Detections

Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.

40,407 detections

Detects Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) probing attempts where unexpected schemes such as gopher, dict, or file are used within specific validation parameters, targeting internal services like Redis, Adminer, or local files.
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ills3c Intel&Coffee@Ills3C
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
Detections.ai Community
5 days ago
408
The following analytic detects cmd.exe being used to evade defenses with nothing but built-in commands, a pattern frequently seen in ClickFix-style social engineering and malware loader activity.
Adversaries abuse native cmd.exe features such as call combined with variable assignment to assemble commands piece by piece, hiding the real payload from static inspection and string-based detections.
They also chain native utilities such as timeout and del to erase the dropped executable shortly after it has run, which removes evidence and complicates forensic analysis.
Because these techniques need no additional tooling, they let attackers blend into routine command shell activity.
If confirmed malicious, this could indicate a staged loader concealing its intent or cleaning up after execution.
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Splunk Security@SplunkSecurity
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Splunk Security Content
6 days ago
10012
Detects a multi-step process execution chain associated with the BITTER threat group, where ftp.exe with a script argument spawns a command shell, which subsequently executes msiexec.exe to perform a silent install from a WebDAV SSL path.
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
ills3c Intel&Coffee@Ills3C
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
Detections.ai Community
5 days ago
208
Detects instances where the FTP utility (ftp.exe) executes command shells or related utilities (such as cmd.exe) using script files containing escape characters, which is a known behavior of BITTER/PapRAT malware.
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
ills3c Intel&Coffee@Ills3C
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
Detections.ai Community
5 days ago
108
Detects SGTool.exe performing a network download from non-standard Sogou/Tencent hosts followed by dropping components such as libcef.dll, SogouComMgr.exe, or biz_helper.exe into the SogouInput o Components directory, excluding known baseline updates.
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ills3c Intel&Coffee@Ills3C
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
Detections.ai Community
5 days ago
408
Detects offline decryption of FortiGate configuration secrets (using fortipwkey or passwds.txt) followed within 1 day on the same device by the execution of openfortivpn or forticlient using explicit credentials.
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
ills3c Intel&Coffee@Ills3C
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
Detections.ai Community
5 days ago
008
Detects registry value sets that add Windows Defender path exclusions targeting known ScreenConnect installer scripts, staged MSIs, Windows Temp directories, or RelayTrap paths, which are commonly used by threat actors for defense evasion.
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
ills3c Intel&Coffee@Ills3C
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
Detections.ai Community
5 days ago
309
Detects potential lateral movement using PsExec, identifying the installation and execution of the PsExec service (PsExecService.exe) alongside the creation of the PSEXEC named pipe on the same device within a short time window. Uses a 14-day baseline to surface new device and account pairs seen for the first time while excluding allowlisted IT admin accounts and jump hosts.
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
ills3c Intel&Coffee@Ills3C
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
Detections.ai Community
5 days ago
209
Detects a post-exploitation reconnaissance sequence executed by an update script (spawned via cmd.exe) involving registry queries for Windows product name/build and net session admin testing on the same device within a short timeframe.
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
ills3c Intel&Coffee@Ills3C
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
Detections.ai Community
5 days ago
209
Detects the creation of a file with the ".dll" extension that has the name of a System DLL in uncommon or unsuspected locations. (Outisde of "System32", "SysWOW64", etc.).
It is highly recommended to perform an initial baseline before using this rule in production.
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
SigmaHQ
4 days ago
007
Detects cases in which an ISO files is opend within an archiver like 7Zip or Winrar, which is a sign of phishing as threat actors put small ISO files in archives as email attachments to bypass certain filters and protective measures (mark of web)
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
SigmaHQ
4 days ago
007
Detects an inline hook of ntdll RtlPcToFileHeader paired with RtlAddFunctionTable registration in the same process within 10 minutes, which BubbleLoader uses so reflectively loaded payloads get structured exception handling support. Baselined with a 30-day process-hash prevalence check (rare binaries only).
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
ills3c Intel&Coffee@Ills3C
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
Detections.ai Community
4 days ago
006
The following analytic detects Windows system binaries executed with command line arguments that contain superscript or modifier letter characters (for example the Unicode characters used in "/ᵖᵃckᵃge") in place of regular ASCII letters.
Windows command line parsers such as msiexec.exe normalize these look-alike characters, so the argument still works while evading string-based detections.
This technique has been observed in ClickFix-style campaigns where victims paste a command into the Run dialog that silently installs a remote MSI package with msiexec.exe.
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
Splunk Security@SplunkSecurity
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
Splunk Security Content
6 days ago
1011
Detects non-system processes initiating outbound SMB (ports 445/139) or WebDAV-style connections (ports 80/443/8080 with DavWWWRoot) to public IP addresses, correlated with NTLM logon events to external hosts, indicative of forced NTLM authentication attempts.
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
ills3c Intel&Coffee@Ills3C
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
Detections.ai Community
5 days ago
308
Detects the creation of an 'Intel_Log' directory within AppData or Application Data followed by network communication from the same process to Microsoft cloud infrastructure endpoints (login.microsoftonline.com, graph.microsoft.com, sharepoint.com) within a one-hour window, potentially indicating GraphDoor malware activity.
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
ills3c Intel&Coffee@Ills3C
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
Detections.ai Community
5 days ago
508
Detects network share access events (Event ID 5140) used as the base event for a velocity correlation. Alert when one source IpAddress touches more than 20 distinct ShareName values within 5 minutes (medium environment; use >10 small / >40 large). Correlation rule below defines the count.
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
Siddhant Mishra@Siddhant
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
Bloo SpecterForce
3 days ago
104
Detects a single account requesting Kerberos TGS tickets for a high number
of distinct service principal names within a short window. Standard
Kerberoasting detections fire on individual RC4-encrypted ticket requests,
but autonomous AI agents operating at machine speed produce a distinctive
velocity pattern: dozens of TGS requests in seconds, systematically walking
the SPN list from prior LDAP enumeration.

ARTEX worker agents feed discovered SPNs from their exploration graph
directly into Kerberoasting tooling (Rubeus, Impacket) without the pause
a human operator takes to review LDAP output. The compressed time between
SPN discovery and TGS request is the signal.

Lower the threshold for sensitive environments; most legitimate accounts
rarely request more than 2-3 distinct SPNs in any 10-minute window.

BQL (Bloo Query Language):

stream=authentication where action='KERBEROS_SERVICE_TICKET_REQUESTED'
and TicketEncryptionType='0x17'
and not ServiceName like '%$'
| groupby User, ServiceName
| having count > 10
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Siddhant Mishra@Siddhant
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
Bloo SpecterForce
3 days ago
004
Detects Windows Security event log clearing (Event ID 1102) occurring on
multiple hosts within a short window, indicating a coordinated defense
evasion operation. Autonomous AI agents performing post-exploitation
cleanup sweep log clearing across all compromised hosts in parallel —
producing a temporal cluster of 1102 events that is operationally
impossible for a human to execute manually at the same speed.

ARTEX planner agents schedule cleanup tasks after objective completion.
Worker agents clear logs on each compromised host simultaneously. While
a single log clear may be administrative, multiple hosts clearing logs
within seconds of each other — especially outside maintenance windows —
is a strong indicator of autonomous adversary activity.

Forward Windows Security Event 1102 (audit log cleared) and 4688/Sysmon
1 (wevtutil.exe execution) to your SIEM for centralized correlation.

BQL (Bloo Query Language):

stream=win-audit where event_id='1102'
| groupby user, system
| having count > 2
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Siddhant Mishra@Siddhant
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
Bloo SpecterForce
3 days ago
104
Detects a sequence where a webshell or tunnel tool (such as Neo-reGeorg, reGeorg, or suo5) is deployed or executed, followed by credential-dumping or lateral movement tooling (such as evil-winrm, dploot, donpapi, or NetExec with SAM/LSA extraction) on the same device within a 7-day window.
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ills3c Intel&Coffee@Ills3C
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
Detections.ai Community
5 days ago
007
Detects the execution of the restic backup utility interacting with S3 storage (unbaselined) combined with correlation to file events involving the 'AutomBackupCZ.zip' archive on the same device within a 1-day window.
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
ills3c Intel&Coffee@Ills3C
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
Detections.ai Community
5 days ago
007
Detects the creation of forged Kerberos credential cache (.ccache) files written by a process whose command line contains ticket-forging arguments (such as ticketer, -nthash, -aesKey, or -domain-sid). It also correlates whether the forged ticket is subsequently used on the same device within a short window.
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ills3c Intel&Coffee@Ills3C
GlassDiceBearhttps://www.dicebear.comhttps://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/„Glass” (https://www.dicebear.com) by „DiceBear”, licensed under „CC0 1.0” (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
Detections.ai Community
5 days ago
107
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