Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects sign-in activity where an attacker or user fails a phishing-resistant MFA challenge (such as FIDO2, Windows Hello, or Passwordless Phone) and immediately succeeds using a lower-assurance, phishable factor (SMS, Voice call, or Push notification). This pattern is indicative of an Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) attack attempting to bypass stronger authentication methods.
Detects a suspicious authentication pattern involving 3 or more MFA failures within 15 minutes, immediately followed by an MFA success for the same user. This pattern is characteristic of potential Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) activity, where an attacker intercepts a session or MFA token and relays it through separate infrastructure, while the legitimate user's own MFA attempts fail or time out.
Detects successful sign-in events flagged by the identity provider with risk indicators suggesting session token replay or theft. This includes anomalies such as unexpected token issuers, suspicious browsers, or unfamiliar device features, which are characteristic of session cookie theft and replay attacks.
Detects instances where end users grant high-risk delegated permissions (e.g., Mail.Read, Files.ReadWrite.All) to applications via OAuth consent flows outside of standard administrator approval processes. This behavior is indicative of device-code phishing or consent phishing campaigns designed to gain unauthorized access to user data.
Detects instances where an existing, non-interactive SSO session token is reused from a suspicious network location, such as an anonymizing proxy, VPN, or VPS, or triggered by an impossible travel risk event. The rule specifically looks for token usage that lacks a fresh interactive Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) challenge, a common indicator of session token hijacking or 'replay' attacks frequently used in cloud account takeover campaigns.
Detects MFA method resets, security info updates, or new authentication device registrations targeting privileged or administrator accounts in Azure AD/Entra ID audit logs. This activity is often indicative of social engineering campaigns, including AI-driven voice or video deepfake impersonation of employees contacting helpdesk support to gain unauthorized account access.
Detects SAML token authentication events where the token-signing certificate does not match the established federation baseline (indicating potential token forging or unauthorized IdP activity) or where critical conditional access claims (MFA and device compliance) are missing from the SAML assertion.
Detects a sequence of suspicious identity activities indicative of a post-account-takeover pivot. The rule identifies a user profile engaging in corporate VPN SAML SSO probing, triggering a MFA enrollment interrupt in Azure, and subsequently accessing multiple Microsoft 365 applications (Azure Portal, OfficeHome, SharePoint) within a 30-minute window.
Detects high-volume account existence checks targeting the Microsoft Teams API. The rule identifies anomalous authentication attempts characterized by the use of outdated Electron/Chrome user-agent strings associated with the TeamFiltration tool, specifically targeting the Microsoft Teams API AppId (1fec8e78-bce4-4aaf-ab1b-5451cc387264).
Detects potential Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) session token theft by monitoring for an initial interactive sign-in followed shortly by a non-interactive token refresh from a different IP address and browser fingerprint without a multi-factor authentication (MFA) challenge. This behavior is indicative of an adversary replaying captured session cookies via reverse-proxy infrastructure.
Detects potential Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) session token theft by monitoring for an initial interactive sign-in followed shortly by a non-interactive token refresh from a different IP address and browser fingerprint without a multi-factor authentication (MFA) challenge. This behavior is indicative of an adversary replaying captured session cookies via reverse-proxy infrastructure.
Detects instances where a user successfully authenticates via the OAuth Device Code flow using an unmanaged or non-compliant device, followed closely by high-privileged Azure/Graph API administrative actions within a short timeframe. This behavior is indicative of a device-code phishing attack aimed at bypassing MFA controls, including FIDO2/passkeys, by compromising an active session.
This rule detects potential 'Quishing' (QR code phishing) attempts by identifying email-based phishing detection or malicious URL indicators followed by a user clicking the URL and subsequently authenticating to a corporate system from a mobile device (Android or iOS) within a 30-minute window. This behavior often suggests an adversary successfully harvesting credentials via a QR code link and then using them to gain unauthorized access.
Detects attempts to tamper with, disable, or delete audit logging configurations in AWS CloudTrail and Azure Monitor. Monitoring these activities is critical to ensure that audit logs remain intact for security investigations.
Detects instances where a user successfully authenticates to a cloud service (Azure AD) from an unrecognized ASN, device, or country without performing MFA, followed shortly by high-risk actions such as mailbox rule creation, mass file downloads, or OAuth application registration. This pattern is indicative of session cookie theft or OAuth token replay used to bypass MFA.
Detects suspicious help-desk activity where a user password is reset by an administrator followed shortly by a new MFA factor being enrolled for that same user. This pattern is characteristic of Scattered Spider-style social engineering and vishing attacks to bypass MFA without deploying malware.
Detects suspicious help-desk activity where a user password is reset by an administrator followed shortly by a new MFA factor being enrolled for that same user. This pattern is characteristic of Scattered Spider-style social engineering and vishing attacks to bypass MFA without deploying malware.
Detects high-volume authentication failures originating from a single source IP targeting multiple unique user accounts, indicative of password spraying or credential stuffing attacks against cloud identity providers.
Detects high-volume account existence checks targeting the Microsoft Teams API. The rule identifies anomalous authentication attempts characterized by the use of outdated Electron/Chrome user-agent strings associated with the TeamFiltration tool, specifically targeting the Microsoft Teams API AppId (1fec8e78-bce4-4aaf-ab1b-5451cc387264).
Detects a sequence of suspicious identity activities indicative of a post-account-takeover pivot. The rule identifies a user profile engaging in corporate VPN SAML SSO probing, triggering a MFA enrollment interrupt in Azure, and subsequently accessing multiple Microsoft 365 applications (Azure Portal, OfficeHome, SharePoint) within a 30-minute window.
This rule identifies potential prompt injection attempts against Microsoft Copilot and Azure OpenAI services by monitoring CloudAppEvents for specific adversarial markers, encoded instruction blocks, or hidden text patterns. It flags recurring attempts from a single user as suspicious probing activity.
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