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Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects a suspicious sequence of events where a remote access tool (RAT) is installed on a device, followed by significantly elevated and anomalous database query activity performed by the same account over an extended period. The rule utilizes a baseline window to identify deviations from normal query volumes while excluding known service accounts and administrative ETL/BI tasks.
Detects UAT-11587 Stage 1 HTA and WSF stager template: hidden/zero-sized window, fixed Cloudflare Pages tracking beacon with ?track, and WinHttp/MSXML ActiveXObject loading Stage 2 from Cloudflare R2 or CloudFront.
Detects the Kothamine post-installation technique where npm/node spawns PowerShell to reflectively load a .NET assembly stager into memory. This behavior is followed by the PowerShell process spawning anomalous instances of RuntimeBroker.exe or svchost.exe. These spawned processes exhibit suspicious characteristics, such as executing from non-standard file paths, having missing command-line arguments (like the required '-k' for svchost), or having an illegitimate parent process (powershell.exe) instead of standard system parents like services.exe or wininit.exe.
Detects the Kothamine post-installation technique where npm/node spawns PowerShell to reflectively load a .NET assembly stager into memory. This behavior is followed by the PowerShell process spawning anomalous instances of RuntimeBroker.exe or svchost.exe. These spawned processes exhibit suspicious characteristics, such as executing from non-standard file paths, having missing command-line arguments (like the required '-k' for svchost), or having an illegitimate parent process (powershell.exe) instead of standard system parents like services.exe or wininit.exe.
Detects the Kothamine post-installation technique where npm/node spawns PowerShell to reflectively load a .NET assembly stager into memory. This behavior is followed by the PowerShell process spawning anomalous instances of RuntimeBroker.exe or svchost.exe. These spawned processes exhibit suspicious characteristics, such as executing from non-standard file paths, having missing command-line arguments (like the required '-k' for svchost), or having an illegitimate parent process (powershell.exe) instead of standard system parents like services.exe or wininit.exe.
Matches published SHA-256 hashes for the Kothamine Injector and Agent DLL, which drop MicrosoftEdgeUpdateCore.exe/.dll and inject into explorer.exe. Exact full-file SHA-256 match only, no fuzzy or partial matching, no additional PE structural checks.
Matches published SHA-256 hashes for the Kothamine Injector and Agent DLL, which drop MicrosoftEdgeUpdateCore.exe/.dll and inject into explorer.exe. Exact full-file SHA-256 match only, no fuzzy or partial matching, no additional PE structural checks.
Matches published SHA-256 hashes for the Kothamine Injector and Agent DLL, which drop MicrosoftEdgeUpdateCore.exe/.dll and inject into explorer.exe. Exact full-file SHA-256 match only, no fuzzy or partial matching, no additional PE structural checks.
Matches archived SHA-256 hashes of known malicious CRX builds from the 'VPN for X' proxy farm extension family
Detects scenarios where common download utilities are used to fetch a file from the internet, followed by the immediate execution or loading of that same file within a 10-minute window, indicative of an Ingress Tool Transfer followed by execution.
Detects attempts to inject code into an AI agent orchestrator process by monitoring for suspicious CreateRemoteThread events. This rule is designed to identify potential process hijacking attacks by malicious actors seeking to bypass application-layer controls, while excluding common legitimate security monitoring tools that may exhibit similar behavior.
Detects attempts to disable Windows Defender features via PowerShell, terminate critical security services using administrative tools like sc.exe or net.exe, or inject/patch AMSI (Antimalware Scan Interface) within a process context to evade detection.
Detects the Graphalgo Go-based remote access trojan (RAT) sending an initial system report containing device and user information to the Slack API. This activity occurs during the initial check-in phase before establishing a primary command and control channel.
Detects the execution of the Graphalgo RAT second-stage payload. The rule identifies the spawning of a detached 'go run .' process, which performs an ephemeral key exchange using a hardcoded public key before C2 establishment. It also correlates this activity with parent processes common in software build environments (npm, terraform, go) to differentiate malicious staging from developer activity.
Detects the execution of known Living-off-the-Land Binaries (LOLBins) such as mshta, certutil, regsvr32, rundll32, and msiexec, where the command-line arguments contain suspicious patterns indicative of script execution or remote file fetching. These behaviors are consistent with T1218 (System Binary Proxy Execution) to bypass security controls by utilizing trusted, signed binaries to execute malicious code.
This rule detects potential lateral movement via WMI by identifying two distinct suspicious behaviors: WmiPrvSE.exe spawning unexpected child processes (excluding common legitimate processes) or the usage of wmic.exe and PowerShell cmdlets (Invoke-WmiMethod, Invoke-CimMethod) to execute processes on remote systems, as indicated by command line arguments specifying target nodes or computer names.
Detects common LSASS memory dumping techniques, including suspicious process access rights (EventID 10) and the execution of tools or techniques (EventID 1) such as comsvcs.dll, procdump, taskmgr, or werfault, which are often used to harvest credentials.
Detects suspicious cross-process access patterns targeting trusted system processes (svchost.exe, explorer.exe, notepad.exe) by utilizing broad process access rights (such as PROCESS_VM_WRITE and PROCESS_CREATE_THREAD). This behavior is characteristic of process injection techniques like process hollowing, often employed by loaders and malware to execute code within the context of a legitimate process.
Detects the abuse of Windows signed binaries (LOLBins) rundll32.exe and regsvr32.exe for proxy execution. Rundll32.exe activity is monitored for the use of javascript: pseudo-protocol or comsvcs.dll for MiniDump operations, while regsvr32.exe activity is monitored for Squiblydoo-style remote scriptlet execution via /i:http and other suspicious flag combinations.
This rule detects modifications to Windows Registry 'Run' or 'RunOnce' keys where the configured value points to a file located in common user-writable or temporary directories (AppData, Temp, ProgramData) with an executable extension (.exe, .dll, .scr, .bat, .vbs, .ps1, .cmd). This pattern is a common technique used by adversaries to establish persistence by ensuring malicious code executes automatically upon user login or system startup.
Detects instances where a signed executable loads an unsigned, invalid, or revoked DLL that shares the same base filename, located outside of standard Windows system directories (System32, SysWOW64, WinSxS). This behavior is characteristic of DLL search-order hijacking and side-loading attacks often employed by loaders and malware such as Cobalt Strike.
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