Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
7,270 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
3,342
1,086
505
478
472
Contributors
1,824
1,622
874
505
300
Categories
3,031
2,542
1,076
1,049
929
Platforms
39,960
7,270
6,537
3,868
3,651
Products / Services
1,331
1,109
991
658
494
MITRE Techniques
2,271
1,336
1,318
904
885
CVEs
66
65
33
32
28
IDS Classtypes
81
80
56
27
10
IDS Protocols
149
98
6
5
4
Detects outbound HTTP/HTTPS POST requests where the URI, query string, or path contains evidence of sensitive credential material, such as AWS access keys, private key blocks, or common environment variable patterns, indicative of potential credential harvesting and exfiltration to an external destination.
Detects incoming HTTP requests where the 'pagename' parameter contains directory traversal sequences (e.g., '../', '..%2f'). These attempts are typically indicative of automated vulnerability scanning or exploitation attempts targeting WordPress page-template resolution logic, specifically related to CVE-2026-87902.
Detects Node.js processes, such as npm package postinstall hooks, spawning shell commands used for host enumeration. This includes accessing system environment variables, network configurations, and filesystem metadata, a pattern frequently utilized by malicious packages for initial reconnaissance post-installation.
Detects unauthorized outbound network traffic from browser processes to the lookalike domain 'pdf.gusercontent.com'. This domain is associated with a malicious Firefox browser extension, 'PDF Identity Verifier', which is designed to exfiltrate session telemetry and data from Google account sessions.
Detects CARBONATO botnet activity where malicious processes are masquerading as legitimate Linux system components. This includes XMRig mining software running as /usr/sbin/systemd-logind, process arguments attempting to mimic kernel kworker threads, or processes running from directories associated with netd-svc/resolved container images.
Detects evidence of persistence mechanisms targeting Docker environments on Linux systems. The rule identifies suspicious modifications using crontab, systemctl (service creation/start), and chattr (to make files immutable), specifically monitoring for artifacts related to '.docker-network-monitor' and 'docker-network-resolver'. It flags systems where multiple such configuration changes occur within a single day.
Detects an endpoint initiating outbound network connections to three or more distinct LLM provider APIs (DeepSeek, Qwen, Mistral, Gemini) within a short timeframe (15-minute windows). This behavior aligns with the multi-provider voting mechanism used by the CLOSEDQUORUM post-compromise framework to autonomously determine subsequent actions using diverse generative AI models.
Detects malicious interactions with an unauthenticated Docker daemon API, specifically identifying the creation of privileged containers with host bind mounts, the deployment of containers with specific naming conventions for network reconnaissance (netns-probe/net-setup), subsequent container start events, and the use of the Docker exec API to perform host namespace escapes via nsenter.
Detects the execution of the CARBONATO malware watchdog process (.docker-network-monitor) which performs container redeployment operations, indicating an active backdoor and persistent threat attempting to restore its presence within a Docker environment after initial cleanup.
Detects evidence of the CARBONATO post-exploitation pattern, specifically identifying the installation of a Hermes Agent by monitoring the creation of a 'SOUL.md' persona file within a '.hermes' folder, followed by correlated outbound network traffic to a specific LLM gateway or known Vercel proxy infrastructure used for command relay.
Detects anomalous activity associated with the CARBONATO worm, specifically monitoring for unauthorized creation of 'net-setup' containers or pulling 'system/resolved' images via the Docker API port 2375. Additionally, the rule identifies rapid, sequential network scanning behavior targeting the Docker API port across internal IP ranges.
Detects unauthorized access attempts to a Docker Registry API on port 5000. The rule identifies attempts to enumerate the image catalog and extract sensitive environment variable information from configuration blobs, which may contain hardcoded credentials or indicators of compromise.
Detects a specific command and control (C2) communication pattern characteristic of RatHat malware, involving the retrieval of HTML overlay templates followed by the submission of captured form or credential data from the same device within a one-hour window.
Detects unauthorized file creation within the /root/.hermes/loot/ directory and specific path combinations associated with the CARBONATO botnet's Hermes Agent. This activity is indicative of credential harvesting, specifically the exfiltration of AI API keys for various LLM providers.
Detects the execution of the XMRig cryptominer masquerading as the legitimate systemd-logind service. The rule identifies suspicious command-line arguments indicative of mining activity, or instances where systemd-logind is spawned from unauthorized parent processes such as shell interpreters, container engines, or nsenter, which is often characteristic of post-exploitation activity like privileged Docker container escapes.
Detects the CARBONATO botnet using two distinct persistence and evasion techniques: masquerading user-space processes as kernel worker threads by setting command line arguments to '[kworker/u2:0]', or disguising mining binaries as the systemd-logind service. Legitimate kernel threads are spawned by PID 2 and lack an executable path, while the legitimate systemd-logind is expected to be spawned by systemd/init.
Detects the presence of known RatHat Go-based command agents (liblocal-service.so) or frpc reverse-proxy clients (libmedia_codec.so) when staged within temporary directories such as /data/local/tmp on Android devices, often following manual ADB shell interaction.
Detects potential web shell installation via WordPress administrative panels. The rule identifies a WordPress administrator session executing a theme installation request triggered by an external (off-site) referer, followed shortly thereafter by the creation of new PHP files within the WordPress themes directory. This pattern is often indicative of an attacker leveraging a compromised admin session to upload a backdoor.
Detects anomalous patterns associated with potential WordPress comment moderation bypass. The rule identifies suspicious rapid sequences of comment submissions, use of unapproved comment preview endpoints with moderation hashes, or reuse of approved-commenter cookies. These behaviors can be indicative of an attacker attempting to preview or force-render stored XSS payloads to administrators or visitors before the comment has been officially approved.
Detects potential zero-click administrator session hijacking by correlating a logged-in administrator accessing a page containing user-generated content (e.g., comments) followed immediately by a sensitive administrative action (e.g., plugin installation, user creation) within a 5-second window, suggesting automated script execution via an autofocus/onfocus handler triggered by the admin's browser.
Detects malicious software bundles consistent with the Contagious Interview (G1052) threat group's multi-stage infection chain. The rule identifies the presence of multiple malware family identifiers (such as BeaverTail, InvisibleFerret, and others) within the context of npm or VS Code task configuration files, which are commonly used in job-assessment themed social engineering campaigns.
Page 49 of 347