Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the trusted .NET host used in Blinder Tunnel to run an attacker-supplied AppDomainManager: a renamed signed Visual Studio hosting binary as RuntimeBroker.exe, or vshost32.exe for the Blackwood tunneling tool. The attacker’s <host>.exe .config names the malicious DLL, which loads before any host code. The genuine RuntimeBroker.exe only runs from System32, and the \Microsoft\RuntimeBrokers\ install folder does not exist on a clean Windows install. The path arm therefore still fires if the actor renames the host. A LaunchContext field separates first execution (MSBuild/devenv .csproj trigger or Inno Setup installer) from Explorer autostart.
Detects potential debugger detection evasion attempts via command line arguments associated with debugging checks or process execution of debugging utilities, as well as persistence configuration using Image File Execution Options (IFEO) or AeDebug registry keys targeting debuggers.
Detects configuration changes to DLP policy. Weakening the policy — excluding a
channel, removing a classification, allowing a destination — opens an exfiltration
route for everyone it covers, and unlike most controls, DLP changes rarely trigger
any operational complaint to reveal them.
Onboarding: TRELLIX-DLP is ingested via Syslog (XML) (Bloo extractor 805).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=configuration where sourcename='TRELLIX-DLP'
and action='CONFIGURATION_CHANGED'
| groupby user
channel, removing a classification, allowing a destination — opens an exfiltration
route for everyone it covers, and unlike most controls, DLP changes rarely trigger
any operational complaint to reveal them.
Onboarding: TRELLIX-DLP is ingested via Syslog (XML) (Bloo extractor 805).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=configuration where sourcename='TRELLIX-DLP'
and action='CONFIGURATION_CHANGED'
| groupby user
Detects a privileged command executed through Centrify on Windows. Brokered
elevation records the command under the identity that requested it rather than the
shared administrative account it ran as, which restores attribution that local
Windows auditing frequently loses.
Onboarding: CENTRIFY-AUDITTRAIL-WINDOWS is ingested via Syslog (KV) (Bloo extractor 821).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=iam where sourcename='CENTRIFY-AUDITTRAIL-WINDOWS'
and action='USER_COMMAND_EXECUTED'
| groupby user, targetuser, role, domain
elevation records the command under the identity that requested it rather than the
shared administrative account it ran as, which restores attribution that local
Windows auditing frequently loses.
Onboarding: CENTRIFY-AUDITTRAIL-WINDOWS is ingested via Syslog (KV) (Bloo extractor 821).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=iam where sourcename='CENTRIFY-AUDITTRAIL-WINDOWS'
and action='USER_COMMAND_EXECUTED'
| groupby user, targetuser, role, domain
Detects anomalous Kerberos ticket requests observed by ADAudit Plus. Service ticket
harvesting — one account requesting tickets for many services in quick succession —
is the precursor to offline cracking of service account credentials, and it is quiet
at the domain controller unless something is watching for the pattern.
Onboarding: MANAGE-ENGINE-ADAUDIT-PLUS is ingested via Syslog (KV) (Bloo extractor 830).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=win-audit where sourcename='MANAGE-ENGINE-ADAUDIT-PLUS'
and action='KERBEROS_AUTHENTICATION_TICKET_REQUESTED'
| duration 1h
| groupby user, domain
| select user, domain, count(*) as cnt
| having cnt > 20
harvesting — one account requesting tickets for many services in quick succession —
is the precursor to offline cracking of service account credentials, and it is quiet
at the domain controller unless something is watching for the pattern.
Onboarding: MANAGE-ENGINE-ADAUDIT-PLUS is ingested via Syslog (KV) (Bloo extractor 830).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=win-audit where sourcename='MANAGE-ENGINE-ADAUDIT-PLUS'
and action='KERBEROS_AUTHENTICATION_TICKET_REQUESTED'
| duration 1h
| groupby user, domain
| select user, domain, count(*) as cnt
| having cnt > 20
Detects inbound mail carrying an attachment from a sending server not previously
seen. Most legitimate correspondence arrives from infrastructure with history;
first-contact plus attachment is the shape of a targeted delivery attempt.
Pair with the recipient list: a single first-seen sender reaching many recipients at
once is a campaign rather than a one-off.
Onboarding: MS-EXCHANGE is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 142).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=email-gateway where sourcename='MS-EXCHANGE'
and action='EMAIL_RECEIVED' and file != ''
| groupby remoteip, sender, file, recipient
seen. Most legitimate correspondence arrives from infrastructure with history;
first-contact plus attachment is the shape of a targeted delivery attempt.
Pair with the recipient list: a single first-seen sender reaching many recipients at
once is a campaign rather than a one-off.
Onboarding: MS-EXCHANGE is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 142).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=email-gateway where sourcename='MS-EXCHANGE'
and action='EMAIL_RECEIVED' and file != ''
| groupby remoteip, sender, file, recipient
Detects network, file, process, and email interactions associated with known IOCs related to Power BI phishing and rogue ScreenConnect campaigns over a 30-day lookback period.
Detects endpoint execution of specific known brute-force scripts and tools (such as ssh_brute.py, brute3.py, auto_login.py, etc.) using Python or shell interpreters, correlated with a high outbound network connection fan-out (50 or more distinct target IPs) from the same process.
Detects endpoint execution of specific known brute-force scripts and tools (such as ssh_brute.py, brute3.py, auto_login.py, etc.) using Python or shell interpreters, correlated with a high outbound network connection fan-out (50 or more distinct target IPs) from the same process.
Detects DNS queries to definitionupdates.microsoft.com or the go.microsoft.com fwlink redirect used for WD update downloads, when the querying process is not a Windows system component. BlueHammer utilizes these definition updates as part of its exploit chain.
Detects inbound external connections on TCP port 541 (FGFM/FMG-Access protocol) correlated with the creation of .tm archives on the same device, or connections from known malicious IP addresses communicating over TCP 541.
Detects inbound external connections on TCP port 541 (FGFM/FMG-Access protocol) correlated with the creation of .tm archives on the same device, or connections from known malicious IP addresses communicating over TCP 541.
Detects when AppLocker "Audit only" enforcement mode reports that an Application, DLL, Script, MSI, or Packaged-App would have been blocked if AppLocker "Enforce rules" enforcement mode was enabled.
Detects the execution of the hacktool Defendnot. Defendnot is a hacktool that abuses Microsoft undocumented WSC (Windows Security Center) API
to disable Windows Defender by registering itself as a fake antivirus product. Threat actors often use these kind of tools to bypass security measures.
to disable Windows Defender by registering itself as a fake antivirus product. Threat actors often use these kind of tools to bypass security measures.
Detects execution of the XMRig Monero cryptominer or a miner
launched with XMRig-specific pool and tuning arguments. In the AhsayCBS
exploitation campaign attackers dropped XMRig onto compromised backup
servers to hijack CPU resources for Monero mining, severely degrading
server performance. Detection keys on XMRig binary names and the mining
command-line grammar (stratum pool URLs, donate-level and thread-hint flags).
launched with XMRig-specific pool and tuning arguments. In the AhsayCBS
exploitation campaign attackers dropped XMRig onto compromised backup
servers to hijack CPU resources for Monero mining, severely degrading
server performance. Detection keys on XMRig binary names and the mining
command-line grammar (stratum pool URLs, donate-level and thread-hint flags).
Detects the execution of ntdsutil.exe with arguments to create an Install from Media (IFM) database backup, preceded shortly by a Remote Interactive logon (RDP) from a remote IP source, which can indicate adversary activity attempting to dump Active Directory credentials.
Detects a high volume of file creation events (greater than 200 files) on an external USB mount session by a non-system account, which may indicate potential data exfiltration or staging to removable media.
Detects network connections, process executions, file creations, and image loads associated with the UNC7017 AOMEI supply chain campaign IOC sweep, including specific malicious URLs, domains, IPs, file paths, and hashes.
Detects endpoint, network, and security log activity matching known indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with PEERSTITCH / CL-STA-0954, including specific file hashes, IP addresses, and URLs.
Sweeps network, process command-line and URL-click telemetry for the Kimsuky payload C2 domain and its subdomains using an anchored match, which avoids lookalike or suffix-matching domains.
Detects suspicious DNS queries to external service interaction domains often used for out-of-band interactions after successful RCE
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