Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects PowerShell processes spawned by common managed file transfer (MFT) or web service processes (such as Serv-U, GoAnywhere, MOVEit, Cleo, Tomcat, etc.) performing remote system discovery or ingress tool transfer activities.
Hunts for sqlservr.exe spawning command shells or system utilities, a pattern consistent with xp_cmdshell abuse. It also flags later steps from a public intrusion write-up: certutil decoding, SAM, SYSTEM or SECURITY hive saves and local account or group changes.
Results are grouped per device and day and ranked by stage count. Rows can also appear without a SQL parent when two later stages occur on the same device and day.
Triage: Some jobs use xp_cmdshell legitimately. Review the command line and the account. Hunting query, not an alert.
Limitations: Activity inside the SQL process with no child process is not visible. Renamed tools, obfuscation and privilege escalation tools are not covered. Needs Defender for Endpoint on the SQL servers.
Results are grouped per device and day and ranked by stage count. Rows can also appear without a SQL parent when two later stages occur on the same device and day.
Triage: Some jobs use xp_cmdshell legitimately. Review the command line and the account. Hunting query, not an alert.
Limitations: Activity inside the SQL process with no child process is not visible. Renamed tools, obfuscation and privilege escalation tools are not covered. Needs Defender for Endpoint on the SQL servers.
Detects inbound external connections on TCP port 541 (FGFM/FMG-Access protocol) correlated with the creation of .tm archives on the same device, or connections from known malicious IP addresses communicating over TCP 541.
Sweeps file, process and image-load telemetry for known Kimsuky (APT-C-55) malware MD5 hashes. Exact hash matches carry very low false-positive risk.
Detects the usage of binaries such as 'net', 'sc' or 'powershell' in order to stop, pause, disable or delete critical or important Windows services such as AV, Backup, etc. As seen being used in some ransomware scripts
Detects the sequential relationship of data staging using tools like WinRAR and subsequent exfiltration using tools like Rclone, WinSCP, or FileZilla on a single host within a 24-hour window.
Detects the execution of Linux encryptors or binaries via the Windows Subsystem for Linux (WSL), utilizing tools like wsl.exe, wslhost.exe, or bash.exe with execution arguments or referencing ELF files, mount paths, and permission modifications.
Detects Play-style lateral movement via Group Policy: an executable (.exe/.dll) written to a SYSVOL/GPO path by the same non-machine account that modified a GPO in the same 30-minute window. Attackers use this to push ransomware or Cobalt Strike/SystemBC payloads domain-wide.
Detects HTTP requests to a Cloudflare Workers subdomain
(*.workers.dev) targeting the /token/v1/{UID} signaling endpoint, originating
from a headless Chrome user agent. Chaos ransomware's msaRAT offloads all C2
signaling to the browser via CDP-injected JavaScript, performing WebRTC SDP
Offer/Answer exchange through this trusted developer platform to evade domain
reputation blocking.
(*.workers.dev) targeting the /token/v1/{UID} signaling endpoint, originating
from a headless Chrome user agent. Chaos ransomware's msaRAT offloads all C2
signaling to the browser via CDP-injected JavaScript, performing WebRTC SDP
Offer/Answer exchange through this trusted developer platform to evade domain
reputation blocking.
Detects curl.exe writing an MSI package into the ProgramData
directory. Chaos ransomware stages a trojanized installer this way, fetching
update_ms.msi from an attacker-controlled host over plain HTTP on port 443 so
the traffic reads as TLS to port-based inspection. The match is on the
behaviour rather than on that filename: curl is a signed in-box binary and has
no legitimate reason to drop an installer package into ProgramData.
directory. Chaos ransomware stages a trojanized installer this way, fetching
update_ms.msi from an attacker-controlled host over plain HTTP on port 443 so
the traffic reads as TLS to port-based inspection. The match is on the
behaviour rather than on that filename: curl is a signed in-box binary and has
no legitimate reason to drop an installer package into ProgramData.
Detects execution of the XMRig Monero cryptominer or a miner
launched with XMRig-specific pool and tuning arguments. In the AhsayCBS
exploitation campaign attackers dropped XMRig onto compromised backup
servers to hijack CPU resources for Monero mining, severely degrading
server performance. Detection keys on XMRig binary names and the mining
command-line grammar (stratum pool URLs, donate-level and thread-hint flags).
launched with XMRig-specific pool and tuning arguments. In the AhsayCBS
exploitation campaign attackers dropped XMRig onto compromised backup
servers to hijack CPU resources for Monero mining, severely degrading
server performance. Detection keys on XMRig binary names and the mining
command-line grammar (stratum pool URLs, donate-level and thread-hint flags).
Detects creation of a JSP/JSPX/WAR server-side script inside
an AhsayCBS installation or web application directory. In this campaign the
actors exploited critical AhsayCBS vulnerabilities and dropped webshells into
the application web directories to maintain persistent remote access. Legitimate
deployment writes scripts from the AhsayCBS updater, not ad-hoc into web roots.
an AhsayCBS installation or web application directory. In this campaign the
actors exploited critical AhsayCBS vulnerabilities and dropped webshells into
the application web directories to maintain persistent remote access. Legitimate
deployment writes scripts from the AhsayCBS updater, not ad-hoc into web roots.
Detects endpoint execution of specific known brute-force scripts and tools (such as ssh_brute.py, brute3.py, auto_login.py, etc.) using Python or shell interpreters, correlated with a high outbound network connection fan-out (50 or more distinct target IPs) from the same process.
Sweeps Defender XDR telemetry for known NEBULA / KNTRAT indicators (SHA256 hashes, C2 IP, decoy domain and URLs, burner publisher emails). Hash matching is scoped per table (execution hash only in process events), noisy tooling is excluded from command-line matches, network hits are limited to connection events, and results are aggregated per device and IOC.
Detects when the IIS worker process (w3wp.exe) spawns common system and network discovery utilities such as whoami, ipconfig, systeminfo, net, and others, which may indicate web shell activity or post-exploitation discovery.
Detects execution of Defendnot installation via PowerShell one-liner that downloads and executes the Defendnot script from a remote URL.
Defendnot is a hacktool that abuses Microsoft's undocumented WSC API to disable Windows Defender by registering itself as a fake antivirus product.
Defendnot is a hacktool that abuses Microsoft's undocumented WSC API to disable Windows Defender by registering itself as a fake antivirus product.
Detects one user triggering DLP repeatedly in a short window. A single violation is
usually a mistake; a pattern is either someone systematically working around the
control or an attacker testing which channels are permitted before using the one
that is.
Onboarding: TRELLIX-DLP is ingested via Syslog (XML) (Bloo extractor 805).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=threat where sourcename='TRELLIX-DLP'
and action in ('THREAT_DETECTED', 'THREAT_BLOCKED')
| duration 1h
| groupby user, srcip
| select user, srcip, count(*) as cnt
| having cnt > 10
usually a mistake; a pattern is either someone systematically working around the
control or an attacker testing which channels are permitted before using the one
that is.
Onboarding: TRELLIX-DLP is ingested via Syslog (XML) (Bloo extractor 805).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=threat where sourcename='TRELLIX-DLP'
and action in ('THREAT_DETECTED', 'THREAT_BLOCKED')
| duration 1h
| groupby user, srcip
| select user, srcip, count(*) as cnt
| having cnt > 10
Detects repeated network policy access denials. NPS governs RADIUS-based access to
VPN and wireless, so a burst of denials for one identity is credential testing
against the remote access perimeter — often the first move against an organisation
from outside.
Onboarding: MANAGE-ENGINE-ADAUDIT-PLUS is ingested via Syslog (KV) (Bloo extractor 830).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=win-audit where sourcename='MANAGE-ENGINE-ADAUDIT-PLUS'
and action='NPS_USER_DENIED'
| duration 15m
| groupby user, networkpolicyname, reasoncode
| select user, networkpolicyname, reasoncode, count(*) as cnt
| having cnt > 10
VPN and wireless, so a burst of denials for one identity is credential testing
against the remote access perimeter — often the first move against an organisation
from outside.
Onboarding: MANAGE-ENGINE-ADAUDIT-PLUS is ingested via Syslog (KV) (Bloo extractor 830).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=win-audit where sourcename='MANAGE-ENGINE-ADAUDIT-PLUS'
and action='NPS_USER_DENIED'
| duration 15m
| groupby user, networkpolicyname, reasoncode
| select user, networkpolicyname, reasoncode, count(*) as cnt
| having cnt > 10
Detects Kerberos service ticket requests observed in network traffic analysis.
Seeing this on the wire rather than at the domain controller catches harvesting even
where domain controller auditing is incomplete, and it gives the source address
directly rather than requiring correlation.
Onboarding: NTA is ingested via Network Traffic Analysis (Bloo extractor 717).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/integrations
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=nta-connection where sourcename='NTA'
and action='KERBEROS_SERVICE_TICKET_REQUESTED'
| duration 1h
| groupby srcip, dstip
| select srcip, dstip, count(*) as cnt
| having cnt > 20
Seeing this on the wire rather than at the domain controller catches harvesting even
where domain controller auditing is incomplete, and it gives the source address
directly rather than requiring correlation.
Onboarding: NTA is ingested via Network Traffic Analysis (Bloo extractor 717).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/integrations
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=nta-connection where sourcename='NTA'
and action='KERBEROS_SERVICE_TICKET_REQUESTED'
| duration 1h
| groupby srcip, dstip
| select srcip, dstip, count(*) as cnt
| having cnt > 20
Detects modification of user account attributes in Active Directory. Attribute
changes are how durable access is engineered quietly: disabling pre-authentication,
setting a service principal name, or clearing password expiry each weaken an account
without creating a new one for anybody to notice.
Onboarding: MANAGE-ENGINE-ADAUDIT-PLUS is ingested via Syslog (KV) (Bloo extractor 830).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=iam where sourcename='MANAGE-ENGINE-ADAUDIT-PLUS'
and action='USER_ACCOUNT_CHANGED'
| groupby user, targetuser, accountdomain, category, role
changes are how durable access is engineered quietly: disabling pre-authentication,
setting a service principal name, or clearing password expiry each weaken an account
without creating a new one for anybody to notice.
Onboarding: MANAGE-ENGINE-ADAUDIT-PLUS is ingested via Syslog (KV) (Bloo extractor 830).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=iam where sourcename='MANAGE-ENGINE-ADAUDIT-PLUS'
and action='USER_ACCOUNT_CHANGED'
| groupby user, targetuser, accountdomain, category, role
Detects access to directory service objects. Bulk reads of directory objects are how
an attacker maps the domain — users, groups, trusts, service principals — before
deciding what to target. It is read-only activity, which means nothing breaks and
nothing else is likely to alert.
Onboarding: MANAGE-ENGINE-ADAUDIT-PLUS is ingested via Syslog (KV) (Bloo extractor 830).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=win-audit where sourcename='MANAGE-ENGINE-ADAUDIT-PLUS'
and action='DIRECTORY_SERVICE_ACCESSED'
| duration 1h
| groupby user, objectclass, objecttype, domain
an attacker maps the domain — users, groups, trusts, service principals — before
deciding what to target. It is read-only activity, which means nothing breaks and
nothing else is likely to alert.
Onboarding: MANAGE-ENGINE-ADAUDIT-PLUS is ingested via Syslog (KV) (Bloo extractor 830).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=win-audit where sourcename='MANAGE-ENGINE-ADAUDIT-PLUS'
and action='DIRECTORY_SERVICE_ACCESSED'
| duration 1h
| groupby user, objectclass, objecttype, domain
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