Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects a burst of multiple MFA push authentication denial events for a single user within a 10-minute window, indicative of an MFA fatigue (push-bombing) attack. This behavior is often followed by an attempt to wait for the user to inadvertently approve the notification.
Detects the removal of phishing-resistant authentication methods (FIDO2 or Windows Hello for Business) and the registration of weaker, phishable MFA methods (SMS, voice, or phone app) within Entra ID. This behavior is indicative of an attacker attempting to lower the security posture of an account to facilitate future credential theft or unauthorized access.
Detects instances where an administrative action involving a password reset or MFA configuration (StrongAuthenticationMethod update) is initiated by a user account that lacks the designated Helpdesk or Password Administrator role. This behavior indicates potential unauthorized privilege escalation or credential manipulation by an account not formally assigned to support workflows.
This rule detects a potential vishing attack by correlating suspicious IT helpdesk requests (e.g., password or MFA reset without manager approval or verified callback) with subsequent sensitive Entra ID identity changes (e.g., self-service password resets, MFA device registration, or new device registration) occurring for the same user within a short time window. This activity is indicative of an attacker attempting to social-engineer helpdesk staff to bypass authentication controls and compromise a user account.
Detects a suspicious sequence of events where a user modifies their MFA phone number, followed within 30 minutes by a sign-in event flagged with 'impossibleTravel' or 'unfamiliarFeatures' risk. This pattern is indicative of potential SIM-swap fraud, where an attacker has hijacked the user's phone number to receive MFA prompts and then attempts to access the account from an anomalous location.
Detects successful user authentications originating from geographically distant locations within a time window that makes physical travel impossible. The detection further filters for scenarios where the subsequent sign-in is associated with a different, non-compliant, or untrusted device, indicating a likely compromised account.
Detects rapid, large-scale deletion of Azure storage accounts by a single identity within a short timeframe. This behavior is indicative of destructive activity, such as a malicious actor attempting to disrupt service availability or impact organizational data, rather than typical administrative teardown.
Detects rapid, large-scale deletion of Azure storage accounts by a single identity within a short timeframe. This behavior is indicative of destructive activity, such as a malicious actor attempting to disrupt service availability or impact organizational data, rather than typical administrative teardown.
Detects rapid, large-scale deletion of Azure storage accounts by a single identity within a short timeframe. This behavior is indicative of destructive activity, such as a malicious actor attempting to disrupt service availability or impact organizational data, rather than typical administrative teardown.
Detects a suspicious sequence of behavior where an Azure service principal authenticates and immediately performs broad reconnaissance (enumeration) across multiple subscriptions and resource types. This pattern is often indicative of an adversary using a compromised service principal credential to map out an environment.
Detects a service principal attempting to delete multiple Azure SQL databases in a short timeframe, resulting in failures. This pattern is characteristic of malicious data destruction activity, such as that observed in Storm-3168 (JADEPUFFER) campaigns, but accounts for the possibility of misconfigured infrastructure-as-code pipelines by requiring a high volume of failed requests across distinct resources.
Detects a service principal attempting to delete multiple Azure SQL databases in a short timeframe, resulting in failures. This pattern is characteristic of malicious data destruction activity, such as that observed in Storm-3168 (JADEPUFFER) campaigns, but accounts for the possibility of misconfigured infrastructure-as-code pipelines by requiring a high volume of failed requests across distinct resources.
Detects a service principal attempting to delete multiple Azure SQL databases in a short timeframe, resulting in failures. This pattern is characteristic of malicious data destruction activity, such as that observed in Storm-3168 (JADEPUFFER) campaigns, but accounts for the possibility of misconfigured infrastructure-as-code pipelines by requiring a high volume of failed requests across distinct resources.
Detects a service principal or user account performing a burst of 'ListKeys' operations across multiple Azure Storage accounts. This behavior is indicative of an attacker attempting to dump access keys for multiple storage accounts after initial compromise or privilege escalation to gain further access to sensitive cloud data.
Detects a service principal or user account performing a burst of 'ListKeys' operations across multiple Azure Storage accounts. This behavior is indicative of an attacker attempting to dump access keys for multiple storage accounts after initial compromise or privilege escalation to gain further access to sensitive cloud data.
Detects attempts to delete Azure resource locks protecting Site Recovery or Backup services, followed by credential retrieval (ListKeys) within a one-hour window. This sequence pattern is a strong indicator of an adversary attempting to disable backup protection before potentially destroying data or exfiltrating keys.
Detects attempts to delete Azure resource locks protecting Site Recovery or Backup services, followed by credential retrieval (ListKeys) within a one-hour window. This sequence pattern is a strong indicator of an adversary attempting to disable backup protection before potentially destroying data or exfiltrating keys.
Detects attempts to delete Azure resource locks protecting Site Recovery or Backup services, followed by credential retrieval (ListKeys) within a one-hour window. This sequence pattern is a strong indicator of an adversary attempting to disable backup protection before potentially destroying data or exfiltrating keys.
This rule detects reconnaissance activity targeting Azure App Service instances, specifically looking for attempts to access web-shell-like files, WordPress administration paths, PHP-CGI endpoints, or LangFlow code validation paths. It identifies potential Storm-3168 actor infrastructure through known IOCs or through patterns of high-volume, path-diverse HTTP requests that deviate from typical noise, helping to distinguish targeted probing from common internet background scanning.
Detects a precursor pattern identified as JADEPUFFER, where a failed 'ListKeys' operation (indicating an attempt to discover or access keys for a non-existent storage account) is immediately followed by a burst of destructive delete operations on critical cloud resources (e.g., storage, databases, key vaults) by the same actor.
Detects a precursor pattern identified as JADEPUFFER, where a failed 'ListKeys' operation (indicating an attempt to discover or access keys for a non-existent storage account) is immediately followed by a burst of destructive delete operations on critical cloud resources (e.g., storage, databases, key vaults) by the same actor.
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