Detections

Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.

9,759 detections

Detects the load of dbghelp/dbgcore DLL (used to make memory dumps) by suspicious processes.
Tools like ProcessHacker and some attacker tradecract use MiniDumpWriteDump API found in dbghelp.dll or dbgcore.dll.
As an example, SilentTrynity C2 Framework has a module that leverages this API to dump the contents of Lsass.exe and transfer it over the network back to the attacker's machine.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
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Detects SILENTTRINITY stager dll loading activity
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
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Detects potential DLL hijack of "iertutil.dll" found in the DCOM InternetExplorer.Application Class
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
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Loading unsigned image (DLL, EXE) into LSASS process
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
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Detects any assembly DLL being loaded by an Office Product
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
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Detects CLR DLL being loaded by an Office Product
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
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Detects Microsoft Excel loading an Add-In (.xll) file from an uncommon location
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
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Detects outlvba (Microsoft VBA for Outlook Addin) DLL being loaded by the outlook process
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
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Detects VB DLL's loaded by an office application. Which could indicate the presence of VBA Macros.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
000
Detects signs of the WMI script host process "scrcons.exe" loading scripting DLLs which could indicates WMI ActiveScriptEventConsumers EventConsumers activity.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
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Detects potential DLL sideloading of DLLs that are known to be abused from suspicious locations
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
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Detects a threat actor creating a file named `wbemcomn.dll` in the `C:\Windows\System32\wbem\` directory over the network and loading it for a WMI DLL Hijack scenario.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
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Detects a network connection initiated by the certutil.exe utility.
Attackers can abuse the utility in order to download malware or additional payloads.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
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Detects a non-browser process communicating with the Notion API. This could indicate potential use of a covert C2 channel such as "OffensiveNotion C2"
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
000
Detects svchost hosting RDP termsvcs communicating with the loopback address and on TCP port 3389
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
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Detects svchost hosting RDP termsvcs communicating to target systems on TCP port 80 or 443
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
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Detects programs that connect to uncommon destination ports
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
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Detects suspicious local connections via a named pipe to the AD FS configuration database (Windows Internal Database).
Used to access information such as the AD FS configuration settings which contains sensitive information used to sign SAML tokens.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
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Detects creation of default named pipe used by the DiagTrackEoP POC, a tool that abuses "SeImpersonate" privilege.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
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Detects default CSExec pipe creation
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
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Detects the WMI Event Consumer service scrcons.exe creating a named pipe
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
000
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