Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
40,045 detections
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Detects unauthorized modifications to critical authentication-related configuration files and registry keys. Specifically monitors changes to LSA security packages and notification packages on Windows systems, as well as PAM configuration file modifications on Linux systems, when performed by unsigned or untrusted processes outside of known installer activity.
Detects the placement of potentially malicious executable or script files onto a network share followed by the execution of that specific file path from a different host within a short timeframe. This behavior is indicative of lateral movement using tainted shared content.
Detects potential remote service session hijacking by monitoring for RDP session ID reuse by a different user or unauthorized SSH session reattachment (e.g., tmux/screen hijacking). It correlates logon events with process execution to identify instances where an existing session is accessed by an account other than the original owner, while excluding legitimate service/support account activity.
Detects commandline keywords indicative of potential usge of the tool WinPwn. A tool for Windows and Active Directory reconnaissance and exploitation.
This rule monitors network traffic from internal devices and security logs for communication with a curated list of known malicious or suspicious scanner IP addresses, indicating potential reconnaissance or probing activity by external actors.
Detects anomalous remote interactive or network logons where the specific account and remote host/IP combination has not been observed in the previous 14 days. The rule correlates these new login events with subsequent process execution on the destination host within a short window (5 minutes) to identify potential lateral movement where an adversary uses valid credentials to log in and immediately execute commands.
Detects anomalous remote interactive or network logons where the specific account and remote host/IP combination has not been observed in the previous 14 days. The rule correlates these new login events with subsequent process execution on the destination host within a short window (5 minutes) to identify potential lateral movement where an adversary uses valid credentials to log in and immediately execute commands.
This rule detects potentially malicious activity associated with removable media (USB drives) by identifying two distinct patterns: first, the creation of an 'autorun.inf' file on a removable drive followed by the execution of a script or executable from that same drive shortly after. Second, it identifies executables appearing on removable media that are launched across multiple distinct hosts within a one-hour window, which may indicate worm-like spreading or mass-malware distribution via portable storage.
This rule detects potentially malicious activity associated with removable media (USB drives) by identifying two distinct patterns: first, the creation of an 'autorun.inf' file on a removable drive followed by the execution of a script or executable from that same drive shortly after. Second, it identifies executables appearing on removable media that are launched across multiple distinct hosts within a one-hour window, which may indicate worm-like spreading or mass-malware distribution via portable storage.
Detects anomalous authentication behavior where a user account utilizes the same authentication session (LogonId) or material to authenticate across multiple distinct destination hosts in a short timeframe. This rule monitors for both NTLM (Type 3) and Kerberos (TGS/TGT) events, which are indicative of lateral movement techniques such as Pass-the-Hash or Pass-the-Ticket.
Detects anomalous authentication behavior where a user account utilizes the same authentication session (LogonId) or material to authenticate across multiple distinct destination hosts in a short timeframe. This rule monitors for both NTLM (Type 3) and Kerberos (TGS/TGT) events, which are indicative of lateral movement techniques such as Pass-the-Hash or Pass-the-Ticket.
Detects potential abuse of MSBuild.exe or DotNet.exe as a proxy for executing arbitrary code. The rule identifies processes executing MSBuild or specific DotNet CLI operations (build, publish, test, pack) that do not originate from expected binary names, indicating a possible attempt to bypass application execution defenses using trusted developer utilities.
Detects attempts to inhibit system recovery by deleting volume shadow copies or modifying backup/boot recovery configurations. The rule monitors for the execution of vssadmin, wmic, wbadmin, and bcdedit with flags known to facilitate system recovery inhibition, often observed as a precursor to ransomware activity.
Detects the installation or execution of known remote access tools (RMM) from suspicious parent processes (browsers, archives) or from user-writable directories (Temp, Downloads). This behavior is characteristic of initial access and staging activities performed by ransomware operators or Initial Access Brokers (IABs). The rule excludes known IT-managed deployment paths and signed binaries used by the organization.
Detects the installation or execution of known remote access tools (RMM) from suspicious parent processes (browsers, archives) or from user-writable directories (Temp, Downloads). This behavior is characteristic of initial access and staging activities performed by ransomware operators or Initial Access Brokers (IABs). The rule excludes known IT-managed deployment paths and signed binaries used by the organization.
Detects unauthorized attempts to dump the process memory of the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS), a common technique used by attackers to harvest credentials from memory. This includes the use of legitimate diagnostic tools like procdump and comsvcs.dll, as well as the identification of resulting dump files in directory paths associated with LSASS.
This rule detects the presence or execution of a file named 'GlobalProtect.exe' within the Palo Alto GlobalProtect directory. It focuses on identifying potentially masqueraded or unauthorized binaries by monitoring file events and associated process execution. This pattern is commonly used by attackers to disguise malicious files as legitimate security software to evade detection.
Detects the creation or modification of Windows Registry RunOnce keys using the value name 'GlobalProtectVPN', intended to execute 'GlobalProtect.exe'. This pattern is associated with malware masquerading as legitimate GlobalProtect VPN software to achieve persistence upon user logon.
Detects Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) certificate requests where the Subject Alternative Name (SAN) contains a User Principal Name (UPN) that does not match the requester's identity. This pattern indicates potential exploitation of ESC1 or ESC6 certificate template misconfigurations, allowing an attacker to request certificates for arbitrary identities.
Detects anomalous child process execution by Chromium-based browsers (e.g., chrome.exe, msedge.exe, brave.exe). This behavior is indicative of potential exploitation of browser vulnerabilities such as CVE-2026-85046, where a memory corruption vulnerability is leveraged to escape the browser sandbox and execute arbitrary commands via interpreters like cmd.exe or powershell.exe.
This rule monitors security event logs for the presence of a specific file hash identified as potentially malicious (d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e). This hash specifically corresponds to an empty file (MD5 checksum of an empty string), often indicating potential obfuscation techniques, failed file writes, or placeholder files used by malicious scripts.
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