indicate that the IP address of a machine within your network was seen with it's IP address base64 encoded in an outbound web request. This method of egressing the IP was seen used in POLONIUM's RunningRAT tool, however the detection is generic.'
C2-NamedPipe
KQL
Detects the creation of a named pipe used by known APT malware.
Reference - https://docs.microsoft.com/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-wpo/4de75e21-36fd-440a-859b-75accc74487c
Reference - https://docs.microsoft.com/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-wpo/4de75e21-36fd-440a-859b-75accc74487c
Detect Active Directory LDAP queries that search for users with comment or description that contains the string "pass" that might suggest for the user password
This LDAP query cover MetaSploit - enum_ad_user_comments tool
This LDAP query cover MetaSploit - enum_ad_user_comments tool
'This query looks for suspicious request patterns to Exchange servers that fit a pattern observed by Silk Typhoon actors.
The same query can be run on HTTPProxy logs from on-premise hosted Exchange servers.
Reference: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers/'
The same query can be run on HTTPProxy logs from on-premise hosted Exchange servers.
Reference: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers/'
This query will show rare firewall rule changes using netsh utility by comparing rule names and program names from the previous day
with those from the historical chosen time frame.
- This technique was seen in relation to Solarigate attack but the results can indicate potential malicious activity used in different attacks.
- The process name in each data source is commented out as an adversary could rename it. It is advisable to keep process name commented but
if the results show unrelated false positives, users may want to uncomment it.
- Note also that the queries use the KQL "has_all" operator, which hasn't yet been documented officially, but will be soon.
In short, "has_all" will only match when the referenced field has all strings in the list.
Refer to netsh syntax: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/netsh
Refer to our Microsoft Defender XDR blog for details on use during the Solorigate attack:
https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/01/20/deep-dive-into-the-solorigate-second-stage-activation-from-sunburst-to-teardrop-and-raindrop/
with those from the historical chosen time frame.
- This technique was seen in relation to Solarigate attack but the results can indicate potential malicious activity used in different attacks.
- The process name in each data source is commented out as an adversary could rename it. It is advisable to keep process name commented but
if the results show unrelated false positives, users may want to uncomment it.
- Note also that the queries use the KQL "has_all" operator, which hasn't yet been documented officially, but will be soon.
In short, "has_all" will only match when the referenced field has all strings in the list.
Refer to netsh syntax: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/netsh
Refer to our Microsoft Defender XDR blog for details on use during the Solorigate attack:
https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/01/20/deep-dive-into-the-solorigate-second-stage-activation-from-sunburst-to-teardrop-and-raindrop/
This query was originally published in the threat analytics report, "Exchange Server zero-days exploited in the wild".
In early March 2021, Microsoft released patches for four different zero-day vulnerabilities affecting Microsoft Exchange Server. The vulnerabilities were being used in a coordinated attack. For more information on the vulnerabilities, visit the following links:
1. CVE-2021-26855
2. CVE-2021-26857
3. CVE-2021-26858
4. CVE-2021-27065
The following query finds evidence of a reverse shell being loaded using a technique associated with the Nishang penetration testing framework. This might indicate an attacker has remote access to the device.
More queries related to this threat can be found under the See also section of this page.
Reference - https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2021/03/02/multiple-security-updates-released-for-exchange-server/
In early March 2021, Microsoft released patches for four different zero-day vulnerabilities affecting Microsoft Exchange Server. The vulnerabilities were being used in a coordinated attack. For more information on the vulnerabilities, visit the following links:
1. CVE-2021-26855
2. CVE-2021-26857
3. CVE-2021-26858
4. CVE-2021-27065
The following query finds evidence of a reverse shell being loaded using a technique associated with the Nishang penetration testing framework. This might indicate an attacker has remote access to the device.
More queries related to this threat can be found under the See also section of this page.
Reference - https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2021/03/02/multiple-security-updates-released-for-exchange-server/
This query helps reviewing URL click count by ClickAction
Finding base64 encoded PE files header seen in the command line parameters.
Tags: #fileLess #powershell.
Tags: #fileLess #powershell.
This query finds the 10 latest logons performed by email recipients within 30 minutes after they received known malicious emails. You can use this query to check whether the accounts of the email recipients have been compromised.
This query was originally published in the threat analytics report, CVE-2020-0601 certificate validation vulnerability.
The Windows CryptoAPI Spoofing Vulnerability, CVE-2020-0601, can be exploited to spoof code-signing certificates. For example, an attacker could forge a certificate that lists Microsoft as the issuer. This would allow an attacker to disguise a malicious executable as legitimate.
The vulnerability was patched with the January 2020 Security Update.
Use the following query to locate files containing ECC certificates that might have been forged using this vulnerability. The query identifies files that don't correctly identify the signer name, yet list Microsoft as the root signer.
References:
https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2020-0601
https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/security-guidance/releasenotedetail/2020-Jan
The Windows CryptoAPI Spoofing Vulnerability, CVE-2020-0601, can be exploited to spoof code-signing certificates. For example, an attacker could forge a certificate that lists Microsoft as the issuer. This would allow an attacker to disguise a malicious executable as legitimate.
The vulnerability was patched with the January 2020 Security Update.
Use the following query to locate files containing ECC certificates that might have been forged using this vulnerability. The query identifies files that don't correctly identify the signer name, yet list Microsoft as the root signer.
References:
https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2020-0601
https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/security-guidance/releasenotedetail/2020-Jan
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