Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
2,982 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
1,486
513
403
239
167
Contributors
986
658
304
198
109
Categories
916
822
673
590
452
Platforms
39,934
7,265
6,535
3,865
3,645
2,982
Products / Services
1,229
703
443
309
200
MITRE Techniques
1,053
824
459
384
348
CVEs
17
16
16
10
10
IDS Classtypes
24
7
7
4
3
IDS Protocols
49
1
Detects GitHub push events where the actor pushing the changes does not match the commit author or committer identities, and the commit is not cryptographically signed. This pattern may indicate credential theft or account compromise where an adversary is pushing code using stolen credentials or impersonating authorized users.
Detects high-volume file and data access events within Microsoft 365 services (SharePoint, OneDrive, Exchange) originating from Python-based user agents (e.g., 'python-requests', 'python-httpx'). This pattern is indicative of automated scraping, data exfiltration, or bulk activity performed by unauthorized scripts.
Monitors GitHub Audit Logs for git pushes or workflow changes occurring after the September 16, 2026, reactivation window that reference the actions-cool/issues-helper or actions-cool/maintain-one-comment repositories. The rule excludes routine automated maintenance activity from trusted bots and common maintenance commit messages, aiming to identify unauthorized attempts to utilize or modify potentially compromised GitHub actions.
Monitors GitHub Audit Logs for git pushes or workflow changes occurring after the September 16, 2026, reactivation window that reference the actions-cool/issues-helper or actions-cool/maintain-one-comment repositories. The rule excludes routine automated maintenance activity from trusted bots and common maintenance commit messages, aiming to identify unauthorized attempts to utilize or modify potentially compromised GitHub actions.
Monitors GitHub Audit Logs for git pushes or workflow changes occurring after the September 16, 2026, reactivation window that reference the actions-cool/issues-helper or actions-cool/maintain-one-comment repositories. The rule excludes routine automated maintenance activity from trusted bots and common maintenance commit messages, aiming to identify unauthorized attempts to utilize or modify potentially compromised GitHub actions.
Monitors GitHub Audit Logs for git pushes or workflow changes occurring after the September 16, 2026, reactivation window that reference the actions-cool/issues-helper or actions-cool/maintain-one-comment repositories. The rule excludes routine automated maintenance activity from trusted bots and common maintenance commit messages, aiming to identify unauthorized attempts to utilize or modify potentially compromised GitHub actions.
Monitors GitHub Audit Logs for git pushes or workflow changes occurring after the September 16, 2026, reactivation window that reference the actions-cool/issues-helper or actions-cool/maintain-one-comment repositories. The rule excludes routine automated maintenance activity from trusted bots and common maintenance commit messages, aiming to identify unauthorized attempts to utilize or modify potentially compromised GitHub actions.
This rule detects GitHub Actions workflows that explicitly reference specific 'actions-cool' GitHub actions using a known-bad mutable version tag ('@v2.2.1'). This tag corresponds to malicious code introduced into these repositories, allowing for potential CI/CD pipeline poisoning and supply chain compromise.
This rule detects GitHub Actions workflows that explicitly reference specific 'actions-cool' GitHub actions using a known-bad mutable version tag ('@v2.2.1'). This tag corresponds to malicious code introduced into these repositories, allowing for potential CI/CD pipeline poisoning and supply chain compromise.
This rule detects GitHub Actions workflows that explicitly reference specific 'actions-cool' GitHub actions using a known-bad mutable version tag ('@v2.2.1'). This tag corresponds to malicious code introduced into these repositories, allowing for potential CI/CD pipeline poisoning and supply chain compromise.
This rule detects GitHub Actions workflows that explicitly reference specific 'actions-cool' GitHub actions using a known-bad mutable version tag ('@v2.2.1'). This tag corresponds to malicious code introduced into these repositories, allowing for potential CI/CD pipeline poisoning and supply chain compromise.
Detects the use of specific malicious versions (v2.2.1) of GitHub Actions (actions-cool/issues-helper or actions-cool/maintain-one-comment) in workflow runs that also involve the exposure or referencing of the GITHUB_TOKEN, indicating potential credential theft and CI/CD pipeline compromise.
Detects the use of specific malicious versions (v2.2.1) of GitHub Actions (actions-cool/issues-helper or actions-cool/maintain-one-comment) in workflow runs that also involve the exposure or referencing of the GITHUB_TOKEN, indicating potential credential theft and CI/CD pipeline compromise.
Detects the use of specific malicious versions (v2.2.1) of GitHub Actions (actions-cool/issues-helper or actions-cool/maintain-one-comment) in workflow runs that also involve the exposure or referencing of the GITHUB_TOKEN, indicating potential credential theft and CI/CD pipeline compromise.
Detects a specific pattern indicative of malicious GitHub Actions reactivation. The rule identifies a workflow run that fails quickly (e.g., due to repository access issues) followed immediately by a successful run of the same workflow with a significantly longer duration. This behavior is consistent with resolving issues related to malicious actions-cool repository workflows.
Detects a specific pattern indicative of malicious GitHub Actions reactivation. The rule identifies a workflow run that fails quickly (e.g., due to repository access issues) followed immediately by a successful run of the same workflow with a significantly longer duration. This behavior is consistent with resolving issues related to malicious actions-cool repository workflows.
Detects a specific pattern indicative of malicious GitHub Actions reactivation. The rule identifies a workflow run that fails quickly (e.g., due to repository access issues) followed immediately by a successful run of the same workflow with a significantly longer duration. This behavior is consistent with resolving issues related to malicious actions-cool repository workflows.
Detects a specific pattern indicative of malicious GitHub Actions reactivation. The rule identifies a workflow run that fails quickly (e.g., due to repository access issues) followed immediately by a successful run of the same workflow with a significantly longer duration. This behavior is consistent with resolving issues related to malicious actions-cool repository workflows.
Detects a specific pattern indicative of malicious GitHub Actions reactivation. The rule identifies a workflow run that fails quickly (e.g., due to repository access issues) followed immediately by a successful run of the same workflow with a significantly longer duration. This behavior is consistent with resolving issues related to malicious actions-cool repository workflows.
Detects the suspicious reactivation of 'actions-cool/issues-helper' or 'actions-cool/maintain-one-comment' repositories within a known malicious window (September 14-19, 2026). These repositories were involved in the 'Mini Shai-Hulud' supply-chain attack. This rule identifies when previously disabled repositories are re-enabled or modified to become active, potentially re-exposing malicious release tags to downstream users.
Detects the suspicious reactivation of 'actions-cool/issues-helper' or 'actions-cool/maintain-one-comment' repositories within a known malicious window (September 14-19, 2026). These repositories were involved in the 'Mini Shai-Hulud' supply-chain attack. This rule identifies when previously disabled repositories are re-enabled or modified to become active, potentially re-exposing malicious release tags to downstream users.
Page 45 of 142