Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
1,153 detections
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'Identifies any Azure VM Run Command operations and links these operations with
MDE host logging. Linking these two data sources provides hunting opportunities.
Logging from AzureActivity provides the IP address and UPN of the account that
invoked the command. Joining this with logging from MDE provides insights into
what cmdlets were loaded by the command.'
MDE host logging. Linking these two data sources provides hunting opportunities.
Logging from AzureActivity provides the IP address and UPN of the account that
invoked the command. Joining this with logging from MDE provides insights into
what cmdlets were loaded by the command.'
'Identifies when Azure Run command is used to execute a PowerShell script on a VM that is unique.
The uniqueness of the PowerShell script is determined by taking a combined hash of the cmdLets it imports and the file size of the PowerShell script. Alerts from this detection indicate a unique PowerShell was executed in your environment.'
The uniqueness of the PowerShell script is determined by taking a combined hash of the cmdLets it imports and the file size of the PowerShell script. Alerts from this detection indicate a unique PowerShell was executed in your environment.'
'This querys look for users accounts that have not been successfully logged into recently, who then have a MFA method added or updated before logging in.
Threat actors may look to re-activate dormant accounts and use them for access by adding MFA methods in the hope that changes to such dormant accounts may go un-noticed.'
Threat actors may look to re-activate dormant accounts and use them for access by adding MFA methods in the hope that changes to such dormant accounts may go un-noticed.'
'This hunting query identifies updates to the RequiredResourceAccess property of an OAuth application.
This property specifies resources that an application requires access to and the set of OAuth permission scopes and application roles that it needs under each of those resources.
This pre-configuration of required resource access drives the consent experience. The resourceAccess property of the requiredResourceAccess type is a collection of ResourceAccess.
A threat actor might update this property before granting permissions to an application.
'
This property specifies resources that an application requires access to and the set of OAuth permission scopes and application roles that it needs under each of those resources.
This pre-configuration of required resource access drives the consent experience. The resourceAccess property of the requiredResourceAccess type is a collection of ResourceAccess.
A threat actor might update this property before granting permissions to an application.
'
'Looks for new device registrations following a risky user account sign-in. By default the
query will use a 6 hour lookback period, this can be configured within the query.'
query will use a 6 hour lookback period, this can be configured within the query.'
This query shows authentication methods being added and devices registered around the time of a high risk sign in which could indicate an attempt to establish persistence on a compromised account. The threshold can be changed to a wider timeframe if needed.
'This query look for users starting an Azure CloudShell session and summarizes the Azure Activity from that
user account during that timeframe (by default 1 hour). This can be used to help identify abuse of the CloudShell
to modify Azure resources.'
user account during that timeframe (by default 1 hour). This can be used to help identify abuse of the CloudShell
to modify Azure resources.'
'Detects when a Temporary Access Pass (TAP) is created for a Privileged Account.
A Temporary Access Pass is a time-limited passcode issued by an admin that satisfies strong authentication requirements and can be used to onboard other authentication methods, including Passwordless ones such as Microsoft Authenticator or even Windows Hello.
A threat actor could use a TAP to register a new authentication method to maintain persistance to an account.
Review any TAP creations to ensure they were used legitimately.
Ref: https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-privileged-accounts#changes-to-privileged-accounts'
A Temporary Access Pass is a time-limited passcode issued by an admin that satisfies strong authentication requirements and can be used to onboard other authentication methods, including Passwordless ones such as Microsoft Authenticator or even Windows Hello.
A threat actor could use a TAP to register a new authentication method to maintain persistance to an account.
Review any TAP creations to ensure they were used legitimately.
Ref: https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-privileged-accounts#changes-to-privileged-accounts'
'This query examines Microsoft Entra ID sign-ins for each application and identifies the most anomalous change in a user's location profile. The goal is to detect user account compromise, possibly via a specific application vector.'
'PIM provides a key mechanism for assigning privileges to accounts, this query detects changes to PIM role settings.
Monitor these changes to ensure they are being made legitimately and don't confer more privileges than expected or reduce the security of a PIM elevation.
Ref: https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-privileged-accounts#changes-to-privileged-accounts'
Monitor these changes to ensure they are being made legitimately and don't confer more privileges than expected or reduce the security of a PIM elevation.
Ref: https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-privileged-accounts#changes-to-privileged-accounts'
'This query will detect if user properties of Global Administrator are updated by an existing user. Usually only user administrator or other global administrator can update such properties.
Investigate if such user change is an attempt to elevate an existing low privileged identity or rogue administrator activity'
Investigate if such user change is an attempt to elevate an existing low privileged identity or rogue administrator activity'
'Identifies when the Azure Run Command operation is executed by a UserPrincipalName and IP Address that has resulted in a recent user entity behaviour alert.'
'This query combines different Storage alerts with CommonSecurityLogs and StorageLogs helping analysts triage and investigate any
possible Storage related attacks faster thus reducing Mean Time To Respond'
possible Storage related attacks faster thus reducing Mean Time To Respond'
'This hunting query will try to identify instances where a file us uploaded to file storage and then deleted
within a given threshold. By default the query will find instances where a file is uploaded and deleted within
5 minutes. This hunting query will help detect automated exfiltration.'
within a given threshold. By default the query will find instances where a file is uploaded and deleted within
5 minutes. This hunting query will help detect automated exfiltration.'
'This query could identify critical user management operations like user registration(Microsoft Entra ID Multi-Factor Authentication & self-service password reset (SSPR)) authentication by admin account followed by attempts to stop System Restore activity. Stopping system restore prevents from recovering data by going back to a restore point. The operations could be an indication of attackers trying to maintain persistence, move laterally with attempts to stop system restore point that could point to a potential ransomware attack.'
'This script identifies password changes or resets across multiple host and cloud sources. Account manipulation, including password changes and resets, may help adversaries maintain access to credentials and permission levels.'
'This script identifies rare domain accounts accessing cloud resources by examining logs. You can lower the domainLimit value to see domains with fewer access attempts. For example, set domainLimit = 2 to see domains with 2 or fewer access attempts.'
'Identifies when a new user is granted access and starts creating resources in Azure. This can help you identify rogue or malicious user behavior.'
'This query combines different SQL alerts with CommonSecurityLogs and AuditLogs helping analysts /investigate any possible SQL related attacks faster
thus reducing Mean Time To Respond'
thus reducing Mean Time To Respond'
'Detects a Service Principal being assigned an app role that has sensitive access such as Mail.Read.
A threat actor who compromises a Service Principal may assign it an app role to allow it to access sensitive data, or to perform other actions.
Ensure that any assignment to a Service Principal is valid and appropriate.
Ref: https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-applications#application-granted-highly-privileged-permissions'
A threat actor who compromises a Service Principal may assign it an app role to allow it to access sensitive data, or to perform other actions.
Ensure that any assignment to a Service Principal is valid and appropriate.
Ref: https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-applications#application-granted-highly-privileged-permissions'
'This query combines different Storage alerts with CommonSecurityLogs and AuditLogs helping analysts investigate any possible storage related attacks faster
thus reducing Mean Time To Respond'
thus reducing Mean Time To Respond'
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