Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the creation or modification of a Windows service named 'BluetoothService' where its executable path points to a non-standard, user-writable location (e.g., AppData, Temp, ProgramData). This technique is often used by malware, such as the Chrysalis backdoor in the Lotus Blossom campaign, to establish persistence and evade detection by masquerading as a legitimate system service.
Detects PowerShell scripts using .NET Reflection to modify internal fields to disable Event Tracing for Windows (ETW) or the Anti-Malware Scan Interface (AMSI). This technique is used by malware like the MIMICRAT loader to evade defenses before executing its main payload.
Detects the creation of files matching SHA256 hashes of known malware (SparkRAT, VShell, webshells) observed in the CVE-2026-1731 exploitation campaign. This rule specifically looks for file creation events where the SHA256 hash of the created file matches one of the predefined malware hashes.
Detects PowerShell one-liners used by TrustConnect/DocConnect to download and execute secondary payloads. These commands are provided as a 'Quick Deploy' feature in the MaaS C2 panel and typically use Invoke-RestMethod (irm) piped to Invoke-Expression (iex) from known malicious domains.
Detects high-impact phishing campaigns identified by Microsoft Defender for Office 365. Alerts when a campaign (CampaignName, CampaignId) targets 25 or more recipients (RecipientEmailAddress) within 48 hours, providing timestamp and message details (NetworkMessageId) for investigation.
This is a broad hunting query to find Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) associated with the Notepad++ supply-chain attack attributed to the Lotus Blossom actor and the Chrysalis backdoor. It searches for known file hashes, file paths, network indicators (IPs, domains, URLs), and user-agents across multiple event types.
This detection identifies suspicious command-line obfuscation executed by common scripting engines such as PowerShell, CMD, and Windows Script Host. It detects high signal behaviors including string concatenation, repeated string reconstruction, character based assembly, and encoded command execution flags.
These techniques are commonly used to conceal execution intent and evade security monitoring. Alerts should be reviewed in context to distinguish legitimate scripting from potentially evasive activity.
These techniques are commonly used to conceal execution intent and evade security monitoring. Alerts should be reviewed in context to distinguish legitimate scripting from potentially evasive activity.
Detects the execution of common Living Off The Land Binaries and Scripts (LOLBAS) initiated from Windows Explorer. The detection logic specifically looks for command lines that contain indicators of obfuscation or padding, which are common techniques used in malicious LNK (shortcut) files to hide their true purpose. This rule identifies processes like mshta.exe, powershell.exe, cmd.exe, certutil.exe, cscript.exe, and wscript.exe being launched by explorer.exe with suspicious command-line arguments.
Detects the execution of executables that masquerade as common collaboration tools (e.g., Teams, Zoom, Adobe) but have characteristics of the TrustConnect RAT. TrustConnect uses large (approx. 35MB) .NET Core single-file executables where the internal/original filename is a .dll, which is a mismatch from the .exe process name.
Detects HTTP requests to vulnerable Ivanti EPMM endpoints containing URI patterns associated with active exploitation of CVE-2026-1281 and CVE-2026-1340. The rule looks for specific URI paths and the presence of a 'gPath' parameter, which is indicative of an exploitation attempt.
Detects when a Visual Studio Code process (Code.exe) or its underlying Node.js process accesses sensitive user directories or files. This could indicate the exploitation of a vulnerable extension, such as in CVE-2025-65717, to steal credentials or other sensitive data.
This rule detects Windows Admin Center (WAC) creating a listening connection on its default port (6516) on internet-facing devices, specifically when the WAC version is not '2.6.4'. This could indicate an unpatched or vulnerable version of WAC exposed to the internet, potentially making it susceptible to exploitation.
Detects modification of the VSCode settings.json file by a process other than VSCode itself. This could indicate an attempt to exploit vulnerabilities where an attacker tricks a user into applying a malicious configuration to achieve remote code execution.
This rule detects suspicious entries in the RunMRU (Most Recently Used) registry key that indicate potential persistence mechanisms. It specifically looks for entries containing DNS-related tools (like nslookup, dig, host), other common system utilities (ping, tracert, ipconfig, powershell, cmd.exe, wmic, curl, wget, certutil, bitsadmin), or suspicious flags commonly associated with obfuscated or malicious commands (e.g., base64 encoding, web requests, common sensitive paths). The rule also correlates these registry modifications with subsequent process creations to confirm execution.
This rule detects various activities associated with the FoxKitsune malware, including network staging, suspicious file drops in SysWOW64, unusual svchost execution, service persistence, and attempts to tamper with Windows Defender. It correlates these events to identify potential FoxKitsune infections.
Detects a command-line pattern where nslookup is used to query a DNS server, and its output is piped to other commands to parse and execute a payload. This is a technique used by ClickFix campaigns to deliver malware via DNS.
Detects the creation of files in specific staging directories used by the CRESCENTHARVEST malware for collecting keylogs, browser data, and Telegram sessions before exfiltration. The rule specifically looks for 'daT.txt' in 'spool\Drivers\color', and any file creation within '\Windows\Temp\sysdriver\' or '\Windows\Temp\tdata\'.
This rule detects attempts to download the 'clawd.bot' or 'openclaw.ai' installation scripts using various command-line tools. It specifically looks for the use of 'curl', 'wget', 'aria2c', 'fetch', 'powershell', 'pwsh', 'certutil', 'bitsadmin', or 'mshta' when their command lines contain either 'clawd.bot/install.sh' or 'openclaw.ai/install.sh'. This activity is indicative of potential malware deployment or initial access attempts related to the OpenClaw/Clawd threat.
Detects behavioral indicators associated with a malware campaign distributing a credential and crypto-wallet stealer disguised as a Windows 11 update. Detection is based on TTPs rather than IOCs for longevity: suspicious directory creation, obfuscated PowerShell execution, and registry-based persistence.
Detects potential reverse shell activity originating from a Grandstream VoIP device. This is a high-fidelity indicator of compromise following the successful exploitation of CVE-2026-2329. This version uses DeviceNetworkEvents.
Detects the execution or loading of the Tiny C Compiler (TCC) runtime (libtcc.dll, tcc.exe) by non-development processes. This 'living-on-edge' compilation technique, observed in use by actors like Lotus Blossom, helps bypass static file-based detections by compiling malicious code directly on the host.
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