Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
9,759 detections
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KQL Query
Detects the presence of the Amatera secondary-payload archive component, which consists of a legitimate signed Chrome executable (platform_experience_helper.exe) paired with a malicious NativeAOT-compiled Secur32.dll designed for DLL side-loading. The malicious DLL is identified by its interaction with the GetUserNameExW Windows API.
Detects execution of package management commands (pip, npm, conda) that attempt to pull packages from registries other than the approved internal repositories. This behavior is indicative of potential AI supply-chain compromise, including malicious packages or namesquatting targeted at machine-learning or LLM-related development workflows.
Detects instances where machine learning runtime processes (e.g., Python, torch-model-loader) load serialized model files (e.g., .pkl, .joblib, .pth) and subsequently spawn suspicious child processes like command shells, scripting engines, or download utilities. This behavior is indicative of arbitrary code execution via unsafe deserialization of a malicious model artifact.
This rule detects potential AI/ML supply chain compromise by monitoring for package installations (via pip, conda, poetry, etc.) from non-standard repositories, direct URLs, or version control systems within data science and CI/CD pipelines (e.g., Jupyter, Airflow, Jenkins). It further correlates this activity with subsequent suspicious outbound network connections from the host, which is indicative of slopsquatting or malicious dependency execution.
Detects a sequence of potentially malicious activity involving the bulk reading or downloading of sensitive AI-related artifacts (model files, datasets), followed by the staging of these files into a compressed archive, and finally an outbound network transfer to an external IP address. This behavior pattern is indicative of data exfiltration of intellectual property.
Detects the execution of known Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) tool binaries (ScreenConnect, AnyDesk, Atera) that are initiated by suspicious parent processes such as browsers, scripting hosts, or office applications, or run from non-standard locations. This behavior is indicative of threat actors deploying trojanized RMM tools to establish a covert command-and-control channel that blends into normal IT administrative traffic.
Detects suspicious cross-process access (Sysmon Event ID 10) and remote thread creation (Sysmon Event ID 8) targeting sensitive processes such as lsass.exe, svchost.exe, and explorer.exe, which are indicative of process injection or hollowing techniques used for evasion or persistence.
Detects malicious processes or scripts that perform multi-stage environment fingerprinting to identify virtualization or sandbox environments. The rule identifies chains of suspicious activities, including querying registry keys related to virtualization (e.g., VMware, VirtualBox, QEMU), WMI queries for BIOS/Computer system details, API calls common to sandbox evasion (GetCursorPos, GetTickCount), and artificial execution delays (sleep/timeout), typically used by malware like LummaC2 to perform conditional exits if an analysis environment is detected.
Detects execution of potentially malicious processes (mshta, powershell, cmd, conhost) which are common vectors for ClickFix-style attacks, where a user is socially engineered into copying and pasting malicious commands into the Windows Run dialog or a command prompt.
Detects execution of potentially malicious processes (mshta, powershell, cmd, conhost) which are common vectors for ClickFix-style attacks, where a user is socially engineered into copying and pasting malicious commands into the Windows Run dialog or a command prompt.
Detects processes querying registry keys or accessing file paths associated with common virtualization and sandbox environments (e.g., VMware, VirtualBox, Hyper-V, Sandboxie). This behavior is often indicative of malware attempting to identify if it is running in an analysis or sandbox environment to evade detection.
Detects bulk file access or modifications involving sensitive files such as certificates (.pfx, .p12, .pem, .key), password manager vaults (.kdbx, .kdb), and files containing keywords related to credentials or logins. This behavior is indicative of an adversary staging or exfiltrating sensitive security material for further credential access.
Detects potential malicious PowerShell activity involving suspicious file paths in 'C:\Users\Public\' and the use of 'UPLOAD' command strings, which may indicate the staging and execution of payloads.
Detects a coordinated attack sequence where a browser process is terminated, followed immediately by the execution of an unsigned Python interpreter from a suspicious location (temp/downloads folder), which is then followed by the installation of an unsigned browser extension. This pattern mimics ClickFix and browser-based RAT lure campaigns.
Detects a multi-stage process execution chain beginning with common end-user applications (browsers, Office apps, explorer.exe) spawning known LOLBins (Living-off-the-Land Binaries), which in turn execute secondary LOLBins with suspicious command-line indicators. This pattern often signifies post-exploitation activity such as secondary payload delivery, fileless malware execution, or proxy execution of malicious scripts/commands, consistent with ClickFix or BYOVD-related ingress techniques.
This rule detects potential 'ClickFix' phishing activity where a user is tricked into executing malicious commands in a Windows shell. The rule looks for browser or file explorer processes acting as the parent process to command-line interpreters (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, etc.) executing suspicious command-line arguments often used to fetch or run malicious scripts from the internet.
Detects the 'ClickFix' social engineering attack where a user is instructed to use the Windows Run dialog (Win+R) to execute a malicious one-liner. This activity is characterized by explorer.exe spawning common command/script interpreters (powershell, cmd, mshta, etc.) containing typical download-and-execute strings (cradles), which bypasses browser-based download security controls.
Detects mshta.exe or rundll32.exe spawned as a direct child of explorer.exe with a remote HTTP/HTTPS URL or javascript: URI as an argument. This pattern is indicative of ClickFix-style phishing campaigns where users are socially engineered into running malicious commands via the Windows Run dialog or clipboard, leading to execution of remote malicious payloads proxied through trusted system binaries.
Detects the execution of Python interpreters from user-writable directories (Temp, Downloads, AppData) when launched by common LOLBins or shell-like parents, which is indicative of the CastleLoader 'ClickFix' phishing chain where attackers deploy a portable Python runtime to execute malicious payloads.
Detects the creation of files on disk by a browser process where the Zone.Identifier metadata indicates the origin was a blob:, data:, or about:blank URI. This behavior is indicative of HTML smuggling, where malicious payloads are reconstructed client-side from within an HTML document, bypassing network-based security controls.
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