Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
7,270 detections
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Detects endpoint network connections and correlates multi-stage communications associated with the ClickFix browser cache smuggling campaign, including initial payload retrieval and secondary stage/C2 communication across devices.
Detects DNS requests to major generative AI and Large Language Model API endpoints (such as OpenAI, Anthropic, Google Gemini, Mistral, Groq, DeepSeek, and others) initiated by processes other than standard web browsers (e.g., chrome, msedge, firefox, safari). This behavior may indicate unauthorized data exfiltration, shadow AI usage, or automated tooling/scripts interacting with LLM APIs.
Detects suspicious Ghostscript execution patterns where Python spawns Ghostscript with dangerous I/O pipe arguments or disabled SAFER mode, or where Ghostscript spawns shell interpreters.
Detects indicators of compromise including Bash-based reverse shells communicating with a C2 domain on port 7070, outbound network connections from web server and shell processes to the same C2 infrastructure, and the dropping of known suspicious plugin archive files (akismetv4-plugin.zip, Hlx.zip, template.zip).
Detects when a shell process (such as sh, bash, dash, cmd.exe, or powershell.exe) is spawned by a metrics, logging, or authentication management service shortly after the service accepts an inbound network connection, potentially approximating exploitation of an internal management service.
Detects script-driven (curl, wget, python) outbound connections to
AI/LLM API endpoints. The campaign uses legitimate AI platform APIs as covert
command, control, and exfiltration channels, blending malicious traffic with
approved web services to evade network-based detection.
AI/LLM API endpoints. The campaign uses legitimate AI platform APIs as covert
command, control, and exfiltration channels, blending malicious traffic with
approved web services to evade network-based detection.
Detects the Tensorlake npm 0.5.144 compromise (Shai-Hulud worm via preinstall). Includes a baseline query to identify the affected package/version across Defender inventory, file, network, device and process events, plus preinstall download/obfuscated-exec behaviour. Results are summarized per device/account.
Detects the execution of PaperCut reverse SOCKS5 bridge kit operator-side scripts (such as admin_bridge.py, live_reverse_socks5.py, start_socks.sh) or the creation of related Java bridge class artifacts.
Detects malicious behaviors involving the Chisel tunneling tool, including reverse SOCKS proxy connections with TLS verification skipped, cron-based persistence referencing watchdog scripts in hidden /var/tmp directories, and associated tool staging activities.
Detects network connections, process command-line executions, and email URL info matching known APT28 (Swallowtail, HOOKEDGE, LegionRelay) indicators of compromise, including specific IP addresses and GUIDs.
Detects suspicious post-exploitation activities, reconnaissance, and command execution originating from web server and PHP lineage processes, indicating potential webshell activity or compromised web applications.
Detects behavioral indicators of an SSH or autossh reverse tunnel (-R) executed with no remote command (-N) and host-key checking disabled, combined with network connections to a known command and control IP address.
Detects persistence mechanisms associated with the trojanized anthropic.claude-code loader, including macOS LaunchAgent creation (com.apple.sysmond), Linux cron @reboot persistence using hidden config files (.smt), Windows scheduled tasks (SysMon SYSTEM task), and SSH authorized keys manipulation.
Detects PHP out-of-memory fatal errors (Allowed memory size exhausted) on hosts where memory_limit=-1 has been configured as mitigation. On these hosts, memory is unlimited, so this error indicates potential configuration tampering or an attack.
Detects web server processes (apache2, httpd) spawning a Unix shell (sh, dash, bash) which subsequently executes curl, wget, or php to perform an external HTTP fetch or download. This behavior is commonly associated with PHP or web application post-exploitation callbacks (webshells).
Detects multiple distinct source IPs sending forged 'pitboss PPE' authentication failure messages to NetScaler authentication endpoints within a short timeframe, associated with a fetch-based FreeBSD payload download (kw2-freebsd-x64-s11).
Detects command execution patterns on NetScaler appliances involving the extraction of system details (id, uname, hostname, nsrelease) and writing or echoing them into HTML files within NetScaler web directories, indicative of web shell installation or staging.
Detects administrative access to the DLP console from an unfamiliar address. Console
access permits policy change, violation review and exception approval — everything
needed to make data loss invisible, in one place.
Onboarding: TRELLIX-DLP is ingested via Syslog (XML) (Bloo extractor 805).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=authentication where sourcename='TRELLIX-DLP' and action='LOGIN'
| groupby user, srcip, authproto
access permits policy change, violation review and exception approval — everything
needed to make data loss invisible, in one place.
Onboarding: TRELLIX-DLP is ingested via Syslog (XML) (Bloo extractor 805).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=authentication where sourcename='TRELLIX-DLP' and action='LOGIN'
| groupby user, srcip, authproto
Detects GitLab backend processes (such as puma, sidekiq, rails, ruby, bundle) spawning shells, scripting interpreters, or network tools with suspicious command-line parameters, potentially indicating post-exploitation activity or vulnerability exploitation.
Detects a VS Code-family editor or extension host process running 'git config --global user.email' and, within one minute from the same parent process, a curl public-IP lookup (ifconfig.me / api.ipify.org), the host-profiling step of the trojanized anthropic.claude-code loader.
Detects a VS Code-family editor or extension host modifying ~/.ssh/authorized_keys, or shell commands appending the svc-telemetry label / embedded Ed25519 key, as used by the trojanized anthropic.claude-code extension.
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