Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects anomalous authentication behavior where a user account utilizes the same authentication session (LogonId) or material to authenticate across multiple distinct destination hosts in a short timeframe. This rule monitors for both NTLM (Type 3) and Kerberos (TGS/TGT) events, which are indicative of lateral movement techniques such as Pass-the-Hash or Pass-the-Ticket.
Detects unauthorized devices or processes attempting to communicate with the Telegram Bot API (/sendMessage or /sendDocument) and monitors for credential-related terms within the request metadata. This often indicates the use of Telegram as a command-and-control (C2) channel for data exfiltration or credential theft.
This rule monitors for the execution or presence of specific file names and SHA256 hashes known to be associated with malicious activity. It queries both process creation and file events to identify these indicators of compromise (IOCs).
Detects the loading of reflective (memory-only) DLLs within the chrome.exe process address space. This activity is indicative of memory-based exploit chains, such as those that corrupt WebAssembly module metadata to facilitate arbitrary code execution following a sandbox escape.
Detects the creation of a scheduled task containing 'EdgeCore_AutoUpdate' in the command line using either schtasks.exe or Register-ScheduledTask. This pattern is often indicative of persistence mechanisms attempting to masquerade as legitimate update services.
This rule monitors for potential persistence and malicious activity by aggregating three distinct detection signals: COM hijacking attempts via the InprocServer32 registry key, the creation of scheduled tasks using specific suspicious naming conventions, and the identification of named mutexes indicative of specific malware presence.
Detects instances where the GlobalProtect VPN client executable spawns a Windows command shell (cmd.exe). This behavior is highly suspicious as a legitimate VPN client typically does not launch interactive shells, and this pattern has been associated with the execution of malicious payloads such as fake MSI installers.
Detects OAuth2 JWT bearer-grant token requests to Google's OAuth endpoint using the attacker-controlled service-account identity and Sheets API scope observed in the fake GlobalProtect campaign
Detects anomalous command-line arguments and process injection behaviors associated with the Sogou IME protocol handler (biz_helper.exe). The rule monitors for malicious argument injection (e.g., embedded scripts, URLs pointing to non-Sogou domains) and correlates these events with suspicious child processes or network activity, consistent with techniques observed in the GRAYRABBIT / UNC3569 threat activity.
Detects known malicious file hashes for GRAYRABBIT delivery chain components: trojanized 7zp.dll loader, encrypted PE loader shellcode, and GRAYRABBIT backdoor core.dll, gated on PE structural validity and filesize
Detects UNC3569/GRAYRABBIT shellcode combining call/pop self-location, PEB InLoadOrderModuleList walk, and the specific XOR-then-ROR8 export-name hashing loop observed in the GRAYRABBIT loader chain, requiring multiple distinctive elements together to reduce false positives on generic shellcode idioms
Detects UNC3569/GRAYRABBIT shellcode combining call/pop self-location, PEB InLoadOrderModuleList walk, and the specific XOR-then-ROR8 export-name hashing loop observed in the GRAYRABBIT loader chain, requiring multiple distinctive elements together to reduce false positives on generic shellcode idioms
Detects Rust-compiled executables exhibiting C2-capable characteristics consistent with backdoors dropped on compromised JFrog Artifactory servers
Detects Rust-compiled executables exhibiting C2-capable characteristics consistent with backdoors dropped on compromised JFrog Artifactory servers
This rule detects the creation of a scheduled task named 'GlobalProtectVPNUpdate' using schtasks.exe, which has been identified as a technique used to facilitate the execution of malicious payloads masquerading as legitimate GlobalProtect VPN components. It also monitors for the subsequent execution of 'GlobalProtect.exe' when initiated by Windows background services like taskeng.exe or svchost.exe, which is indicative of persistence and unauthorized code execution.
Detects the suspicious execution of cmd.exe with piped stdio handles (indicative of a reverse shell) initiated by non-standard parent processes associated with the GRAYRABBIT malware, correlated with an immediate outbound network connection from the same process.
Detects the execution of an unsigned 7z.exe that loads an unsigned 7z.dll from a public, user-writable directory (C:\Users\Public\Documents). The rule specifically looks for the creation of the DLL shortly before it is loaded, indicating potential DLL side-loading to bypass security controls using a renamed or modified archive utility.
Detects the execution of an unsigned 7z.exe that loads an unsigned 7z.dll from a public, user-writable directory (C:\Users\Public\Documents). The rule specifically looks for the creation of the DLL shortly before it is loaded, indicating potential DLL side-loading to bypass security controls using a renamed or modified archive utility.
Detects the execution of an unsigned 7z.exe that loads an unsigned 7z.dll from a public, user-writable directory (C:\Users\Public\Documents). The rule specifically looks for the creation of the DLL shortly before it is loaded, indicating potential DLL side-loading to bypass security controls using a renamed or modified archive utility.
This rule detects command line patterns associated with common Impacket tools (wmiexec, psexec, smbexec) executed via Windows processes (cmd.exe, powershell.exe) or via network connections to ports 445 and 135 initiated by Python processes. These tools are frequently used by adversaries for lateral movement, remote service execution, and command execution on compromised systems.
Detects attempts to access or create copies of the Active Directory 'ntds.dit' database or the Windows Security Account Manager (SAM) registry hive using unauthorized processes. Attackers often target these files to extract credential hashes from Domain Controllers or local systems.
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