Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
40,045 detections
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Detects the execution of known potentially malicious tools cplsupport.exe and wtass.exe with install parameters, or the creation of a Windows service associated with these filenames using sc.exe. This activity is indicative of service-based persistence or malicious software installation.
Detects suspicious service installation patterns involving WmiPrvSE, common in lateral movement techniques.
Detects file creation, modification, or renaming in System32 by TieringEngineService.exe or MsMpEng.exe within a short time frame.
Detects suspicious service creation or registry modifications involving WpnUserHost that do not reference System32.
Detects suspicious service creation or registry modifications involving WpnUserHost that do not reference System32.
Detects suspicious service creation or registry modifications involving WpnUserHost that do not reference System32.
Detects suspicious service creation or registry modifications related to wscl.exe that mimic persistence mechanisms.
Detects suspicious service creation or registry modifications related to wscl.exe that mimic persistence mechanisms.
Detects remote service creation consistent with PsExec-style lateral movement by correlating network logons (Type 3) with subsequent service installations.
Detects remote service creation consistent with PsExec-style lateral movement by correlating network logons (Type 3) with subsequent service installations.
Detects remote service creation consistent with PsExec-style lateral movement by correlating network logons (Type 3) with subsequent service installations.
Detects persistence activities initiated by Postgres-related processes or users involving scheduled tasks and system services.
Detects installation of specific suspicious or known helper services, often associated with persistence or proxying.
Detects installation of specific suspicious or known helper services, often associated with persistence or proxying.
This rule detects modifications, creation, or renaming of the Windows hosts file located at 'C:\Windows\System32\drivers\etc\hosts'. Adversaries often modify this file to redirect network traffic, facilitate phishing, or prevent security tools from communicating with update or telemetry servers.
Detects the execution of known WinProtector rogueware binaries. These files often present fake 'threat detected' popups to coerce users into paying for fraudulent software and are frequently bundled with other malware, such as Sality.
This rule monitors for suspicious activity targeting security software and host security configurations. It detects the termination of security-related processes using 'taskkill' or service management commands, the disabling of Windows Firewall via 'netsh', and the modification of critical Registry keys related to User Account Control (UAC), Registry editing access, and Task Manager functionality.
Detects malicious activity patterns characteristic of Sality or similar rootkits, which involve disabling endpoint protection mechanisms (AV/Firewall) in conjunction with kernel-mode driver installation or hooking operations to persist and hide malware activity.
This rule detects potential credential and keystroke theft by identifying the installation of a Windows hook (SetWindowsHookEx) followed within 30 minutes by file access to sensitive browser credential stores (Login Data, key4.db, etc.) by the same process on a single device.
Detects the Sality malware secondary loader creating a new thread within the same infected process, a technique known as self-injection, used to execute decrypted payloads. The rule specifically looks for 'CreateRemoteThreadApiCall' events where the initiating process ID matches the target process ID and correlates this behavior with the creation of mutexes associated with the Sality malware family.
This rule detects potentially malicious executables associated with Sality malware that consistently launch shortly after system startup across multiple boot sessions. It correlates boot events with process execution events within a 10-minute window post-startup to identify programs exhibiting persistence behavior across at least two separate boot instances.
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