Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects files matching known SHA256 hashes associated with the VoidLink malware framework. This is a high-fidelity indicator with a very low chance of false positives.
This rule detects indicators associated with the 'Office Assistant' supply chain attack. It identifies malicious browser extensions by their IDs in file paths or names, and also detects known malicious file MD5s and C2 communication domains. The rule correlates file events and network events to provide a comprehensive view of the attack.
Detects the creation and subsequent execution of a masqueraded binary named "CertificationKit.ini" in the C:\ProgramData directory. This technique has been observed in recent MuddyWater campaigns where a .ini file extension is used to disguise an executable, which is then launched via cmd.exe.
This detection identifies outbound network traffic to domains, IP addresses, or a specific port known to be associated with the PHALT#BLYX campaign's infrastructure. The campaign uses these for malware delivery and DCRat command and control (C2). The rule specifically looks for connections to known malicious IPs or domains, or connections on port 3535 (used by DCRat) originating from processes associated with the malware (staxs.exe, tybd7.exe, aspnet_compiler.exe).
vvs-stealer
KQL
This rule detects activities associated with the VVS Stealer malware, as described in the Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 blog. It identifies the malware through specific SHA256 hashes of known VVS Stealer executables, network connections to hardcoded Discord webhook URLs used for exfiltration, persistence mechanisms via creation of executables in Windows startup folders, creation of '_vault.zip' files (likely containing stolen data), and suspicious Discord-related process activity indicative of the stealer's operation.
Detects a multi-stage process execution chain characteristic of the 'ClickFix' technique. This involves 'explorer.exe' spawning a headless 'conhost.exe', which subsequently executes a Living Off the Land Binary (LOLBin) such as 'curl', 'pwsh', 'powershell', or 'mshta' to download a payload from an HTTP/HTTPS source. This chain indicates an attempt to bypass traditional security controls and execute malicious code.
This rule identifies processes that trigger three or more STATUS_INVALID_PAGE_PROTECTION (0xC0000045) errors within a one-second interval. This specific behavior is caused by a recurring programming flaw in the pkr_mtsi packer, where it attempts to call NtProtectVirtualMemory with invalid memory protection constants.
Detects instances where msbuild.exe is used to execute project files (.proj) from suspicious or uncommon directories. Adversaries may abuse MSBuild to proxy execution of malicious code, often placing these project files in temporary or public user directories to evade detection.
This rule detects the presence of known malicious browser extensions, specifically "Zoom Stealer Extension" and "Shady Panda Extension", by looking for their unique Extension IDs within file paths or file names on devices. It identifies the first and last seen timestamps, the names of the extensions, their IDs, associated campaigns, and the browsers they target, summarizing this information per device.
This rule detects several suspicious activities often associated with post-exploitation and defense evasion. It identifies PowerShell commands used for recursively searching for msbuild.exe, tampering with Windows Defender settings (disabling real-time monitoring or adding exclusions), and downloading files from the internet to common temporary or application data directories. Additionally, it flags msbuild.exe executing suspicious .proj files from temporary directories, and any executable launched from temporary or program data folders by PowerShell or MSBuild. The rule also includes detection for persistence via .url file creation in the Startup folder and the dropping of specific suspicious files (.proj, pins.dat, staxs.exe, tybd7.exe) by PowerShell or MSBuild in temporary or program data directories.
This rule detects network connections from devices to a predefined list of known malicious domains. It identifies attempts by internal systems to communicate with command and control servers, phishing sites, or other infrastructure associated with threat actors.
This detection aims to identify suspicious popup activity on devices by analyzing process events that launch notifications. The query focuses on detecting referrers that generate multiple unique popup URLs, which could indicate potentially malicious behavior.
You can use this to check for potential browser popups generated by malicious sites gaining notification permission on a browser before they lead to further compromise of a host.
You can use this to check for potential browser popups generated by malicious sites gaining notification permission on a browser before they lead to further compromise of a host.
This rule detects the creation of files with specific malicious extension IDs on devices. These extensions are typically associated with browser-based malware or unwanted programs that modify browser behavior, steal data, or perform other malicious activities. The rule specifically looks for `FileCreated` events where the `FileName` matches any of the predefined malicious extension IDs.
This rule detects suspicious batch (.bat) file creation events by monitoring for several indicators. It flags batch files created by processes using command lines indicative of downloads (e.g., 'http:', 'https:', 'iwr', 'iex', 'invoke'), batch files created by suspicious executables ('curl.exe', 'mshta.exe'), batch files placed in high-risk directories ('\Users\Public\', '\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\'), or batch files exceeding a size threshold of 5MB. The rule explicitly excludes processes named 'java.exe' or 'javaw.exe' from triggering alerts.
This rule detects network connections or URL click events to a list of domains known to be associated with phishing or malware distribution. The rule specifically looks for connections to these domains that also contain certain path segments like '/wlc/', '/load/', or '/success/', which are often indicative of malicious activity or payload delivery. It also broadly checks for any URL click events containing these suspicious domains.
This rule detects the loading of unsigned or untrusted DLLs from suspicious, non-standard file paths into a set of common Windows processes. It correlates DLL load events with recent process executions to identify potentially malicious shared module usage, often indicative of DLL hijacking or side-loading techniques. The rule specifically looks for DLLs loaded from paths like \Users\Public\, \Temp\, \AppData\, \ProgramData\, \Downloads\, and \PerfLogs\, into processes such as explorer.exe, svchost.exe, lsass.exe, and common applications like chrome.exe or winword.exe. It then filters these events to only include DLLs that are either unsigned or untrusted, and whose signer is not part of a predefined list of trusted entities (e.g., Microsoft, Google).
Detects execution of Windows LOLBins spawned shortly after a suspicious attachment is written to user accessible paths, a behavior commonly observed in spearphishing campaigns delivering malware loaders and ransomware.
This detection monitors for the creation or deletion of files within the TokenBroker and AAD Broker Plugin cache folders. These folders store authentication tokens that, if accessed or manipulated by an unauthorized process, could indicate credential theft activity.
This rule detects the presence of known malicious browser extensions on devices. It identifies extensions based on a curated list of Extension IDs associated with various threats, including Urban VPN, extensions that turned malicious, general malicious browser extensions, and those involved in Chrome extension supply chain attacks. The rule queries `DeviceTvmBrowserExtensions` to find any activated extensions matching these IDs.
This query identifies devices that have accepted inbound web traffic (ports 80/443) where the accepting process is IIS worker (w3wp.exe) or IIS Express (iisexpress.exe). It focuses on public IPv4 sources (excluding RFC1918/private, loopback, and IPv6), helping you surface internet-exposed web servers that are actively receiving external connections.
Detects the execution of AutoHotKey (.ahk) or AutoIt (.au3) scripts from common staging directories such as C:\Users\Public\ or C:\Temp\. This is a known technique used by malware like DarkGate to stage and execute its payload.
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