Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
40,407 detections
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Detects Evil-WinRM / WinRM-fs usage or wsmprovhost.exe-spawned PowerShell tied specifically to bird-agent backdoor artifacts (cplsupport, wtass, config.toml) or encoded/download-cradle command patterns, rather than any WinRM session, reducing noise from routine remote administration.
This rule detects potentially malicious activity originating from Microsoft Word (WINWORD.EXE). It monitors for two specific patterns: the creation of script files (.bat, .vbs, .cmd) with GUID-based filenames in non-temp directories, and the creation or execution of files matching known malicious hashes associated with the Hookedge malware family.
Detects the execution of known malicious files associated with the BlueDelta threat group, specifically the HOOKEDGE and HEADLACE malware families, using a curated list of SHA-256 file hashes. Additionally, the rule monitors for the execution of scripts with GUID-based filenames, a common tactic for temporal or staged file deployment.
Detects execution or file presence associated with HOOKEDGE/HEADLACE malware. This rule uses a dual-approach: matching known malicious file hashes (SHA256) and monitoring for specific script files (bat, vbs, cmd) following a GUID-formatted naming convention typically used by the HOOKEDGE installer chain.
Detects attempts to tamper with or destroy Windows Boot Configuration Data (BCD) using bcdedit.exe to weaken system security policies or registry-based deletion of the BCD store to inhibit system boot and recovery.
Detects the creation or modification of Registry values under 'Image File Execution Options' (IFEO) that register a debugger for common administrative or diagnostic tools (e.g., Task Manager, Registry Editor, PowerShell). This technique can be used by malicious actors like XHOPELESS to intercept, block, or hijack the execution of legitimate tools, often to maintain persistence or impair security analysis.
Detects modifications to the Winlogon Shell or Userinit registry keys. These keys are commonly used by adversaries for persistence to execute malicious binaries or scripts upon user logon.
This rule detects the creation of scheduled tasks using names that masquerade as legitimate update services for Microsoft Edge, OneDrive, or Windows. Adversaries often use these names to hide persistence mechanisms within the Task Scheduler to maintain system access.
Detects the clearing of Windows event logs using the native 'wevtutil.exe' command or the PowerShell 'Clear-EventLog' cmdlet. This activity is commonly associated with anti-forensic techniques used by threat actors and wiper malware to obstruct incident response efforts and remove traces of malicious activity.
Detects attempts by processes to query Windows Registry keys that store configuration data for virtualization software like VMware and Oracle VirtualBox. This behavior is commonly used by malware to detect if it is running within an analysis environment to evade detection.
Detects a process enabling multiple sensitive Windows privileges simultaneously via a single AdjustTokenPrivileges event (Event ID 4703). This behavior is characteristic of malicious tools, such as the XHOPELESS wiper, attempting to gain broad system control for activities like tampering with firmware, killing protected processes, loading malicious drivers, or modifying boot configurations.
Detects suspicious activity related to the Windows Subsystem for Linux (WSL), such as installing new distributions (especially penetration testing ones like Kali), importing custom images, or executing commands non-interactively. Attackers may use WSL to run malicious Linux binaries, hide artifacts, and evade defenses.
Detects uncommon or suspicious child processes spawning from a WSL process. This could indicate an attempt to evade parent/child relationship detections or persistence attempts via cron using WSL.
Detects the loading of compression libraries (such as lzma.dll or 7z.dll) by ERAAgent.exe followed by suspicious process or thread activity (e.g., remote thread creation, memory allocation). This pattern is often associated with the staging and execution of malicious payloads in memory.
Detects periodic execution cycles of ERAAgent.exe that involve memory protection changes, characteristic of the SLEEPWALKER malware's XOR-decrypt-execute-reencrypt loop scheduled by a cron-like mechanism.
This rule monitors for web server exploit attempts (indicated by patterns like JNDI lookups or SQL injection sequences in URI/cookie data) that correlate with a surge in server-side errors (400+ status codes) and subsequent anomalous process creation or outbound network connections from the web server process.
This rule detects potential execution of malicious files from removable media (e.g., USB drives). It monitors for a sequence of events where a removable drive is mounted, a file is subsequently created on that drive, and then that same file is executed within a short time window.
Detects the loading of registry hives using the 'reg load' command. This technique is often associated with adversary attempts to manipulate the Windows registry, access sensitive data, or establish persistence, particularly when followed by actions executed in the SYSTEM context from the same process lineage.
This rule detects the installation of browser extensions that occur during an idle user session (greater than 7 minutes). This behavior is consistent with automated, remote-driven synthetic input injection, often utilized by malware (e.g., NinjaMare) to install malicious extensions without user consent while the system is unattended.
Detects Evil-WinRM / WinRM-fs usage or wsmprovhost.exe-spawned PowerShell tied specifically to bird-agent backdoor artifacts (cplsupport, wtass, config.toml) or encoded/download-cradle command patterns, rather than any WinRM session, reducing noise from routine remote administration.
Detects modifications to the 'metrics_interval' registry value within the 'Software\SynapseAgent' key. This activity suggests configuration changes to the SynapseAgent, which could indicate tampering with agent telemetry or polling frequency.
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