Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
40,045 detections
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Detects endpoint and network activity matching known Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) associated with BPFDoor, AVERAT, and Rekoobe backdoors based on Rapid7 research. The query checks for specific file hashes, IP addresses, and domain names across process, file, image load, network, and DNS events.
Detects indicators of compromise associated with malicious Firefox wallet-clone extensions (Rabby/OKX clones) by checking for known file hashes, extension file names in Firefox profile directories, and network connections to known C2 domains and workers.dev subdomains.
Sweeps endpoint telemetry for known UAC-0099 MATCHBOIL/LONEPAGE indicators: SHA256 hashes, C2 IPs, C2 domains (including subdomains), and payload/C2 URLs. Matches are limited to public outbound connections, Defender self-activity is excluded from file hits, and repeat hits are collapsed to one row per device and indicator. The lists are a subset of the 142 IOCs in the source report.
Sweeps endpoint telemetry for known UAC-0099 MATCHBOIL/LONEPAGE indicators: SHA256 hashes, C2 IPs, C2 domains (including subdomains), and payload/C2 URLs. Matches are limited to public outbound connections, Defender self-activity is excluded from file hits, and repeat hits are collapsed to one row per device and indicator. The lists are a subset of the 142 IOCs in the source report.
Sweeps endpoint telemetry for known UAC-0099 MATCHBOIL/LONEPAGE indicators: SHA256 hashes, C2 IPs, C2 domains (including subdomains), and payload/C2 URLs. Matches are limited to public outbound connections, Defender self-activity is excluded from file hits, and repeat hits are collapsed to one row per device and indicator. The lists are a subset of the 142 IOCs in the source report.
Detects payload staging activity associated with threat actor UAC-0099, correlating the creation or modification of executable/DLL files in disguised LocalAppData directories with decoy images or library configuration files within a one-hour window.
Detects payload staging activity associated with threat actor UAC-0099, correlating the creation or modification of executable/DLL files in disguised LocalAppData directories with decoy images or library configuration files within a one-hour window.
Detects payload staging activity associated with threat actor UAC-0099, correlating the creation or modification of executable/DLL files in disguised LocalAppData directories with decoy images or library configuration files within a one-hour window.
Detects a behavioral chain where PowerShell stages a hidden base64-encoded command and schedules a VBScript task, or PowerShell fetches an upgrade.txt file via web client methods for execution.
Detects persistence mechanisms associated with the MATCHBOIL campaign, identifying instances where a registry run key and a scheduled task pointing to an application data (%LOCALAPPDATA%) path are created by the same process within a short window, or where known specific scheduled task names and run value names are observed.
This detection identifies potential abuse of SSH "ProxyCommand" or "LocalCommand" by monitoring for suspicious process execution patterns.
Specifically, it looks for instances where ssh.exe (as a parent process) containing "ProxyCommand" or "LocalCommand" in its arguments spawns potentially malicious child processes like mshta, powershell, wscript, or cscript, or processes containing "http" in their command line.
This technique can be used by attackers to execute arbitrary commands through SSH proxy configurations, potentially enabling command & control activities or remote code execution. The detection focuses on commonly abused Windows scripting engines and web requests that may indicate malicious activity when spawned through SSH proxy commands.
Specifically, it looks for instances where ssh.exe (as a parent process) containing "ProxyCommand" or "LocalCommand" in its arguments spawns potentially malicious child processes like mshta, powershell, wscript, or cscript, or processes containing "http" in their command line.
This technique can be used by attackers to execute arbitrary commands through SSH proxy configurations, potentially enabling command & control activities or remote code execution. The detection focuses on commonly abused Windows scripting engines and web requests that may indicate malicious activity when spawned through SSH proxy commands.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks on remote hosts by monitoring for the NetrJobAdd function call (opnum 0) against the ATSVC RPC interface (UUID: 1FF70682-0A51-30E8-076D-740BE8CEE98B). This interface is associated with the legacy Windows AT scheduler, which is frequently abused by offensive security tools like Impacket's atexec for remote command execution and lateral movement.
Identifies repeated Ollama inference requests with long response times on /api/generate, /api/chat, and /v1/chat/completions.
Long response time can result from model size, prompt length, host resources, or normal workload. GIN access logs do not include prompt content and cannot establish a prompt injection or jailbreak attempt, so use this as an exploratory performance signal.
Long response time can result from model size, prompt length, host resources, or normal workload. GIN access logs do not include prompt content and cannot establish a prompt injection or jailbreak attempt, so use this as an exploratory performance signal.
IOC sweep for P7 DarkSword / Coruna: known file hashes, C2/exploit-host IPs, domains and URLs against Defender device file and network events. Tightened to public IPs, connection action types, exact hosts/subdomains and path-qualified URLs; the shared AWS IP is only matched with its C2 port.
IOC sweep for P7 DarkSword / Coruna: known file hashes, C2/exploit-host IPs, domains and URLs against Defender device file and network events. Tightened to public IPs, connection action types, exact hosts/subdomains and path-qualified URLs; the shared AWS IP is only matched with its C2 port.
IOC sweep for P7 DarkSword / Coruna: known file hashes, C2/exploit-host IPs, domains and URLs against Defender device file and network events. Tightened to public IPs, connection action types, exact hosts/subdomains and path-qualified URLs; the shared AWS IP is only matched with its C2 port.
Detects endpoint connections to known DarkSword/Coruna exploit-host and C2 infrastructure. The shared AWS IP is only matched on C2 ports 8881/8882 to reduce collateral hits.
Detects devices reaching P7 DarkSword exploit-delivery hosts (cdn/js.gotoiphone.com, mzpo30.cam) and the agdx53.cc C2, with delivery-then-C2 chaining surfaced as the highest-confidence match. Matching is limited to the exact listed hosts and successful/attempted connection events.
Detects devices reaching P7 DarkSword exploit-delivery hosts (cdn/js.gotoiphone.com, mzpo30.cam) and the agdx53.cc C2, with delivery-then-C2 chaining surfaced as the highest-confidence match. Matching is limited to the exact listed hosts and successful/attempted connection events.
The following analytic identifies a popular 3rd party software process being executed where it's process name does not match it's original file name attribute.
Processes that have been renamed and executed may be an indicator that an adversary is attempting to evade defenses or execute malicious code.
Processes that have been renamed and executed may be an indicator that an adversary is attempting to evade defenses or execute malicious code.
This rule monitors endpoint telemetry (DNS queries, network connections, file creation, and process execution) to identify matches against a predefined list of known malicious indicators, including IP addresses, domains, and file hashes (SHA256). The rule differentiates between confirmed malicious activity and low-confidence indicators, providing a prioritized view of potential threats.
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