Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects PowerShell execution involving Base64 decoding or certutil decoding combined with writing files to the AppData directory using .NET I/O methods or PowerShell cmdlets.
IOC sweep (SHA256, domains, URLs, IPs, sender emails) for the RedFlick-style VHDX/LNK/WebDAV campaign against Moldovan and Ukrainian civil society, with false-positive controls.
Detects potential web shell activity where a web or application server process (such as IIS, Apache, Nginx, or Tomcat) writes a script file (e.g., .aspx, .jsp, .php) into a web-accessible directory, followed shortly by spawning a command-line shell or utility process.
Detects potential web shell activity where a web or application server process (such as IIS, Apache, Nginx, or Tomcat) writes a script file (e.g., .aspx, .jsp, .php) into a web-accessible directory, followed shortly by spawning a command-line shell or utility process.
Detects endpoint execution of specific known brute-force scripts and tools (such as ssh_brute.py, brute3.py, auto_login.py, etc.) using Python or shell interpreters, correlated with a high outbound network connection fan-out (50 or more distinct target IPs) from the same process.
Detects creation of a scheduled task named "Windows Defender Advanced
Threat Protection Service" configured to run at system startup with SYSTEM privileges
and launch an executable named defender.exe. HoneyMyte (Mustang Panda) used this exact
schtasks command to establish boot persistence for the CoolClient backdoor sideloader,
masquerading the task and binary as a legitimate Windows Defender component.
Threat Protection Service" configured to run at system startup with SYSTEM privileges
and launch an executable named defender.exe. HoneyMyte (Mustang Panda) used this exact
schtasks command to establish boot persistence for the CoolClient backdoor sideloader,
masquerading the task and binary as a legitimate Windows Defender component.
Detects the persistence mechanism used by ShelbyLoader V2 (RuntimeBroker.dll), the loader in the Iran-nexus Blinder Tunnel campaign (CL-STA-1178). The implant writes HKCU\...\Run\MicrosoftRuntime pointing at %LOCALAPPDATA%\Microsoft\RuntimeBrokers\RuntimeBroker.exe, then re-asserts it hourly. The genuine RuntimeBroker.exe is a System32 COM broker that is never autostarted from a Run key, so matching either the implant’s value name or RuntimeBroker.exe in Run data gives a near-binary signal with no allow-list. Covers both the Unit 42 and Nextron variants.
Detects network, DNS, email, and URL click events matching known IOC domains associated with AdFection, Candiru, and Discover-Tech threat intelligence reports.
Detects Windows Terminal or related console hosts spawning PowerShell or PowerShell Core with command-line arguments indicative of staging, downloading, or executing remote scripts (such as encoded commands, Invoke-Expression, or web requests), commonly associated with ClickFix or social engineering techniques.
Detects the WinLol Rust dropper staging a DLL sideload by writing a copy of Microsoft OneDrive.exe and a proxy version.dll into a user temp directory by a non-OneDrive, non-installer process.
Detects process handle on LSASS process with certain access mask
The following analytic detects the execution of known remote access software within the environment. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and parent processes mapped to the Endpoint data model. We then compare with with a list of known remote access software shipped as a lookup file - remote_access_software. This activity is significant as adversaries often use remote access tools like AnyDesk, GoToMyPC, LogMeIn, and TeamViewer to maintain unauthorized access. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to control systems remotely, exfiltrate data, or deploy additional malware, posing a severe threat to the organization's security.
This rule performs a sweep across device file and network events for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the UAT-11587/Antino campaign. It detects malicious file hashes, specific C2 domain connections, and known lure URLs (HTA/WSF) identified by Cisco Talos.
Detects endpoint, network, and security log activity matching known indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with PEERSTITCH / CL-STA-0954, including specific file hashes, IP addresses, and URLs.
Detects endpoint, network, and security log activity matching known indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with PEERSTITCH / CL-STA-0954, including specific file hashes, IP addresses, and URLs.
Detects inbound external connections on TCP port 541 (FGFM/FMG-Access protocol) correlated with the creation of .tm archives on the same device, or connections from known malicious IP addresses communicating over TCP 541.
Detects registry modifications that tamper with internal Windows tools settings, commonly used by malware to disable security features or system tools
Detects administrative login to the ePO console. An ePO administrator can change
protection policy, create exclusions and push software to every managed endpoint —
which makes this account one of the highest-value targets in any estate running it.
Onboarding: TRELLIX-EPO is ingested via RDBMS Log Shipper (Bloo extractor 857).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/integrations
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=authentication where sourcename='TRELLIX-EPO' and action='LOGIN'
| groupby user, srcip, authproto
protection policy, create exclusions and push software to every managed endpoint —
which makes this account one of the highest-value targets in any estate running it.
Onboarding: TRELLIX-EPO is ingested via RDBMS Log Shipper (Bloo extractor 857).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/integrations
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=authentication where sourcename='TRELLIX-EPO' and action='LOGIN'
| groupby user, srcip, authproto
Detects deletion of a role in Centrify for Windows. Removing a role can strip access
from legitimate administrators during an incident, and it also erases the record of
who was entitled to what — which complicates reconstructing the access position
afterwards.
Onboarding: CENTRIFY-AUDITTRAIL-WINDOWS is ingested via Syslog (KV) (Bloo extractor 821).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=iam where sourcename='CENTRIFY-AUDITTRAIL-WINDOWS' and action='ROLE_DELETED'
| groupby user, role, targetuser, domain
from legitimate administrators during an incident, and it also erases the record of
who was entitled to what — which complicates reconstructing the access position
afterwards.
Onboarding: CENTRIFY-AUDITTRAIL-WINDOWS is ingested via Syslog (KV) (Bloo extractor 821).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=iam where sourcename='CENTRIFY-AUDITTRAIL-WINDOWS' and action='ROLE_DELETED'
| groupby user, role, targetuser, domain
Detects a pattern of lease denials consistent with DHCP starvation, where an attacker
requests leases until the pool is empty so that legitimate devices cannot obtain an
address. It is typically a precursor to a rogue DHCP server taking over address
assignment and redirecting traffic.
Onboarding: WIN-DHCP is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 79).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=dhcp where sourcename='WIN-DHCP' and action='IP_LEASE_DENIED'
| duration 10m
| groupby macaddress
| select macaddress, count(*) as cnt
| having cnt > 20
requests leases until the pool is empty so that legitimate devices cannot obtain an
address. It is typically a precursor to a rogue DHCP server taking over address
assignment and redirecting traffic.
Onboarding: WIN-DHCP is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 79).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=dhcp where sourcename='WIN-DHCP' and action='IP_LEASE_DENIED'
| duration 10m
| groupby macaddress
| select macaddress, count(*) as cnt
| having cnt > 20
Detects non-browser processes accessing multiple sensitive browser credential/cookie files or cryptocurrency wallet files within a 24-hour window, which is a common indicator of credential theft or information stealer activity.
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