Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects the presence of Phoenix malware by identifying known SHA256 hashes of its components or network connections to its command and control (C2) infrastructure. It correlates file events with known malware hashes and network events with known C2 IP addresses.
Attackers do not only use emojis in the subject. Sometimes they also use them in the file name itself to make the file look more attractive or legitimate. Based on my experience, I am not expecting legitimate files names with icons so it can be an interesting case to easily convert the hunting into a detection. For example:
📄Invoice.pdf
🔐Reset_Password.html
📦Delivery_Document.zip
This can help find:
- Suspicious files dropped on disk
- Files downloaded from phishing emails
- User-downloaded scam files
- Payloads with social engineering names
📄Invoice.pdf
🔐Reset_Password.html
📦Delivery_Document.zip
This can help find:
- Suspicious files dropped on disk
- Files downloaded from phishing emails
- User-downloaded scam files
- Payloads with social engineering names
This rule detects when the 'oskmenu.xml' file, located in 'C:\Program Files\Common Files\microsoft shared\ink\fsdefinitions', is accessed or modified by any process not running under the SYSTEM account. This file is associated with the On-Screen Keyboard and its modification by non-system accounts could indicate an attempt to alter its behavior, potentially for persistence or privilege escalation.
This rule detects the presence of Blackbeard malware by identifying known SHA256 hashes of its components or network connections to its known C2 infrastructure. It correlates file events with specific hashes and network events with specific remote IP addresses.
Detects when a file is renamed to have the suffix ':payload' and the initiating process's file name is the same as the previous file name. This behavior can be indicative of Payload Ransomware to hide or modify files.
This rule detects specific JavaScript obfuscation patterns used by the Coruna exploit kit framework. The kit was observed being used by multiple threat actors, including UNC6353 and UNC6691. The rule looks for two distinct patterns in process command lines: a map/join/fromCharCode obfuscation pattern and an integer XOR obfuscation pattern, typically executed by JavaScript-enabled processes like web browsers or scripting hosts.
This query detects multiple TTPs associated with the Storm-2561 campaign that uses SEO poisoning to distribute fake VPN clients for credential theft. It looks for known file hashes, a specific code-signing certificate, malicious DLL side-loading and C2 communication patterns.
Detects the creation of a scheduled task using 'schtasks.exe' with specific command-line arguments that indicate an attempt to establish persistence. The rule looks for 'schtasks.exe' creating a task named 'Runtime Broker' that executes a program from a suspicious path within 'C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Runtime\'. This pattern is often used by adversaries to maintain access to a system.
This rule identifies devices running vulnerable versions of Notepad++. It parses the software version to determine if it is older than 8.9.1, which was identified as vulnerable in a security incident. The rule specifically looks for Notepad++ installations and flags any instances where the major version is less than 8, or if the major version is 8 and the minor version is less than 9, or if the major version is 8, the minor version is 9, and the patch version is less than 1.
KQL Query
Detects the creation of a named object with the specific name 'MakeAmericaGreatAgain'. This string has been associated with various malware and potentially unwanted programs, often used as a mutex or other synchronization object to ensure only one instance of the malicious process is running.
KQL Query
Detects the execution of legitimate Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) tools, such as AnyDesk, ScreenConnect, OptiTuneAgent, and SplashtopStreamer, when initiated from non-standard directories (outside 'C:\Program Files') or by command-line shells (powershell.exe, cmd.exe, wscript.exe, cscript.exe). This behavior is often abused by threat actors, including groups like Chaos RaaS, for persistence and remote access.
This rule detects suspicious outbound network connections from devices that exhibit a consistent timing pattern (low standard deviation relative to the average time delta between connections) to public IP addresses. It specifically looks for connections that are not initiated by common browsers unless they are running in headless mode, or connections initiated by processes with low global prevalence or identified as Living Off The Land Binaries (LOLBAS). This pattern can indicate automated activity, command and control communication, or data exfiltration.
Detects a specific script execution pattern where a batch file, often named 'rEgX.cmd', is read by a PowerShell process (or a renamed variant like 'mbs.exe') to extract a hidden, encrypted payload from its own content. This self-parsing technique, used by the Dead#Vax malware, looks for lines starting with a specific marker (e.g., '@') to bypass traditional file-based detection.
Detects the execution of Microsoft Edge via the command shell to open a PDF file. This pattern can be indicative of malicious activity where an attacker attempts to bypass direct execution or leverage a browser vulnerability to open a malicious PDF.
This rule detects the presence of known ShadowAgent malware files on devices by matching their SHA256 hashes. It queries 'DeviceFileEvents' to identify any files with SHA256 hashes that are part of a predefined list associated with ShadowAgent.
This rule detects the creation of PowerShell aliases for high-risk cmdlets or .NET web client patterns. Adversaries may use 'Set-Alias' to create short, obfuscated aliases for common cmdlets like Invoke-WebRequest, Invoke-Expression, or cmdlets related to Defender tampering, making their command-line activity harder to detect and analyze. This detection focuses on the 'ProcessCreated' event for PowerShell processes where 'Set-Alias' is used to map to a predefined list of suspicious cmdlets or patterns.
This rule detects processes where an executable file (.exe) attempts to masquerade as a common document, image, or archive file type by including extensions like .pdf, .doc, .zip, .jpg, etc., within its filename, followed by the .exe extension. It specifically excludes executables originating from Microsoft Office root directories to reduce false positives.
This rule detects DNS queries for reverse lookups, specifically those ending with '.in-addr.arpa' or '.ip6.arpa'. While legitimate, frequent or unusual reverse DNS queries from a specific device or process could indicate reconnaissance activities or attempts to map internal network infrastructure by an attacker.
This rule detects potential phishing attempts targeting Docusign users. It identifies emails containing URLs or network connections to specific domains (page-docusign-[a-z0-9]+\.workers\.dev) which are commonly used in phishing campaigns to mimic legitimate Docusign login pages or related services. The use of 'workers.dev' subdomains often indicates malicious infrastructure.
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