Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects network connections to common IP lookup services (e.g., ip-api.com, ipify.org) initiated by processes often associated with malware, such as Remcos RAT components or hijacked system processes like iexplore.exe. This activity is frequently used by adversaries for reconnaissance or C2 heartbeats to identify the external IP address of a compromised host.
This rule detects anomalous process execution patterns associated with Remcos RAT, specifically monitoring for the spawning of 'rmclient.exe', unauthorized spawning of 'fsutil.exe', or 'svchost.exe' being launched by processes other than system-critical services. These patterns are characteristic of Remcos RAT deploying its watchdog or performing process injection.
Detects Microsoft Office applications (Word, Excel, PowerPoint) and WordPad spawning command-line interpreters (mshta, wscript, cscript, cmd, powershell, pwsh). This behavior is often associated with macro-based malware or malicious document attachments attempting to execute scripts or shell commands to facilitate further infection stages.
Detects anomalous self-upgrade behavior in npm packages where a node process spawns child processes using npm pack or specific command-line arguments to overwrite installed package files. This pattern is associated with malicious supply chain activity, specifically seen in the wshu.net campaign where packages download and replace their own contents at runtime.
This rule detects the execution of the Remcos Remote Access Trojan (RAT) followed by the creation of a keylogger data file by the same process, within a one-hour timeframe. This pattern indicates an active infection where the RAT is performing credential harvesting through keystroke logging.
Detects instances where known endpoint security product binaries (EDR/AV) load DLL files from directories outside of their trusted, standard installation paths. This behavior is a common indicator of DLL sideloading, where an attacker attempts to masquerade malicious code as a component of a trusted security process to evade detection.
Detects the addition of Microsoft Defender exclusions (Path, Extension, or Process) via WMIC or PowerShell, followed by a file creation event within a suspicious directory (e.g., Temp, AppData, ProgramData) within 15 minutes. This behavior is indicative of an adversary attempting to bypass antivirus detection for malicious payloads.
This rule detects unauthorized modifications to the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) in memory. It specifically monitors for calls to VirtualProtect or VirtualProtectEx when directed at amsi.dll or attempting to patch AmsiOpenSession, which is a common technique used by malware to disable AMSI scanning capabilities and evade EDR/AV inspection.
Detects modifications to Windows Registry Run keys associated with the persistence mechanism of Millenium RAT, specifically looking for indicators such as the 'Liu5GgJiKiKqe2Qs' folder or suspicious 'MsEdgeUpdate' entries pointing to executable files in the AppData directory.
Detects cross-process injection (Process Injection) from a specifically identified 'Mixed Reality' process into svchost.exe, followed by suspicious module loads (non-system32 DLLs) within that svchost.exe instance. This behavior pattern is consistent with DcRAT and XenoRAT deployment activities using masquerading or hijacked processes.
Detects potential DcRAT activity characterized by a process spawning under a svchost.exe parent, subsequent loading of GDI display libraries for screen capturing, and outbound network communication on non-standard ports, which indicates data exfiltration.
Correlates a successful Fortinet SSL VPN session with nltest, net, Get-AD*, AdFind, ldapsearch, WinRS, or WMIC discovery commands for the same account within forty-five minutes. This behavior can indicate an attacker establishing initial access via VPN and then performing internal reconnaissance.
Detects Chrome launch with specific crash recovery evasion flags indicative of FlutterShell.
This rule monitors for suspicious activity associated with LegionLoader malware, specifically tracking files and processes interacting with the 'Traiolx Custom Utils' directory. It triggers on the staging of '_socket.pyd', execution of Python interpreters from this directory, and associated C2 communication attempts with the domain 'birdeemusic.com'.
Detects activity associated with a specific phishing campaign distributing 'Distribution Settlement Agreement' PDF lures. The rule monitors for file creation or execution of files matching this naming pattern, as well as network connection attempts to domains identified as related to the threat actors: 'gasparinutrition.com' and 'gappssmtp.com'.
This rule detects when known DLL files (7z.dll or normaliz.dll) are loaded by a process from a file path containing 'Traiolx Custom Utils'. This pattern is often indicative of DLL side-loading or hijacking, where an adversary places malicious or proxy DLLs in a custom directory to be loaded by a legitimate application.
Detects the Windows Installer service (msiexec.exe) spawning the command shell (cmd.exe) to execute specific scripts or commands (xupdate.bat or Traiolx). This pattern is often associated with software installers or malicious activity attempting to run commands via child processes spawned by system-level installers.
This rule detects the execution of specific utilities (e.g., 7zip components, socket modules) originating from a non-standard directory named 'AppData\Roaming\Traiolx Custom Utils'. This pathing pattern is indicative of potential malware staging or the execution of custom tooling in an attempt to masquerade as legitimate software.
This rule detects instances of the Python interpreter (python.exe) executing from the AppData\Roaming directory, which is a common persistence location for malware. It further correlates these process events with outbound network connections to external (non-private/non-RFC1918) IP addresses, identifying potential Command and Control (C2) or data exfiltration activity.
Detects instances where the Windows Service Host process (svchost.exe) initiates more than five network connections to external (non-private/non-local) IP addresses within a short timeframe. This behavior is often characteristic of command-and-control (C2) activity or beaconing by malicious code masquerading as or injecting into system services.
This rule detects the presence of a specific malicious Chrome extension ID (flkebkiofojicogddingbdmcmkpbplcd) in process command lines or file paths on Windows endpoints, originating from browser processes such as Chrome, Edge, or Brave.
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