Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the creation or modification of O365 inbox rules designed to move incoming emails to the 'Deleted Items' folder, delete messages, or mark them as read. This behavior is a common indicator of an adversary attempting to hide phishing lures, security alerts, or C2 communications within a compromised mailbox.
Detects anomalous 'Bind' operations in Microsoft 365 Exchange Online audit logs where the user-agent string includes 'Firefox/131.0' and 'Client=REST' while using specific Microsoft Outlook ClientAppId and APIId parameters. This pattern has been observed in automated, cross-tenant mailbox exfiltration campaigns targeting sensitive payroll and financial documentation.
Detects phishing emails that impersonate Adobe Acrobat Sign or DocuSign using invoice or RFP-themed lures. The rule identifies suspicious emails by checking for brand-related keywords in the subject and display name, identifying links that do not lead to legitimate signing domains, and identifying senders that are impersonating a brand or are newly seen in the environment.
Detects phishing emails that impersonate Adobe Acrobat Sign or DocuSign using invoice or RFP-themed lures. The rule identifies suspicious emails by checking for brand-related keywords in the subject and display name, identifying links that do not lead to legitimate signing domains, and identifying senders that are impersonating a brand or are newly seen in the environment.
Detects phishing emails that impersonate Adobe Acrobat Sign or DocuSign using invoice or RFP-themed lures. The rule identifies suspicious emails by checking for brand-related keywords in the subject and display name, identifying links that do not lead to legitimate signing domains, and identifying senders that are impersonating a brand or are newly seen in the environment.
Detects phishing emails that impersonate Adobe Acrobat Sign or DocuSign using invoice or RFP-themed lures. The rule identifies suspicious emails by checking for brand-related keywords in the subject and display name, identifying links that do not lead to legitimate signing domains, and identifying senders that are impersonating a brand or are newly seen in the environment.
This rule detects high-confidence phishing emails that were delivered to either the Inbox or Junk folder. It explicitly filters out messages that have been explicitly allowed by organization-level policies, user-level actions, or specific safe-sender bypass mechanisms, ensuring the alert focuses on malicious emails that bypassed standard security filters without an authorized exception.
Detects a suspected EvilTokens attack sequence where a user clicks a phishing URL and subsequently initiates a browser session to the Microsoft device-code authorization page (devicelogin) within 15 minutes, with the phishing lure domain appearing in the browser context.
Detects potentially malicious OAuth device code sign-ins by identifying sign-in events that exhibit anomalous characteristics, such as atypical geographic locations, rare client-application combinations, unmanaged/noncompliant device status, or elevated risk signals associated with the account. This detection helps identify account compromise or malicious OAuth consent activity often associated with 'EvilTokens' or device-code phishing attacks.
Detects potential device code phishing patterns where a successful OAuth device-code authentication is rapidly followed by Microsoft Graph resource access from the same account. The rule identifies suspicious polling sessions (e.g., EvilTokens) by monitoring for successful device-code sign-ins and immediate, subsequent Graph API activity. It filters known first-party applications and incorporates risk-based triggers and reconnaissance behavioral patterns to minimize false positives.
Detects anomalous outbound email activity from an account that recently performed an OAuth device code sign-in characterized by elevated risk levels. The rule identifies potential token abuse by looking for a high volume of emails with either a significant percentage of external recipients or patterns indicative of bulk mailing, common in phishing campaigns that leverage compromised identities (e.g., EvilTokens).
Detects anomalous outbound email activity from an account that recently performed an OAuth device code sign-in characterized by elevated risk levels. The rule identifies potential token abuse by looking for a high volume of emails with either a significant percentage of external recipients or patterns indicative of bulk mailing, common in phishing campaigns that leverage compromised identities (e.g., EvilTokens).
Detects the creation of an email inbox rule that includes both a concealment/deletion action and an external forwarding destination, occurring within 4 hours of a high-risk or compromised device-code authentication event. This pattern is indicative of account takeover where an attacker establishes persistence and exfiltration while hiding their activity.
Detects the creation of an email inbox rule that includes both a concealment/deletion action and an external forwarding destination, occurring within 4 hours of a high-risk or compromised device-code authentication event. This pattern is indicative of account takeover where an attacker establishes persistence and exfiltration while hiding their activity.
Detects the creation of an email inbox rule that includes both a concealment/deletion action and an external forwarding destination, occurring within 4 hours of a high-risk or compromised device-code authentication event. This pattern is indicative of account takeover where an attacker establishes persistence and exfiltration while hiding their activity.
Detects the scripted, non-human-paced registration of a rogue external authentication method by monitoring a sequence of specific Azure Audit Log operations (Add application, Add service principal, Add delegated permission grant) occurring within 60 seconds of each other by the same actor. The detection is further corroborated by analyzing Microsoft Graph Activity Logs for associated Python requests to specific Graph API URIs.
Detects the scripted, non-human-paced registration of a rogue external authentication method by monitoring a sequence of specific Azure Audit Log operations (Add application, Add service principal, Add delegated permission grant) occurring within 60 seconds of each other by the same actor. The detection is further corroborated by analyzing Microsoft Graph Activity Logs for associated Python requests to specific Graph API URIs.
Detects a suspicious sequence of events where a user modifies the Entra Authentication Methods Policy to register an external authentication method (EAM) provider, followed immediately by the same user associating a new FIDO key with their account. This behavior can be indicative of an adversary setting up a persistence mechanism via a malicious or unauthorized MFA provider.
This rule detects potential security configuration tampering by correlating the modification of a Conditional Access policy (e.g., changing users or conditions) with the registration of a new external authentication method configuration by the same user within a 3-hour window. This behavior may indicate an attacker attempting to establish persistence or facilitate bypass of authentication requirements by modifying CA policies and adding a rogue authentication method.
Detects the scripted, non-human-paced registration of a rogue external authentication method by monitoring a sequence of specific Azure Audit Log operations (Add application, Add service principal, Add delegated permission grant) occurring within 60 seconds of each other by the same actor. The detection is further corroborated by analyzing Microsoft Graph Activity Logs for associated Python requests to specific Graph API URIs.
Detects when a user has been elevated to manage all Azure Subscriptions.
This change should be investigated immediately if it isn't planned.
This setting could allow an attacker access to Azure subscriptions in your environment.
This change should be investigated immediately if it isn't planned.
This setting could allow an attacker access to Azure subscriptions in your environment.
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