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Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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CyberSecurityNews has reported a raising case about a new wave of phishing emails masquerading as breach notifications from LastPass.
To summarise, these emails claim that the recipient’s account has been compromised and urge them to download a “security patch” to restore access.
In reality, the attached file is a sophisticated malware loader built to steal credentials and deploy additional malicious payloads onto the victim’s system.
Each phishing message includes a ZIP attachment named 'LastPass_Security_Update' that contains an executable disguised as an MSI installer. When executed, the fake MSI installs a PowerShell script into the user’s AppData folder and schedules it to run via a scheduled task. The script then contacts a remote command-and-control server to download a second-stage payload capable of keylogging, taking screenshots, and moving laterally within corporate networks.
This following KQL Query is based on the IOA where the emails arrive with a .zip file attached and it content is a msi file. Using IOA instead the IOC (LastPass_Security_Update .zip) is more feasible because the malicious actors could easily change the zip name and the detection would not detect the mentioned threat.
To summarise, these emails claim that the recipient’s account has been compromised and urge them to download a “security patch” to restore access.
In reality, the attached file is a sophisticated malware loader built to steal credentials and deploy additional malicious payloads onto the victim’s system.
Each phishing message includes a ZIP attachment named 'LastPass_Security_Update' that contains an executable disguised as an MSI installer. When executed, the fake MSI installs a PowerShell script into the user’s AppData folder and schedules it to run via a scheduled task. The script then contacts a remote command-and-control server to download a second-stage payload capable of keylogging, taking screenshots, and moving laterally within corporate networks.
This following KQL Query is based on the IOA where the emails arrive with a .zip file attached and it content is a msi file. Using IOA instead the IOC (LastPass_Security_Update .zip) is more feasible because the malicious actors could easily change the zip name and the detection would not detect the mentioned threat.
Detects potential exploitation of 7-Zip vulnerabilities CVE-2025-11001 and CVE-2025-11002. The exploit uses a malicious archive to create a symbolic link, which redirects a subsequent file write to an arbitrary, often sensitive, location on the filesystem. This detection looks for a 7-Zip process writing a potentially executable file to an unusual location such as the Desktop, Startup, or System folders.
Detects various activities associated with the UTA0388 threat actor and their GOVERSHELL malware family. This includes network connections to known C2 infrastructure, creation of persistence via scheduled tasks, and execution of the malware payload, often involving DLL side-loading. The detection logic covers network communication with known C2 domains and IPs, creation of scheduled tasks with specific names, execution of the malware from common staging directories with specific flags, and the dropping of GOVERSHELL DLLs or files with known hashes.
Detects suspicious activity related to the Windows Subsystem for Linux (WSL), such as installing new distributions (especially penetration testing ones like Kali), importing custom images, or executing commands non-interactively. Attackers may use WSL to run malicious Linux binaries, hide artifacts, and evade defenses.
This rule detects the execution of arbitrary commands via the Windows Subsystem for Linux (WSL) by monitoring process creation events where 'wsl.exe' is the executable. It specifically looks for command lines that include flags like '--exec' or '-e', or common shell commands and downloaders such as 'curl', 'wget', 'bash -c', 'sh -c', 'nc ', or 'ncat '. This activity can indicate an adversary leveraging WSL to execute malicious code or bypass security controls.
This rule detects the creation of new files within the Microsoft Windows Defender program data folder. It specifically looks for file creation events where the initiating process is not a known, whitelisted Defender process. This behavior could indicate an attempt to tamper with or exploit Windows Defender, potentially to impair its defensive capabilities or to hide malicious activity.
KQL Query
This rule detects suspicious sign-in activities that occur shortly after a network connection to an IP address associated with 'Lab539 Clickfix'. It correlates risky sign-in events from Azure Active Directory (AAD) with network connection logs from devices. Specifically, it looks for AAD sign-ins with a risk level of 30 or higher, from non-guest, non-compliant, and non-managed devices, where the IP address has not been seen for that user in the last 30 days. This is then joined with network connection events to IP addresses found in the 'Lab539 Clickfix' external data, ensuring the sign-in occurs after the network connection within a short timeframe. The 'Lab539 Clickfix' reference suggests a connection to a known threat or campaign, possibly related to phishing or credential compromise.
This rule detects instances where 'powershell.exe', 'pwsh.exe', or 'conhost.exe' are launched by 'explorer.exe' with a command line containing an unusual number of spaces or tabs. This pattern can indicate obfuscation attempts often used by adversaries to hide malicious commands or scripts.
The following analytic detects the use of default or publicly known named pipes associated with Cobalt Strike. It leverages Sysmon EventID 17 and 18 to identify specific named pipes commonly used by Cobalt Strike's Artifact Kit and Malleable C2 Profiles. This activity is significant because Cobalt Strike is a popular tool for adversaries to conduct post-exploitation tasks, and identifying its named pipes can reveal potential malicious activity. If confirmed malicious, this could indicate an active Cobalt Strike beacon, leading to unauthorized access, data exfiltration, or further lateral movement within the network.
This rule detects a suspicious activity chain where an SVG file is created by Outlook, immediately followed by a browser downloading a potentially malicious payload (archive, executable, or script file) on the same device within a short timeframe. This pattern could indicate a social engineering attack where a user is tricked into opening a malicious SVG attachment, which then leads to the download of a secondary malicious file.
Detects the execution of PowerShell, VBScript, PHP, JavaScript, or WSF scripts from the 'AppData\Local\Temp' directory by common Windows processes like explorer.exe or svchost.exe. This behavior can indicate malicious activity where scripts are dropped into temporary locations and then executed.
The following KQL query focuses on detecting cases where files are created, modified, or otherwise accessed via RDP from another computer. Its main objective is to verify whether, during an RDP session, the connection has mapped a local disk or other redirected device — allowing us to easily identify potential cases of data exfiltration through RDP file transfer
Hunts for multi-stage attacker behavior involving executables dropped to user directories, co-located DLL loads, and outbound network connections to Azure cloud domains used as command-and-control infrastructure. This query surfaces advanced adversary tradecraft where payload delivery, code execution, and cloud-based C2 are tightly correlated.
Detects potential Subtle Snail-style DLL side-loading attacks where an unsigned or untrusted DLL is loaded by a signed and trusted parent process from user-writable directories (Downloads, AppData, Temp). This method highlights signature-mismatch scenarios often leveraged by APT and malware actors to stealthily execute malicious code while bypassing traditional defenses.
Detects when a 7-Zip process, potentially running from a user directory, writes a file to a sensitive system location. This could indicate a directory traversal attack (e.g., CVE-2025-11001, CVE-2025-11002) where a malicious archive writes a file outside of the intended extraction path. The rule specifically looks for 7-Zip processes initiated from common user-land folders (like Downloads, Desktop, Documents, Temp) creating files in sensitive system directories (like C:\Windows, C:\Windows\System32, C:\ProgramData, or Startup folders), while excluding legitimate installations to Program Files.
Detects the creation of an MSI (Microsoft Installer) file on a device where the file's origin referrer URL indicates it was downloaded from a ZIP archive that was originally an email attachment. This could indicate a user opening a malicious ZIP file from an email, leading to the execution of an installer.
Detects when a 7-Zip process creates an executable file in a sensitive system directory. This could indicate exploitation of a vulnerability like CVE-2025-11001 or CVE-2025-11002, where a malicious archive writes a file to an unexpected location to achieve persistence or code execution.
This analytic detects suspicious data transfer activities involving the use of the `split` syscall with the `-b` option, which specifies the size of each output file. This technique can be used by attackers to evade detection by breaking large files into smaller parts, bypassing size-based security controls, and facilitating covert exfiltration of sensitive data. By monitoring for unusual or unauthorized use of the `split` syscall with a specified block size, this analytic helps identify potential data exfiltration attempts.
This rule detects suspicious execution patterns of rundll32.exe. Specifically, it looks for rundll32.exe being called with an obfuscated ordinal number (e.g., #+, #-, #0, #655, #656) which can be used by adversaries to obscure malicious code. Additionally, it identifies rundll32.exe attempting to perform a MiniDump of the 'comsvcs' process, which is a common technique for OS credential dumping.
this query combines Queries in a single Query created from Ayush Anand and published on https://www.securityinbits.com/detection-engineering/lsass-dump-comsvcs-rundll32/
this query combines Queries in a single Query created from Ayush Anand and published on https://www.securityinbits.com/detection-engineering/lsass-dump-comsvcs-rundll32/
Detects network connections initiated by Microsoft Quick Assist (QuickAssist.exe) to its official relay server. This activity is expected for legitimate Quick Assist usage, but monitoring it can help identify unauthorized remote access or potential abuse of the tool.
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